In the Name of Allah,
the All- beneficent, the All- merciful

قال الله تعالى:

﴿إِنَّمَا يُرِيدُ ٱللَّهُ لِيُذۡهِبَ عَنكُمُ ٱلرِّجۡسَ أَهۡلَ ٱلۡبَيۡتِ وَيُطَهِّرَكُمۡ تَطۡهِيرًا﴾

Indeed Allah desires to repel all impurity from you, O People of the Household, and purify you with a thorough purification.

(Surat al- Ahzab 33:33).

Prophetic traditions mentioned in both in Sunni and Shi'ah authoritative reference books of *hadith* and *tafsir* (exegesis of the Qur'an) have confirmed that this holy verse was revealed to exclusively refer to the People of the Cloak [*ahl al- kisa'*], viz. Muhammad, 'Ali, Faṭimah, al- Ḥasan, and al- Ḥusayn ('a) as the *Ahl al- Bayt* (People of the Household). For instance, refer to the following references: *Sunni:* Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241 AH), *al- Musnad*, 1:231; 4:107; 6:292, 304; *Sahih Muslim* (d. 261 AH), 7:130; Al- Tirmidhi (d. 279 AH), *Sunan*, 5:361 et al.; Al- Dulabi (d. 310 AH), *Al- Dhuriyyah al- Ṭahirah al- Nabawiyyah*, p. 108; Al- Nasa'i (d. 303 AH), *Al- Sunan al- Kubra'*, 5:108; 113; Al- Ḥakim al- Nayshaburi (d. 405 AH), *Al- Mustadrak 'ala' s- Sahihayn*, 2:416, 3:133, 146- 147; Al- Zarkashi (d. 794 AH), *Al- Burhan*, p. 197; Ibn Hajar al- Asqalani (d. 852 AH), *Fath al- Bari Sharh Sahih al- Bukhari*, 7:104.

Shi'ah: Al- Kulayni (d. 328 AH), *Usul al- Kafi*, 1:287; Ibn Babawayh (d. 329 AH), *Al- Imamah wa' t- Tabsirah*, p. 47, *hadith* 29; Al- Maghribi (d. 363 AH), *Da'a'im al- Islam*, pp. 35, 37; Al- Saduq (d. 381 AH), *Al- Khisal*, pp. 403, 550; Al- Ṭusi (d. 460 AH), *Al- Amali*, *hadith* 438, 482, 783.

For more details, refer to the exegesis of the holy verse recorded in the following books of *tafsir*: Al- Jassas (d. 370 AH), *Ahkam al- Qur'an*; Al- Wahidi (d. 468 AH), *Asbab al- Nuzul*; Ibn al- Jawzi (d. 597 AH), *Zad al- Masir*; Al- Qurṭubi (d. 671 AH), *Al- Jami' Li- Ahkam al- Qur'an*; Ibn Kathir (d. 774 AH), *Tafsir*; Al- Tha'labi (d. 825 AH), *Tafsir*; Al- Ṭabari (d. 875 AH), *Tafsir*; Al- Suyuṭi (d. 911 AH), *Al- Durr al- Manthur*; Al- Shawkani (d. 1250 AH), *Fath al- Qadir*; Al- 'Ayyashi (d. 320 AH), *Tafsir*; Al- Qummi (d. 329 AH), *Tafsir*; Furt al- Kufi (d. 352 AH), *Tafsir* at the margin of the exegesis of *Surat al- Nisa'* verse 59; Al- Ṭabarsi (d. 560 AH), *Majma' al- Bayan*, as well as many other sources.

The Islamic Revolution of Iran Grounds and Ramifications

قال رسول الله ﷺ:

"إني تاركٌ فيكُمُ الثَقلين: كتاب الله، وعترتي أهلَ بيتي، ما إن تمسكتُم بهما لن تضلوا أبداً وأنَّهُما لَن يَفترقا حتّى يردا عَليَّ الحوضَ"

The Messenger of Allah (s) said: "Verily, I am leaving among you two precious things [thaqalayn]: The Book of Allah and my progeny ['itrati], the members of my Household [Ahl al-Bayt]. If you hold fast to them, you shall never go astray. These two will never separate from each other until they meet me at the Pond [hawḍ] (of Kawthar)."

Some references:

- Al-Ḥakim an-Nayshaburi, Al-Mustadrak 'ala's- Sahihayn (Beirut), vol. 3, pp. 109- 110, 148, 533
- Muslim, As- Sahih, (English translation), book 31, hadiths 5920- 3.
- At-Tirmidhi, As- Sahih, vol. 5, pp. 621-2, hadiths 3786, 3788; vol. 2, p. 219.
- An- Nasa'i, Khasa'is 'Ali ibn Abi Ṭalib, hadith 79.
- Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal, Al- Musnad, vol. 3, pp. 14, 17, 26; vol. 3, pp. 26, 59; vol. 4, p. 371; vol. 5, pp. 181-182, 189- 190.
- Ibn al-'Athir, Jami' al-Usul, vol. 1, p. 277.
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- Nasir ad- Din al- Albani, Silsilat al- Ahadith as- Sahihah (Kuwait: Ad- Dar as- Salafiyyah), vol. 4, pp. 355- 358.

The Islamic Revolution of Iran
Grounds and Ramifications

Author
Manuchehr Muhammadi

Translated by:
Mohsen Dehqani

Cultural Affairs Department Ahl al-Bayt ('a) World Assembly

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Author: Dr. Manuchehr Muhammadi
Project supervisor: Translation Unit, Cultural Affairs Department, the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) World Assembly (ABWA)
Translator: Mohsen Dehqani
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www.ahl- ul- bayt.org
info@ahl- ul- bayt.org

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Preface of The Ahl al-Bayt ('a) World Assembly

The invaluable legacy of the Household [Ahl al-Bayt] of the Prophet (may peace be upon them all), as preserved by their followers, is a comprehensive school of thought that embraces all branches of Islamic knowledge. This school has produced many brilliant scholars who have drawn inspiration from this rich and pure resource. It has provided the Muslim ummah with many scholars whom, following in the footsteps of Imams of the Prophet's Household ('a), have done their best to clear up the doubts raised by various creeds and currents within and without Muslim society and to answer their questions. Throughout the past centuries, they have given well- reasoned answers and clarifications concerning these questions and doubts.

To meet the responsibilities assigned to it, the Ahl al-Bayt World Assembly (ABWA) has embarked on a defense of the sanctity of the Islamic message and its verities, often obscured by the partisans of various sects and creeds as well as by currents hostile to Islam. The Assembly follows in the footsteps of the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) and the disciples of their school of thought in its readiness to confront these challenges and tries to be on the frontline in consonance with the demands of every age.

The arguments contained in the works of the scholars belonging to the School of the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) are of unique significance. That is because they are based on genuine scholarship and appeal to reason, and avoid prejudice and bias. These arguments address scholars and thinkers in a manner that appeals to healthy minds and wholesome human nature.

To assist the seekers of truth, the Ahl al-Bayt World Assembly has endeavored to present a new phase of these arguments contained in the studies and translations of the works of contemporary Shi'ah writers and those who have embraced this sublime school of thought through divine blessing.

The Assembly is also engaged in editing and publishing valuable works by leading Shi'ah scholars of earlier ages to assist the seekers of the truth in discovering the truths which the School of the Prophet's Household ('a) has offered to the entire world.

The Ahl al-Bayt World Assembly looks forward to benefit from the opinions of the readers and their suggestions and constructive criticism in this area.

We also invite scholars, translators and other institutions to assist us in propagating the genuine Islamic teachings as preached by the Prophet Muhammad (S).

We beseech God, the Most High, to accept our humble efforts and to enable us to enhance them under the auspices of Imam al-Mahdi, His vicegerent on the earth (may Allah expedite his advent).

We express our gratitude to Dr. Manuchehr Muhammadi for writing the book, and to Mohsen Dehqani for translating it, as well to all our honorable colleagues in accomplishing this task especially the dear ones in the Translation Office for undertaking this responsibility. ✍

Cultural Affairs Department
The Ahl al-Bayt ('a) World Assembly

Foreword

The Department of Teaching Professionals Affairs reproduces sources and compiles teaching material, using different approaches for each of the major courses on Islam, in order to facilitate the growth and development of these courses. This policy makes it possible to benefit from different analyses and views on topics related to these courses.

The proposed teaching material for this department was published in 1998, and, so far, two new editions have been made available to interested readers. Another text, entitled, "Islamic Revolution: Grounds and Ramifications", has been organized by the 'Anjumane Maarife Islami Iran', and written by Dr. Manuchehr Muhammadi.

This compilation analyses the Islamic Revolution using the comparative model. By presenting a theoretical framework, appropriate for analyzing revolutions, it aims to present a general and clear picture of the reasons for its occurrence, the causes and factors responsible for its victory and the trend of changes two decades after the Revolution.

By placing the two opposing powers; namely, the political system ruling over Iran before the Revolution and the societal power shaped from within the society, this book succeeds in analyzing the attributes of both powers, and the factors responsible for the failure of the political power in relation to the societal power. The victory of societal power was the result of three elements: popular participation, incomparable leadership of His Eminence Imam Khomeini, and the dynamic doctrine of Islam.

In the second section of the book, the trend of changes and incidents after the Islamic Revolution have been analyzed at three levels: national, regional and global, in two parts; namely, incidents and changes of the first decade during the leadership of His Eminence Imam Khomeini, and changes related to the second decade.

While comparing the Islamic Revolution with the great global revolutions, such as the French and Russian revolutions, and by relying on historical evidence, the third section of the book highlights the unique features and outstanding characteristics of this Revolution.

In the final section**,** it enumerates the pathology of the Islamic Revolution and the afflictions that it may suffer from, as a result of their growth.

The management of research and tutorial texts of the department thanks the Anjumane Maarife Islami Iran, the respected author of the book, the Islamic Revolution group of the department and all colleagues involved in compiling this research and expresses its readiness to respond to the views and proposals of esteemed teachers and beloved students concerning this book.

Representative Body of the Supreme Leadership in Universities
Department of Teaching Professionals Affairs and Islamic Education Courses
Management Department of Compilation and Research of Tutorial Texts
Summer, 2001.

Author's Preface

I am thankful to Almighty God for granting me the opportunity of serving the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic for twenty years. I do not have the talent for writing nor a history of writing. It was the fascination with the great Islamic Revolution that gave me the courage and audacity in 1985 to embark on writing something that I believed in and had perceived from this great Revolution and publish these beliefs in a book entitled, 'An Analysis of the Islamic Revolution."

The extraordinary reception accorded to the book, that has been reprinted more than eight times, encouraged the writer to once again take to writing and continue with my mission. This resulted in the publishing of four more books[1] on this subject.

It was after some years that some friends advised me to review the book, "An Analyses of the Islamic Revolution" and complement it by adding an analysis of the events and incidents of the Islamic Revolution's second decade. Finally, friends in the "Anjumane Maarife Islami Iran" persuaded me to undertake this for the benefit of the student community. Despite other commitments, I considered it essential to write this book, which is now available to you.

With regard to the contents of the book and its style, it continues to be based on analyses of events and occurrences and, as far as possible, abstains from describing events. The book is offered with a new title, "The Islamic Revolution: Grounds and Ramifications."

While thanking and expressing my gratitude to all my friends who encouraged me in this endeavor, I call upon them to do me a favor by

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1. These books are as follows: "The Islamic Revolution in comparison with the French and Russian Revolutions"; "Principles of Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic"; "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic (principles and issues)" and "A Review of the Foreign Policy during the Pahlavi Era."

studying this book critically, and informing me of its weaknesses and shortcomings.

I implore Almighty God to grant the people of Iran the strength to safeguard this Divine– People's Revolution.

Dr. Manuchehr Muhammadi
August 2001.

Introduction

The word ‘revolution’, at first glance, is associated with fundamental change in the political regime of a country. A ‘revolution’ is a big ‘no’ to all things one is accustomed to; to a government that establishes and executes laws and punishes the violators. Suddenly, all the rights are taken away from this institution and all its near and distant affiliates are removed from the political and social scene. A regime, in charge of all tools of political, societal and cultural power, controlling all centers of change, is suddenly, toppled and replaced by another regime. What is the source of such massive power? How and where was this power previously stored?

Apart from actual examples of “revolution’ that we know of in history, a theoretical examination of this phenomenon can be an attractive subject worthy of reflection.

Naturally, no political system governing society is without its opponent. For sure, there are persons on the fringes of every society who do not approve either with the style of administration or the administration’s executives or the basis of legitimacy and rightfulness of the regime. However, in a society removed from revolutionary circumstances, perceptions and methods of opposition, forces are so dispersed and divided, that their falling in line with the aim and objective of ‘toppling the system’, seems to be often overdue and almost impossible. Therefore, another interesting subject would be to find out what factor unites opposition forces to revolt in unison against the ruling political system and topple it.

A sensitive and astonishing point of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the year 1979 was that, this unifying factor and main catalyst of the Revolution had its origins not only in ideological movements, but in its religion, a monotheistic divine religion.[1] Religion, in the majority

1. Thousands of demonstrators with bare hands would parade in front of well-armed soldiers in the streets of Tehran and chant: "Islam, Islam!” “Brother in the military, why do you commit fratricide!” “Men in the

of communities of that time, lacked the political and social impact, and at most, was limited to a spiritual, inward and individual love for the Creator.

This book shall examine this new approach to the religion of Islam and the reasons for its taking shape and developing in the modern society of Iran.

On the other hand, conflict among various factions, chaos, rallies, riots, protest strikes, communiqués, announcements and declarations, and covert distribution of pamphlets in the various strata of society, intermittently, come onto the stage and cry out their demands, preferences, and special attributes into the ears of history and generations. With these details, it is not fair to deprive the respected reader from viewing these incredible scenes – which indeed is part of history.

However, how can those students, who are studying in fields other than political science, and not directly involved with social-political issues in the course of their education, gain admission to this essential and delicate field of study? This text attempts to present fundamental concepts pertaining to the Islamic Revolution to such students.

Observing current academic and scientific methods, efforts have been made not to transgress the bounds of essential and common issues on this subject; and topics organized to be useful for the student not familiar with complex expressions and theories of political and social sciences.

The importance of studying the Islamic Revolution for the young generation and knowledge-seeking Iranian is not simply because this Revolution has taken place in Iran and brought about changes and transformation in the system governing the country. Rather, this Revolution possesses exclusive features that distinguish it from other revolutions and socio-political upheavals. Despite the passage of

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military join us for the preservation of the Quran!" "Khomeini! Khomeini! You are the heir of (Imam) Hussein (AS)!" I recognized several students in the crowd who were considered leftists by our standards, but they had written their demands in bold letters on the placards and were holding them high in the air. "Michel Fokker, "What Dreams are the Iranians Nurturing?" (Page 28.),

more than two decades from its victory, it continues to remain a rarity of human history. In the following lines we mention some of its distinguishing features:

1. This Revolution triumphed and the nation brought the monarchical regime down without resorting to the use of weapons. They defeated a regime that relied on the most powerful armed forces of the region backed, almost without exception, by all the superpowers of the world, including America, the former Soviet Union, European governments and even the governments in the region.

2. The ramifications and aftershocks of the Revolution reached Washington and the presidential palace of America such that it tied America's presidential election charter to itself. The contemporary president of the United States, Jimmy Carter saw his reelection depend on the changes in Iran and ultimately, because of his failure to control the post-Revolution changes in Iran, was badly defeated. These aftershocks continued during the terms of office of the presidents who succeeded him, including Ronald Reagan, and brought successive defeats and humiliation.

3. The method of struggle in this Revolution was different from other revolutions of the world. It included unarmed demonstrations, with a spirit of selflessness and martyrdom, and unleashed general strikes in government organizations and military garrisons. For a prolonged period, people set aside norms of work, welfare and comfort, norms of consumption and more important than that, norms of preservation of life, to achieve their objective. Towards this end, people, of their own free will and determination, put a brake on the economy, and consciously accepted the financial losses of this decision for protracted years.

4. A Third World nation that, in its international relations, was always under the influence of changes outside its borders, suddenly demolished the rules of the game. At a time when the roots of all global incidents would lead to one of the two superpowers of the time, America or the Soviet Union, this nation, free of all those international games, revolted and created wonders that were unprecedented, not only in its own past history but in the history of

other nations as well. Most importantly, it totally disproved the predictions of the western and eastern thinkers.[1]

5. Despite the extraordinary influence the major intelligence organizations of the world, including the CIA, Mossad of Israel, the British Intelligence Service and KGB of the former Soviet Union, had in Iran, none of them were able to predict the occurrence and victory of the Revolution. Some of them even thought that the Shah would remain on the seat of power for the next ten years.[2]

6. It is interesting to note that the Revolution attained victory without the intervention of constituent and organized factions, and only by relying on the movement of the masses. The atmosphere of freedom after the downfall of the Shah's regime was so pervasive, that unlike-minded and anti-revolution elements were able to penetrate the depths of the newly-established system, and get the first president elected to that office. They even got the chance to martyr the topmost officials

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1. In a report to the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party, the secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while expressing his concerns, stated, "At present, our southern borders are faced with a direct threat…in these recent times, Islamic laws have been established in some of the countries of the east with great fervor…Revival of Islam may perhaps be the most important political event of the twentieth century. Muslim-inhabited regions of the Soviet Union that have been extremely peaceful and calm so far, share common borders with Iran and Afghanistan, and it is possible that religious fervor and excitement of the Iranian Revolution crosses the frontiers. (World Media Journal, vol. 5, quoted from 'Figaro' journal, January 16, 1982).

2. The fire outbreak in Rex Cinema in Abadan, on August 1978, aroused the intense hatred of the people for the Shah, but, America was still unconcerned about the situation in Iran. Five intelligence organizations of that country: (Intelligence Organization, Defense Department, (DIA), Group of Defense Assistance Advisors, Department of Research and Information of the Foreign Office, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Organization), were monitoring and controlling events in Iran. The CIA had, in the beginning of August 1978 (five months prior to the occurrence of the Revolution), reached the conclusion that Iran was neither in a revolutionary position nor even a pre-revolutionary one. On September 28, 1978, the intelligence organization of the Defense Department predicted, "The Shah shall actively remain as the monarch for the next ten years." See: D. Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs.

of the Revolution, such as President Raja'i and Prime Minister Bahunar, by cowardly methods. They launched internal and external wars, imposed economic sanctions and sieges on the country, and engineered military coups. Yet they were unable to create a disruption or deviation in the essence of the Revolution and thwart it.

7. This Revolution threw the tradition of international order into disarray after the Second World War, and brought the two superpowers, perceived to be at unceasing hostility with one another, together. They not only adopted a common stance during the formative stage of the Revolution, but, after that as well; especially during Iraq's aggression on Iran. They supported Iraq and did not withhold any sort of assistance to it. This trend continued until the disintegration of the bipolar order. At a time when Americans attempted to impose the unipolar order on the world, the opposition and noncompliance of the Islamic Revolution caused the collapse and nullification of this new global order, before its formation.[1]

8. This Revolution had a significant impact on the liberation movements as well. Movements, leaning on socialist and nationalist values, had given hope and drawn the attention of the oppressed people of the region to themselves. They lost their appeal and their leaders lost their credibility among the masses as well. It tarnished the image of individuals such as Yasser Arafat, and created a colluding stooge-image of American imperialism.

9. Barely two years had passed since the victory of the Revolution, when its sparks in Lebanon created mobile bombs out of the innocent and deprived youth of South Lebanon. It created such a hell for Israeli occupying forces and its foreign patrons, such as Britain, France, Italy, and most important, America, that all of them were forced to flee from the scene without signing any kind of agreement, and

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1. On this subject Henry Kissinger says, "The Middle East was confronted with four forms that crystallized into one: one, the Shiite radicalism; second, Islamic fundamentalism; third, Iran's Revolution, and fourth, Soviet imperialism… vis-à-vis countries of the Persian Gulf. The direct danger posed by the Revolution of Iran eclipses the long term threat of the Soviet Union…Iran always arouses the nightmares of the Arabs." (Transcript from World Media Journal,, vol. 30, from Al-Dastoor, British edition, dated July 5, 1982.)

concede defeat and helplessness in their encounter with the martyrdom-seeking youth.[1]

10. This Revolution also had an effect on the political and geographical words and terms. It discredited many of them and replaced them with new terms. No longer did terms such as, *Middle East, Arab world, first, second and third world,* hold on to their definitions and denote existing relations in the global order. Nowadays, by the blessing of the Islamic Revolution new terms, such as *world of Islam, great global civilizations, world of arrogance and world of the underprivileged* have found meaning and connotation.

This book shall attempt to present an appropriate theoretical framework, which examines and analyzes the phenomenon of the Islamic Revolution from various angles, to identify the grounds for its appearance and occurrence, and the consequent ramifications in the course of two decades following its victory.

1. About the Islamic Revolution, Moshe Dayan, Israel's foreign minister in Begin's government, had this to say: "An earthquake has occurred in the region and I have advised Begin that an issue far more important than Camp David has happened, which we must deal with." Subsequently a conference for examining the dangers posed by the Islamic Revolution of Iran for the West and Israel was organized by the Moshe Dayan Institute in Tel Aviv with the participation of university professors from America and Israel.

First Part:
General scope, sphere and field of study

Chapter One:
Definition of Revolution

Chapter Two:
Three Stages of Revolution

Chapter One:
Definition of Revolution

- Doctrine of Opposition

- Doctrine of principality of performance

Before examining the Islamic Revolution, we should come to an agreed definition of Revolution in order to know exactly what phenomenon we are studying.

There are two ways of defining *revolution*:

1. Examine historical and researched samples and extract their similarities, and obtain a definition that covers all their connotations.

2. Apart from the traditional term *revolution*, we offer a definition of revolution in its desired circumstance, and endeavor to find the various connotations of it in the actual world.

Although the second method appears to be more scientific and logical, its application in the sphere of socio-political issues seems to be impossible. This is because the subject of this science is the examination of collective human behavior, for which, arriving at a rational, causal, and effectual relationship is extremely belated.

On the other hand, there are a few connotations of revolution in the political science tradition, and therefore the use of the first method is easy. These examples include the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, the Nicaraguan Revolution and the Islamic Revolution of Iran. However, there are other phenomena as well, that often implicitly associate with the word *revolution*, but in their essence and content, have a fundamental difference with revolution. Some connotations of these phenomena are as follows:

1. In the year 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan armed forces, arrested Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister, and a number of high-ranking officials of the country, on charges of

financial corruption and sent them to prison. Subsequently, martial law was declared and the reins of the country passed into the hands of General Musharraf. He called himself the 'Chief Executive' of the government of Pakistan and subsequently, the President. Tanks and armored units were stationed in every corner of important cities, all military forces were put on alert and the country became quiet. This is an example of a conventional and recognized form of military coup – a phenomenon that is sometimes confused with *revolution*, but is removed from its conceptual sphere. With a little reflection on the events that take place in the course of a military coup, one can quite well understand its difference from the phenomenon of *revolution*. A military coup arises from a series of conspiratorial activities outside the norm and law, by means of a group of military personnel against the ruling system, in which people have no sort of role, whatsoever.

2. Thousands of people rallied for a peaceful demonstration in Belgrade, the capital city of Yugoslavia, to oppose Milosevic, the country's President. They carried placards and chanted slogans against Milosevic, demanding that he step aside from power. Milosevic lived in an armored palace at an unknown location and avoided appearing in public. His last weapon for calming the popular protests was the promise to hold early elections. After sometime, the elections were held, and Milosevic's opponent, Costouneska, came to power.

From a review of this example, which is demonstrative of a revolt, we infer that in a revolt, rebellion and a wave of discontent on the scene brings about changes in the management of the political institutions, but it does not lead to transformation and fundamental change in them. In a revolt, only the essence of change is important, not the system replacing it.

An optimistic society thinks that, with certain amendments and reforms of conditions governing society, it can secure its demands through normal means in the system, with the least amount of damage. This transformation is called a reformist movement realized with changes within the ruling system, while preserving it. For example, the Constitutionality Movement, called a revolution, was in fact a reformist movement that transformed the authoritarian system

into a conditional monarchy, preserving the Qajar monarchy and earning the consent of the king, Muzaffaruddin Shah.

Colonialism is an extremely ugly phenomenon of modern history. In this phenomenon, European governments, through military and political control over other countries in the continents of Africa, Asia and America, plundered and looted their abundant resources ostensibly, in the name of progress and development and left behind a shameful blot on Europe's recent history. At the time of expanding territories under its control, Britain boasted that the sun never set over the territories under the domination of that small island.

The second-half of the twentieth century witnessed popular uprisings in the colonial territories against foreign domination. The people of these territories succeeded in liberating themselves, one after the other, from under the yoke of European powers. Mahatma Gandhi's agitation in India against domination by the British, and the uprising of the people of Algeria against the French, are examples of these independence-seeking movements. In this popular movement, only freedom from foreign domination is important, and changes in the value and cultural system influenced by colonialism, is seldom a major consideration. Therefore, in classification of socio-political changes, it is more appropriate to attribute the term 'freedom-fighting movements' to them, rather than the term *revolution*.

Despite all the differences of opinion that appear in the definition of the word *revolution*, one point that appears to be certain is that it is defined as 'a popular movement for bringing about rapid and fundamental change in dominant values and beliefs, political institutions, social structures, leadership, administrative methods and activities of a society, which is accompanied by violence.' Therefore, in order to examine the contents of the meaning of revolution, it is necessary to pay attention to the origin, process, direction, and factors motivating these changes, and place them like pieces of a puzzle next to each other to obtain a complete and comprehensive sketch of the unique characteristics of a revolution.

A revolution is a socio-political phenomenon and not only a subject to be studied by political scientists; but the focus of sociologists as well. The most important pillar of sociology, a science that examines the special characteristics of society and the process of its changes, is

recognition, and analyses of the social behavior of human beings. Therefore, it can be said that, until the mindset of individuals is not transformed, their social behavior does not change, and without change in social behavior, no revolution can take place in society. In other words, change in the moral virtues of society and current values at all levels of society, special attributes of societal heroes, and in general, convictions governing entire society, result in the birth of new desires within society. Because political leaders and executives of society do not practice these new ideals and values, this contrast results in the instability of society.

Perhaps examining the special attributes of heroes that the society admires is a suitable method for understanding what's going on in society, what values are appreciated, and what ideals can direct changes in society. In every society there are yardsticks that individuals, by referring to them, make themselves appear acceptable to the people and attain popularity. Examining these yardsticks is a suitable way of understanding the type of values and convictions that a society is committed to. Transforming these yardsticks will signify a transformation of society's internal values and beliefs.[1]

Those ideas leave an impact on societal foundations and are either converted into stimulant values in public movements, or presented to all of society's individuals in the form of an ideological system, which gains acceptance. Therefore, change in the values dominating society that result in emergence of new motivations throw the stability and equilibrium of the routine social system into disarray, and place society on the verge of instability, indiscipline, and disruption in the political establishment. In this situation, it is likely that the ruling establishment shows two types of reactions:

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1. For instance, in French society, before its revolution, the yardstick for superiority and virtue was affiliation to aristocratic families. However, with the formation and expansion of the wave of the revolution, other yardsticks, such as academic studies, education and academic works became important within society. The emergence of such yardsticks is a sign of development of ideas that focus on the individual values of human beings. These ideas, as we know of were the foundation pillars of the principal slogans of the French Revolution. These slogans were as follows: equality, fraternity and freedom.

1. Accept the new demands of society, and by implementing reforms in its own structure, or granting certain benefits to the protestors; regain control over them and restore social order.[1]

2. Totally negate newly-emerging demands and resort to coercion and use of force in order to control their opponents.

The first situation is, indeed, a reined-in revolution and thereafter, society once again gets back on track to continue with its movement. However, in the second situation society gradually gets closer to a revolutionary action. Efforts of the ruling regime to control demands leads to loss of power and credibility among the masses, more than ever before.

No longer are the words and claims of the regime accepted and trusted by the people. Any statement it presents is treated as an attempt to deceive and lie, and receives ridicule and derision from the people. The regime loses its legitimacy to rule over society and exercise political power. People no longer recognize the management of such a system as the ruling system, and see no reason to obey the laws and institutions of power. Such circumstances make the system enter the crisis-of-legitimacy stage:

- The revolution must lead to change in the governing political system

- In the formation of the revolution, the values and beliefs governing society must be transformed

These two constituents of revolution interact with one another. The values of society change because the existing reality does not gain the consent of the majority in society and there is a feeling of the need to change the ruling political system. On the other hand, it is the masses that have put forward new objectives and ideals, and are the locomotive of the revolution. Any change of the ruling political establishment without the participation of the people is not reckoned as revolution.

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1. The White Revolution of the 1960's in Iran was one such instance of 'anti-revolutions'. A program for responding to demands that were forecasted to be the engine for demonstrations and rallies against the regime in the future. The promise of agrarian reforms was a bribe that the Pahlavi regime paid in advance in order to ensure its survival for a few more years.

However, when we carry the discussion from the confines of theory to the actual scene of human society, the flow of events is not as clear anymore. The ruling system desires to stabilize the status quo and constantly seeks to defend its legitimacy and legality. Therefore, it strives to exploit every situation to limit the influence of ideas opposed to its own, and suppress opposition, that has entered the scene of battle against it to overthrow it. Thus, the more the societal involvement in the movements, the greater the fury of suppression by the system, leading to the final stages of the revolution, which inevitably means street riots. The society is transformed into a scene of battle between two belligerent fronts -people and the ruling administration – facing each other.

Crises of legitimacy and the united front of people opposing the ruling administration drags the society to a dead end from which there is no way out except engaging in physical confrontation. This situation cannot continue for long. Society needs to get out of this abnormal situation as soon as possible and resume the trend of its normal living. Therefore, the recurrence of events gains momentum.

Experts on revolution differ on the causes that bring society to the verge of a revolution. Herein, we will review these theories briefly. There are two specific and differing theories on revolution.

Doctrine of contrast

The doctrine of contrast is best exemplified by Marx's theory of revolution, which defines revolution as an unavoidable and positive phenomenon and the most important factor of evolution and change of society.

Its essence is that the means of production shape the foundation of society and its changes. Transformation in the means of production results in the emergence of a new class. The conflict between this class and the ruling classes causes a revolution. For instance, transformation in the means of production from agricultural to industrial results in the birth of a bourgeoisie (middle) class. The conflict between them causes a bourgeoisie revolution, which itself results in the birth of the labor class, and again, from the conflict between the proletariat (labor class) and bourgeoisie (middle class), a social revolution takes place.

Social peace is an exceptional case of history and the basis of evolution in any society is revolution, and its basis is class differences and disputes. [1]

Doctrine of principality of output

Emile Durkheim's theories form the basis of this school of thought. Durkheim believes that society is not a quantitative collection of individuals. Rather, it is a unique qualitative reality, the singular mind of whose individuals, in normal circumstances, is dominated by social customs and traditions. The division of labor among individuals and various groups builds an orderly society in which all the diverse forces perform their task and duty correctly and in equilibrium with one another. However, division of labor results in solidarity only in normal circumstances. Abnormal or pathological division of labor results in the coming together of incoherent forces and, as a result, creates indiscipline and disequilibrium.

When circumstances make a society melancholic, confused and angry, it pressurizes its members to vent their anger by carrying out certain meaningful actions. Society imposes on them the duty of weeping, lamenting, or inflicting harm on themselves and others, because this collective demonstration and the moral communication that it expresses, gives them back the strength and capability that circumstances tried to take away from them. In this manner it assists them until it gains stability.

Durkheim's theories are generally concerned with social change rather than revolutions. He is concerned with the impact of

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1. The root meaning of class dispute must be found in Aristotle's "Politics". In this book the equivalent of the term 'revolution' is 'stassis' meaning engaging in sedition, and is used in three contexts:
- unlawful and violent change in the ruling group
- change in the constitution of the government
- change in the form of government or regime

The main difference between Aristotle's viewpoint and that of Marx lies in that the historical sociology apparatus of Marx considers revolution as a mandatory and categorical transformation, and the coordinated fruit of events that the history of every society has stored within itself, whereas Aristotle does not hold such an opinion.

industrialization on societal harmony. However, other intellectuals have taken advantage of Durkheim's study model and founded the doctrine of principality of output.

The most important theories of revolution based on the doctrine of principality of output are the following:

1. Chalmers Johnson: According to this writer a revolution is essentially the result of disharmony between the environment and values in the social system. The balance of the social system is disrupted as a result of the impact of four sources, namely:

A) Change in the values with foreign origins;

B) Change in values with domestic origins;

C) Change in environment with foreign origins such as the impact of the Industrial Revolution on various types of societies;

D) Change in environment with domestic origins such as growth of population and or emergence of new factions.

2. Samuel Huntington: In the book entitled, "Political Education in Societies undergoing Change", he presents a theory about the causes of revolutions. According to him, a revolution occurs in societies that witness the increase in political mobilization of groups that were removed from the political scene, and lack the necessary political institutions to attract popular participation. In other words, societies in which 'political renovation' has occurred but political development has still not taken place.

3. Max Weber: By drawing inspiration from the meaning of *tradition* mentioned in Durkheim's theory, he initially recounts three sources of political legitimacy and strength, namely: tradition, law (rationality) and charisma.

Traditions are the base of a balanced social situation. Two disruptive forces can unbalance the situation, namely, rationality and charisma. Rationality can be a first class revolutionary power against tradition and usually, it has been so.

Rationality, at first, changes the social environment and thereafter, brings about a transformation in the global perspective of the people. However, in contrast, charisma initially transforms the internal

thinking of the individual. Charisma is the attribute of an individual who possesses supernatural, superhuman or at least exceptional and rare qualities of character. These special characteristics summon the people to join a movement and its leadership. The charismatic power is removed from established structures, hierarchy, and rationality, and itself guarantees innovation and a missionary-like revolution.

Weber adds that a charismatic leader appears during times of natural, economic, ethical, religious, spiritual pressure and anxiety.

Individualism:

Based on this point of view, the initial conditions of a revolution essentially pertain to the individual's perception of a situation. The subject under review here is neither the interests of the social stratum or groups, nor structure of governmental power or societal cohesion; rather, it is the physical or psychological situation of the individual.

The main assumption of individualism and psychological theories based on the doctrine of principality of output is that human beings have basic needs; and if these needs are repressed or remain unfulfilled, they lead to feelings of violence and aggression. The principal element of political violence and revolutionary behavior is this aggression. Let us take a look at some examples of theoreticians of this group:

Sorokin: He considered repression of instincts as the cause of revolutionary feelings.

Tokoville: In contrast with Sorokin, he believed that improvement in living conditions of the individual and increase in his expectations are the main factors of political discontentment and quarrel. He regarded the main reason of the French Revolution as the increasing welfare of the years prior to the revolution in that country. He said:

"It is not right that revolutions always occur at a time when the situations take a turn for the worst. On the contrary, revolutions occur when a people who, for protracted periods, went along with a tyrannical regime without protest, suddenly discover that the regime had lessened its pressures and consequently they revolt against it."

Some more conservative viewpoints about revolutions:

Edmond Burke has the most interesting views on the subject. In his opinion, society is established not on the basis of rationality, rather, on the basis of ancient traditions and prejudices; and a revolution that strives to eliminate these prejudices deals a huge blow to the body of society. A person can only bring about small changes in society and the attempts of revolutionaries to coordinate society with isolationist ideals are disastrous. These attempts only lead to elimination of 'the common source and capital of nations and eras.' This capital has not been earned accidentally from established freedoms, rights, customs and traditions; rather, it is the consequence of rationalization and analyses of mankind's history and is considered to be the backbone of individual living. Burke states:

"One must be troubled that the work of any individual be delegated solely to the personal source of his intellect, because in our opinion, that reserve is extremely small in any human being. Instead, it is better that human beings take advantage of the reserve and capital of the intellect of all nations and eras."

It is necessary that we now examine and analyze three distinctive stages in the development of revolutions.

The first stage ensures that the circumstances of a society are favorably disposed and have the potential for the development and actualization of a revolution.

The second stage confirms the factors that lead to the occurrence and victory of a revolution.

The third stage actualizes the factors that will ensure the survival or failure of a revolution in their trail.

Chapter Two:
Three Stages of a Revolution

- First Statement: Socio-Political Conditions before the Revolution

- Second Statement: Shaping of Social Power and beginning of the Revolution

- Third Statement: Period after the victory of the Revolution

- Fourth Statement: Afflictions of the Islamic Revolution

First Statement:
Socio-Political Conditions before the Revolution

The conditions of a society inclined to revolution must be considered. Ideally, a revolution can successfully emanate when bipolar conditions are prevailing in society – conditions in which social groups separate from the governing political system and offer resistance against it. Such a society is faced with dual power. At first, the legitimacy and integrity of the political power becomes questionable, and then, following the despair and pessimism of the people for that system, political power gradually becomes impotent. On the other hand, societal forces that gain sufficient confidence in their own capabilities turn away from the political system and come face-to-face with the governing system. Then, the split between political and social power reaches the point where continuation of such a situation in society becomes intolerable. Eric Hofer writes:

"Although normally, the perception exists that revolutions occur in order to create profound changes in society, in fact it is such changes that pave the way for revolutions."

According to him the revolutionary atmosphere is the product of difficulties that are created at the time of achieving radical changes.[1] Until the time that the values of a society are compatible with its environmental realities, the society is immune to revolution. When society is in a state of equilibrium, it accepts certain influences from its members and from outside; and the sum of these two compels society to coordinate the division of labor with its values. Therefore, the conflict between political power and social power is the main cause of revolutionary conflicts. Political power arising from the normal procedure is the relationship between givers of orders and takers of orders. Political power is a collection of official, administrative institutions that take charge of running the affairs of society, by possessing the tools of authority (i.e. military, economic and legal tools). Social power implies the strength of spiritual influence over individuals with shared values, and attracts the obedience and allegiance of society towards itself.

Therefore, 'societal power' arises from the social standing of individuals based on their reputation that grants legitimacy to authority and allegiance. Societal power depends totally on the credibility of individuals and on deference to the societal leadership. 'Political power' can enjoy such a status as well if societal groups are convinced that the political system is capable of securing their minimum demands and preserving the conventional societal relationships.

Presence of power in society brings, in its wake, struggle for power; and this type of power struggle can get mingled with violence. The value system settles some of these conflicts by agreeing on which posts individuals must occupy and in what manner. By devising regulations for competition over power, it tries to place the rest of the disagreements in a normal situation. If individuals who are in possession of political power rise to fight against the value system of society, individuals in the seats of societal power might use their spiritual influence to combat and punish them; and should this conflict not be amenable to peace, it is likely to lead to revolt and revolution.

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1. Chalmers Johnson: Revolutionary Change (theoretical examination of phenomenon of revolution) p. 46.

Existence of shared values greatly reduces the chances of conflict between societal groups and the political power.

Therefore, the most important factor that enhances revolutionary conditions and makes socio-political changes inevitable is the contradiction between the values governing the political system and those governing society. The American writer, Wilbur Moore, regards this as the gap between ideals of society and existing realities,[1] because social values are the consciously shared motives of a society, essential for its survival and consolidation.

Shared values include issues such as religious, mythological and societal beliefs, moral systems, national mores and traditions, supernatural creatures and fantasies, ideals, and many other beliefs and convictions.

Values are necessary for organizing and dividing work in society, because they eliminate the need to use force for appointment of individuals to specific positions. The value system determines the role of individuals in society and grants legitimacy to it. Whenever the regime uses the power that was previously accepted as legitimate in a crisis, it is regarded to be legitimate and accepted.

The most important characteristic of societal conditions before a revolution is the loss of credibility and popularity of the political system in society. In the words of Hana Arnett, "At a time when the credibility of society's political board is in place and complete, there is no chance for any revolution to succeed whatsoever."[2]

When the credibility and confidence in a regime decreases to such an extent that it seems futile to use political power, and the authority of individuals in charge of administration depends only on coercion; and in addition, peaceful and orderly transformation appears to be useful in changing the situation, bringing about change and transformation shall become inevitable. In such circumstances, the use of coercion is the last resort for ensuring the survival of unpopular political power. The number of security forces is increased and the use of force delays the time of change. However, a social system reliant on armed force

1. Wilbert Moore: Social Change, Prentice Hall, New York, 1974. P. 19.
2. Chalmers, Johnson: Ibid, P. 46.

is not a lasting one and is not based on shared values. In such circumstances, occurrence of violent changes is inevitable.

The social-values theory totally rejects the belief that societal cooperation can be obtained by means of force. Such a theory is based on the assumption that, in an organized system, application of force is limited to cases in which there is no general agreement on values, and even in such circumstances, force is taken into consideration only as a last resort.

One can name several economic, political, social, religious and cultural factors as the chief causes of revolutionary conditions.

Feudalism, heavy taxation, inflation, beyond the ability to purchase goods and services, needed by the underprivileged, are some of them. Poverty of the vast social strata, corruption in the ruling class, repression and withdrawal of individual and social freedom, disregard for the values governing society, military and diplomatic defeats, hegemony and direct or indirect influence of foreigners, and drought, can be considered among the factors of revolutionary circumstances.

Contrary to the opinion of Marx and his disciples, economic deprivation is not necessarily the principal cause of revolutionary conditions. Revolutions are not necessarily born in societies that are undergoing a declining trend in their economic conditions. On the contrary, in many societies including that of Iran, a revolution has taken place when there was a kind of relative prosperity in place, and poverty and indigence was not the cause of the revolution. This does not mean that in the pre-revolution period, no group in these societies had grievances of an essentially economic nature. In every society, two principal groups express their discontent because of economic motives. The first set and of lesser importance, is the truly and apparently underprivileged group of society. Undoubtedly, in all revolutionary societies, there is a group of underprivileged people, whose release from certain pressures and deprivations is an extremely important and special characteristic of a revolution. However, this group is not always the chief factor of a revolution and even the Marxists have confessed to this.

Trotsky comments on this:

"In fact, the existence of deprivations is not solely sufficient for igniting a rebellion; because if it was so, the masses would always be in (a state of) revolution."[1]

That which is of greater importance for economic motives of revolution is the existence of the feeling among groups, that the status quo forestalls and restricts their economic growth and activities.

Therefore, economic grievances do not usually arise from serious economic anxieties, but are more often the result of the feeling that people's legitimate rights are being violated by the political system. This factor must be regarded as one of the first signs of revolution. These feelings of deprivation are communicated by means of publicity and social leadership, with strikes and processions.

On the other hand, one must bear in mind the fact that the unfair distribution of economic facilities can be one of the causes of a revolution. A comparison between the privileges for the aristocratic ruling class, their living in palaces, wearing opulent attire, driving expensive cars, hosting lavish banquets that entail huge costs and expenses, and the vast majority of the common people, who live in poverty and deprivation and are rendered incapable of providing for their daily needs, can be a great eye-opener.

Classification of the causes of revolutionary situations can lead us to conclude that revolution generally takes place against monarchical regimes dominated by absolute power, or against the aristocratic class that holds the reins of government in its hands. Such regimes have the following characteristics:

1. The regime manages itself on a daily basis of increasing political pressure and repression;

2. A limited minority - in most cases only one person - possesses all the powers of decision-making and execution in all political, economic and social fields.

3. Corruption in general, especially financial corruption and bribery is widespread and the common practice among the ruling faction.

4. Such regimes mostly rely on the rich and capitalist class.

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1. Crane Brinton, Opcit, P. 13.

5. In order to preserve their rule and ensure its survival, the rulers rely on a powerful and loyal military force.

6. Because the regimes do not enjoy popular support, they submit to foreign pressure and lean on their support.

7. They control mass media and guide public opinion towards the wishes of the regime through extensive propaganda.

8. They are indifferent to public welfare. As a result, the deprived masses increasingly become poorer while the ruling minority and their dependents enjoy greater welfare.

9. They are indifferent and unconcerned about the values governing society, including religious beliefs, traditions and customs of the majority.

Such regimes facilitate a potentially suitable environment for a revolution. For a short term, these regimes succeed in controlling society by means of threats, intimidation, chicanery, assassination, torture and police force. But, a time comes, when they cannot solve the problems, and prepares the ground for a revolutionary movement.

The conditions are as follows:

1. The regimes are faced with various impediments and especially chronic financial difficulties.

2. The regimes become incapable of attracting skilled individuals from among the intellectuals and cream of society to run the affairs of society.

3. They are incapable of solving complex political, economic and social problems.

4. Political power of weak leadership loses its confidence and potency, and simultaneously, the level of tolerance of societal groups is also reduced.

5. The regimes lose their popularity and legitimacy in the eyes of the majority.

6. The regimes move away more than before from society, even those, that stand to benefit from the regimes, gradually distance themselves from them.

It is in such circumstances that political institutions lose their competency for administration of society and are replaced by unofficial social institutions.

For any revolution two series of causes are necessary even though these causes are not directly related to them.

The first is related to the pressures that are created by means of the unbalanced political system. As a result, the political system tries to use force in order to maintain the status quo.

The second cause is related to the ability of the political leaders to bring about rapid and decisive changes in the conditions of societal disunity. If they are not capable of delivering the necessary changes, society will be pushed further towards disequilibrium.

Lucien Pai says:

"Any regime that is faced with a violent protest of the people is probably unsound; because relatively large armed groups get the chance to emerge in society only when the majority of the people are dissatisfied with the regime."[1]

Incompetence of the ruling class is more often the result of their detachment from the rest of society. The ruling class, because of corruption, blocking normal ways of social progress and placing undeserving relatives in top positions, becomes detached from the rest of society.

Whenever sources and factors of change make an impact on a social system, one of the two circumstances is definite: either coordination of diverse elements shall be successful in preserving the state of equilibrium despite new pressures, or the existing system's compatibility shall not have the needed capability to create the necessary coordination.

Factors that decide whether compatibility shall be restored, or a revolution takes place, depends on the foresight of the leaders of the political system, including their ability to understand whether social equilibrium has been disrupted or not. As long as the political leaders

1. Chalmers Johnson: Ibid, P. 98.

do not take essential steps, the social system shall fluctuate in a relative lack of equilibrium.

In case the political power is unwilling, or unable to show the necessary flexibility vis-à-vis the changes demanded by social groups, a clash between both shall become inevitable. This clash shall certainly take on a violent turn. Although engaging in violence in order to bring about change is, in essence, forbidden and discomforting, but it becomes inevitable in case the political system is not willing to comply with society's demands in a peaceful manner.

According to the words of Jose Ortega, "Mankind has always engaged in violence. At times, use of violence has only been regarded as a crime, while, at times, violence has become a tool in the hands of those who have applied all other means for the defense of their legitimate rights and have been unsuccessful. Perhaps, at times, humankind reveals its inherent desires through acts of violence, which is unfortunate. On the other hand, such behavior in society reveals the existence of a reason that has been subjected to excessive pressure." In his opinion, use of force is the only effective weapon in revolutionary conditions.[1]

To start a revolution implies accepting violence to change the system of society. A revolution is not anything other than putting into action a violent plan that can radically transform a social system. The greater the number of social groups that believe in actively changing the situation, the lesser the degree of violence and the need for armed confrontation.

When leaders of a revolution are not able to enlist the support of huge masses of society to realize their objectives and are confronted with the indifference of the masses, they are inevitably compelled to resort to the following methods:

- Audacious Guerilla and partisan warfare

- Tactical coalition with the other social groups

- Adjustment of their own objectives and yardsticks to bring them closer to the rest of the groups

1. Ibid, P. 28.

The use of violence is not the sole means to defeat political power; rather, other factors exist that accelerate changes in favor of social power.

Accelerating factors are those that expose the impotency of the political system and facilitate the revolution. In other words, accelerating factors always attack the monopoly of political power over the armed forces and encourage organized revolutionary groups to revolt against the despised system by taking up arms.

One can name three accelerating factors as follows:

1. Factors that directly impact the armed forces and cause them to disobey commands of the political power.

2. Factors that boost the morale of revolutionary forces giving them the confidence that they can overcome the armed forces of the regime.

3. Successful operations of a revolutionary group against the political power that boosts their morale and increases their activities.

Among other accelerating factors, one can point to the disintegration of military force as a result of defeats in foreign wars, mutiny among military personnel or differences amongst the government elites, psychological and ideological factors. For instance, belief and conviction that the government forces do not have the capability to counter the military attacks of the revolutionaries may be the result of belief in supernatural assistance and strengthen the spirit of martyrdom, hope in foreign assistance at the time when the intention of the revolutionaries become clear, or the conviction that the masses are invincible.

Yet another type of accelerating factor is of a strategic nature. The revolutionaries devise and implement a plan to defeat the ruling armed forces that are in a strong position and offer resistance in the face of change. Revolutionary strategies can in any case be different and their quality be dependent upon the number of individuals, the efficiency of the armed forces and similarly, on the analytical power and initiative of the revolutionaries.

One can name the following as being among the revolutionary strategies:

- Effective infiltration and penetration in the government apparatus by revolutionary factions in order to damage the political system from within

- Guerilla uprisings by numerically small, but armed groups

- General uprisings of the people and movements of the masses through strikes, demonstrations and engaging in negative struggle to cripple the bureaucratic machinery of the political power.

Second Statement:
Shaping Social Power and starting the Revolution

One must bear in mind that public discontent of the political power and bipolarization of society does not necessarily lead to revolution. In such circumstances, any type of socio-political change, such as a military coup, mutiny, reform, as well as revolution can take place. The progress of a revolutionary movement and its victory depend on the presence of three essential pillars: the people, the leadership and the ideology.

The preliminary stage of any revolution is the participation of the public in the form of a continual explosion inside society. In case participation does not enjoy the benefit of a strong leadership, which is not able to guide the movement in a desired manner or generate the required motion to establish the necessary socio-political institutions, one cannot be optimistic of the revolution's victory. Indeed, the defeat or victory of any revolution is determined at this stage and brings in its wake subsequent resistance or deviation and subsequent survival or decline.

A complete revolution comprises of the following actions:

- Destruction of existing political institutions accompanied with violence and momentum

- Formation of new social groups and ensuring their participation in political activities

- Establishing new political institutions

The internal disintegration of the ruling regime alone shall not bring about subsequent revolutionary changes.

Normally, a revolution does not commence with an attack by a new force; rather, it commences with the sudden emergence of all active and inactive forces of society that have lost their faith in the ruling system and question its legitimacy.

In such circumstances, progress or lack of progress of the revolution depends on the groups that participate in the revolution. With the downfall of the regime, a power vacuum shall be created, and if the most powerful groups or their coalition fills it, the victory of the revolution will be assured. Usually, new social forces attempt to quickly take control of the government and its tools of power - the military; and by controlling the factors of power, they try to prevent a movement by other forces, and thus avert the emergence of an anarchistic situation. If none of the social groups, due to differences among themselves, are able to take charge of the affairs, the wrangling among the factions will cause more factions to enter the arena of power and in the end, any group that gains the highest acceptance shall control the reins of administration.

In theory, any social class that has not been absorbed in the political system is itself a potential revolution in the sense that, by nature, any social group must pass through short or long stages in order to reach the stage of revolutionary readiness. In such circumstances the speed of the revolution is tied to the composition and number of groups that have arisen from the bedrock of society and are participating in the revolution. Considering that the collapse of any previous regime is always accompanied with protests, demonstrations and riots, the new social power must be able to guide the demonstrations and give them direction. When confronted with the different stages of the revolution, each group promotes the development of its own aims from the political system. In this process, three social groups emerge: radical revolutionaries, the moderates and the conservatives.

Radical revolutionaries that are mostly the youth and generally underprivileged strata of society, form the main nucleus of the revolutionary movement. Their principal objective is promotion of the revolution and maximum participation of the people in it, for which they offer tactical and ideological reasons. They increase their power by bringing about maximum participation of groups of people

in social power and governance, and furnish the ground for a new political system.

By dragging all social groups on to the political scene, the radical forces add to the momentum of the revolutionary movement. Considering that in Third world countries, rural inhabitants form a huge section of the social forces, in addition to the urban dwellers, the radicals also attempt to set the rural inhabitants into motion. This movement is initiated by various means and motivations. Economic and social motives can be effective in cases of the poorer strata and rural inhabitants, while in other instances, shared religious and nationalistic motives play a more important role.

The moderates do not agree with harsh revolutionary movements and ouster. They are neither closely affiliated with the political system nor do they oppose it by adopting harsh and violent methods. These groups normally belong to the middle and affluent urban and educated classes; and from the point of view of age group too, they usually belong to the mature and middle-aged section. In comparison with the radical groups, this section, on coming to power, aims to choose a middle-of-the-line path and in essence seeks to establish a type of legitimate liberal and so-called democratic government. They justify this step as ensuring an immediate and necessary legal discipline and aim to achieve it.[1] The conservatives oppose any change. They are divided into two groups: The first group depends on the ruling political system, so they consider any kind of change to be detrimental to their interests; while the other group, due to the lack of clarity of the replacing system, are horrified by any change and prefer maintaining the status quo to any ambiguous changes.

As was mentioned previously, a revolution is potentially realized when the split between political power and social power becomes intolerable. With severance of hope in the political system and confidence of social groups, the society shall be driven towards a revolutionary situation and gradually, more social groups shall

1. Such as the young Turks who sought to uphold the constitution of 1876 or even Fidel Castro who during the brief period of his moderation declared the upholding of the constitution of 1940 as his objective; or the liberals of Iran who defended the restitution of the constitution of 1906.

withdraw their loyalty from the political power and be drawn towards social power. It is in these conditions that the revolution's leadership assumes an extraordinarily important and amazing role. Here are some of the characteristics of a revolution's leader:[1]

1. The founder of the rational ideology of the revolution

2. Commander-in-chief of the revolution's operations

3. Head of the government after the revolution's victory

The intellectual guide of the revolution is neither elected nor appointed. The people believe in him, having accepted his opinions and responded to his call, because of the primacy of his message and authenticity of his ideas. The individuals look up to the rational leader of the revolution as one does to the founder of a scientific theory or philosophical or religious doctrine. Their knowledge of his doctrine and its legitimacy, acceptance of his scientific, moral, and pragmatic values, results in a faith that subsequently brings in its wake, a kind of devotion, commitment, solidarity and self-sacrifice.

The other face of the leader is that of a commander of the revolution who plans the manner of actualizing the quick victory of the revolution based on his revolutionary ideology. Such a leader normally possesses a valuable and creditable social platform. He is usually a person who possesses genius, talent and a unique vision. The social conditions have made him disgusted with the ruling political system. By earning sufficient acceptability among the revolutionary factions, he has attained the position of leadership; and from then on, plays a prominent role in the trend of events and influences them.

The face of leadership is a powerful one that appears on the scene after the face of the ideologue and before that of the architect. With his capability and intelligence, he invigorates the words of the doctrine; and with his thought and ideas, gives form to the revolutionary movements. The revolution's ideology is bound with his existence; a faith and belief that if the revolution's ideology were a 'textbook', it becomes 'a human being' in him. He becomes the "vocal book of the revolution", the 'human image' of a thought, the

1. Dr. Shariati, The Muslim Ummah and Imamate, P. 571 – 579.

'manifest reality' of that mental spirituality and 'their destiny'. He determines the strategy of the revolution, the tactics of combat, mobilization of forces, taking up of stances and the pragmatic slogans. He undertakes a precise evaluation of forces, grounds, facilities, conditions and the factions involved. Likewise, he rescues the revolution from deadlocks, perils and dangers; and with his unique talent and practical genius takes over the helm of affairs of the revolutionary society. By identifying the factors of defeat and tolerating setbacks, wins over his society and the historical destiny of his nation; and finally, overcomes adversity and guides the revolution towards victory. As a result, it is he, who transforms the potential of the revolution into action, gives people the right of government and grants the right of sovereignty to the political visage of the post-revolution regime.

The appointment of the head of government or architect of the post-revolution regime depends on the particular political system that undertakes a revolution. This means that it is possible for the head of government to be appointed by the leader of the revolution or a committee or a revolutionary party in power, or perhaps, be proposed by them and then elected by the people. We must not forget that here, neither does one speak of what must be nor even of what normally is; rather, that which is possible to establish, is important. In this stage, the leader of the revolution must aim to realize the ideal society, which he has promised the people. He must lay the foundations of the system that was promoted in the revolution era - that is capable of reviving the essential values of society that were disregarded and consolidate its power on the pillars of social acceptance and legitimacy.

These three faces of leadership can be found in a single person. This is the ideal and most successful type of leadership of any revolution. The leader must possess extraordinarily exceptional traits in order to be able to shut out the competitors from the arena and attain widespread acceptance among most of the social groups. If not available, a leadership council, meaning a group of leaders, will take over the duties and responsibilities of the three faces of leadership. Growth, knowledge and maturity, discipline, attention to detail and management, together with awareness of a nation, makes the task of the leader easier. Level of ideological knowledge attains excellence at

the same rate as development of the struggle, maneuverings for political power, victories and failures.

Of the most important tasks of leadership is acknowledgement of mistakes, referring to the past in order to learn from it and ensuring fresh conditions for victory. Every tactical defeat must be regarded as an opportunity to discuss an issue on a public scale. Every explanation concerning an issue increases the awareness of the people. One can understand from it that the foundation of the uprising is rationality, and the uprising has entered the stage of maturity and development.

In spite of the view that informing the people of the 'how and why' can be dangerous and cause a rift in the ranks of society, the leader must remain faithful to the principle that was the guiding light of the national struggle to achieve freedom. If a leader does not immediately fight this view, then undoubtedly, within a short time it will facilitate the collapse of the movement.[1]

The masses need to learn that in a revolution, the impossible becomes possible. The human being not only has the capability of undertaking a revolution; he also has rights and duties. Men who demand change sow the seeds of revolution; and they do the job with the help of an experienced gardener. The gardeners do not work against the forces of nature. They work on favorable soil and climate; and the fruit of their labor is the fruit of cooperation between man and nature.

Leaders find out that their position depends on transparency of objectives and care in selection of methods – and depends especially on the knowledge of the masses. It is possible to continue the struggle for a short while solely relying on the hatred of the masses vis-à-vis the political system. However, without raising their level of awareness, the revolution shall not attain its final victory. This awareness will be put into action by teaching the revolution's ideology - which is the third pillar of the revolution's victory.

The term 'ideology' has various interpretations. In Persian it is synonymous with 'doctrine'. In the general sense of the term,

1. See: Inhabitants of Hell on Earth, written by Frantz Fanoon, translated by Dr. Ali Shariati, P. 64.

ideology is an analysis of fundamental behavioral laws that embrace all human relations.

The variable factors that lead to segregation between social groups is their ideology or the structure of the values of each group. Without a common ideology, scattered social groups do not unite with one another and as a result of tensions existing in society they disintegrate without making any impact on social structures. However, if that ideology attains a more general substance and greater acceptance, then it can cross its own limits and attract the rest of the social groups to itself, and finally, eliminate the competing ideologies from the scene. In such circumstances, society divides into two clear and reciprocal groups. One group, by adhering to the dominant ideology of the revolution, believes in changing the ruling socio-political system and aims to topple the dominant values. The other faction comprises of a group that struggled against the new movement and tries to preserve the current system and the prevailing values.

Ideology responds to the spiritual needs of confused and discontented individuals with two programs:

A) How must the current political system be changed (destruction)?

B) What must it be replaced with (construction)?

Liberation from the hegemony of the ruling political power may perhaps be a necessary condition for revolution, but a revolution must have an ideology focused on the future with a desired framework to change the value system. Some researchers apply the term ideology in the context of a value system, whereas ideology is distinctly different from this. It is possible for ideology to be transformed into a value system only when it coordinates the entire social system. Ideology only challenges the existing value system and presents a replacement for it.

Ideologies show up as competitor's vis-à-vis the outmoded value system, and define the value system of a society that possesses a balanced and active system. Whenever the cultural values of a society are incapable of justifying the political activities, ideologies become important sources of new values and leanings. Some ideologies contain fettered beliefs, and their psychosomatic application is only to lessen the pangs of public conscience by putting the blame on a

subject as being the factor of all shortcomings. Although these simple ideologies are meant to remove social tensions, they normally do not attract a large number of social rebels. At times, an ideology attains universality and not only becomes a method for political activity, but a replacement of the current value system as well. When the objectives of an ideology is to conduct social division of labor that clearly differs from its present and its past situations, then that ideology is called a revolutionary ideology. Some revolutionary ideologies intend to create fundamental changes in some social values, but do not consider values governing religious beliefs, political structures etc. However, some of the revolutionary ideologies focus on deeper changes in the value structure.

When an ideology attains the degree of perfection, it has three elements that include objective, means and method. A revolutionary ideology never postpones the attainment of its objective. It plans immediate change in the status quo.

At times, a revolutionary ideology is of a religious nature and believes that its supporters are provided with divine assistance. Even such ideologies rely on the movement and efforts of revolutionaries, and believe divine assistance will rush to their help only through their efforts.[1]

Revolutionary ideologies are of three types:

1. Ideologies that aim to revive and establish the value system and traditional culture – no longer in practice - recognized in history and by society as an ideal system with preferred values

2. Ideologies that have been successful in other societies and revolutionaries have chosen them as a role model and seek to pursue and to realize them

3. Ideologies that promote a modern and idealist society that has not yet come into existence anywhere else before

A revolution shall triumph only when its three basic pillars (people, leadership and ideology) act cohesively, appropriately and effectively. The greater the active participation of societal groups;

1. “Indeed Allah does not change a people's lot, unless they change what is in their souls.” (Surah Ar-Ra’d, verse 11)

with an ideology that explains the ideal values of society and finds greater acceptance; and a leadership with its three visages, which can implement suitable strategies, the greater is the probability of a revolution's success with reduced losses.

Third Statement:
Period after the victory of the Revolution (stage of building the alternate system)

For revolutionary leaders and groups, the most difficult stage of the revolution is the post-victory stage; after the overthrow of the ruling political power. The well-known expression 'to demolish is far easier than to build', holds true for revolutions as well. At this stage, revolutionaries confront the most critical of issues, difficulties and pressures. Any revolution that passes through this stage, without its revolutionary ideals and institutions suffering basic and fundamental damages, has ensured the success and survival of the revolution for years to come.

The most important issues that the revolutionaries face at this stage are as follows:

A) After the defeat of the ruling political power, it is replaced by societal power. Contrary to the pre-revolution period, it can no longer attack the political power without a sense of responsibility. At this stage, with the downfall of the erstwhile political system, the revolutionaries are compelled to quickly takeover the responsibilities of the political power and implement them. Due to lack of familiarity with the executive machinery of government, lack of sufficient experience and experienced manpower, they shall face a multitude of problems. Expectations of societal groups from the new system are far more than during the period before the revolution, and can create additional problems and difficulties.

On the other hand, the collapse of the former political regime does not mean the total annihilation of the executive machinery of government, and it will take some time until all values, institutions, structures and individuals affiliated with the former political regime leave the scene and make room for the new system. Thus, the new political power, while undertaking reconstruction, must utilize some of its forces for the destruction of residual effects.

B) The struggle of the revolutionaries does not end with the collapse of the political regime, rather, it continues in another form with greater intensity than in the past. This struggle takes place on both the internal and external fronts.

1. Internal Front: On the internal front, they engage with two groups of opponents:

The first group is of persons attached to the former political regime and benefiting from it, and now, with the collapse of the regime, they see their interests and values threatened, and thus rise in opposition to the new revolutionary regime. One can name the monarchists that were present in the French, Russian and Iranian revolutions, as being of this opposition.

The second group contains those who were in general agreement and consensus with the rest of the revolutionaries concerning the down fall of the former political regime and even cooperated with them. In some cases there was an official coalition among them as well; but concerning the subsequent regime and the type of alternate system, they had no agreement with one another, each attempting to establish a system conforming to its own ideals. It is natural for them to clash with their former colleagues; and whenever they despair of relative triumph or, at least, agreement with them, they join with the opposition and launch an earnest struggle against the dominant revolutionaries.

2. External Front: The revolutionaries are confronted with two types of opposition outside the arena of political sovereignty:

The first type is those societies that have lots of similarities with the deposed political power. With its defeat they fear lest the victory of the revolutionaries facilitates their society's social groups to revolution by emulating that which has been carried out successfully in a similar society. Because of such fears, they oppose the revolutionaries, and strive to undermine the newly-established revolutionary society and prevent it from consolidating and taking shape.

The other type of antipathy is from societies that had very cordial relations, interest and influence with the disposed political system and

now their interests are at stake. Thus, it is but natural that they spare no efforts to oppose the revolutionaries.

The tactics of the opposition groups are not very different from one another and for the most part focus on the three main pillars of the revolution's victory. By sowing discord between the leadership and those societal groups devoted to the revolution, either by metamorphoses or creation of eclecticism, thus weakening the ideology in relation with its efficiency; or by preventing the realization of the ideology's various dimensions, they try to empty the revolution of its contents and furnish the means for despair and pessimism among its adherents and followers.

In most successful revolutions of the world, when the foreign opponents fail to sow discord and provide support to domestic anti-revolutionaries, they resort to direct military action. However, they obtain the opposite result from most of these encounters, because this foreign war has resulted in uniting society and in greater support for the new political power, which lessens the pressure on the political system from within.

In most revolutions, despite the radical societal groups - they do not grab power immediately after victory and a takeover of political control by the moderates is, in most cases, greater because:

Firstly, moderates belong to the societal groups less attached to the former regime, and do not have a major share in its preservation and survival. As a result, they are not subject to accusation and immediate rejection.

Secondly, with their conservative characteristics, the moderates do not engage in serious opposition to it. As a result, they are not pursued or under pressure. On the contrary, by attaining social positions, they have the chance to gain experience, whereas the radical groups, who are mainly young, have a lesser chance of gaining sufficient experience necessary to shoulder executive responsibilities.

Thirdly, in the initial stages of victory, the radicals prefer to handover the governmental administration for a transitory period to the moderates in order to avert both disintegration of the socio-political system and anarchy, as well as defeat the remaining anti-

revolutionaries. This is because this task requires more experience, and, they get enough opportunity to plan and identify the capable and loyal forces to come to power in the next term.

Nevertheless, considering that the majority of the moderates shall always remain moderates, they seldom succeed in running the affairs of society after the revolution and are dragged down from the seat of power.

The main reasons for their defeat consist of the following:

1. Lack of understanding and resolving problems and issues after the revolution

2. Inability to cope with societal expectations, demands and pressures, because of increased awareness and political activity of the vast and liberated masses of revolutionary society.

3. Inability to guide and attract new societal factions, because this requires concentration of power by gaining acceptance, or applying force - and the moderates lack both

4. Inability to prevent the growth and continuation of political movements of opposing societal groups

5. Inability to take revolutionary decisions needed at crucial moments because of having insufficient political and social acceptance and legitimacy.

6. The sum of these issues results in hesitation and negligence in affairs by the moderates, leading to accusations of collusion; and finally, being removed from power by more revolutionary elements that enjoy more widespread support.

When the moderates are removed and power falls into the hands of radical revolutionary forces, the intensity of anti-revolution opposition increases; and the form of this opposition is transformed from a political to a violent state, followed by military clashes.

Plots to overthrow, internal rebellions, creation of an environment of terror and fear are among actions that opposition forces of the revolution undertake in order to defeat the revolutionaries and get hold of power. When these actions bear no fruit, imposition of a foreign war on the revolutionary regime is generally unavoidable.

This war is in fact the final attempt to topple and defeat the revolution, whereas this, in itself, prepares the groundwork for solidarity, organization and public support for the regime. This is because people see themselves face to face with the foreign enemy and consider it their duty to set aside internal differences of opinion and repulse the foreign enemy's aggression.

The victory of the revolutionaries and the defeat of anti-revolutionaries at this stage of confrontation; facilitates stability of the ruling political and revolutionary system. The essential condition of victory of the revolutionaries over all socio-political problems and domestic and foreign oppositions lies solely in preserving the unity and solidarity of the three main pillars of revolution (leadership, people and ideology). If the revolution's leadership shows wider acceptance and greater competency and enjoys greater legitimacy; if societal groups, strive in unison and even attract more groups; and, if the ideology of the revolution is more responsive to wider dimensions of societal living, the more certain is the success and perpetuation of the revolution.

Until the time that a revolutionary movement is in a state of motion and enterprise towards reaching a fixed objective, it is like a flowing stream that has preserved its vigor and limpidity, and by coming in contact with obstacles, rocks and boulders, it becomes clearer and fresher. However, if it comes to a halt and institutionalizes, it shall become like stagnant water that is in the process of decay and decline.[1]

Among the instances that transform a revolution into a moribund institution is limiting the objectives of the revolution to deposition of the regime in power within the limits of the borders of a country, and quickly return to the rule of law (including both the old and new laws). Although establishing legal institutions can assist in consolidating the revolution's system and reduce the period of instability, but there is the lurking danger that it may prevent the growth of the revolution, which needs a revolutionary approach. This is especially true since combating value-factors including ethical,

1. Arnold Toynbee: A Study of History, Oxford University Press, London, 1949.

cultural, administrative and societal values takes time, unless a leader with his unique brilliance and creativity is able to bring about a kind of rapprochement and coordination among the revolutionary movements. This requires the active involvement of the people, because establishing discipline and the rule of law, stabilizes a revolutionary society and the revolution.

Fourth Statement:
Afflictions of the Islamic Revolution

The chief means of predicting the defeat of the revolution lies in its perpetuation, its constant movement and in efforts to implement all its objectives in all spheres, especially spreading and promoting the revolution's message overseas. Therefore, the loftier the objective and the farther out of reach it is, the lesser the possibility of the disintegration of the revolution. In the midst of this, fighting the afflictions of the revolution is what the revolutionaries must identify and aim to eliminate.

Afflictions of the revolution arise from inherent, psychological and social factors that influence the revolutionary society very deviously and stealthily, and inflict damages by emptying the revolution of its inherent ingredients. The most important of the revolution's afflictions are as follows:

A) Penetration of opportunists: In all revolutions, this group, by changing its appearance and deceiving the true revolutionaries, penetrates the various institutions of society, and even the leadership apparatus. Apparently they are more revolutionary than the genuine revolutionaries, but, because they have no faith in the ideals of the revolution, they manage to deviate and corrupt the revolution's essence. The opportunists are themselves divided into groups:

The first group only has the ambition of gaining social positions and privileges. They collude with all types of political systems and have a special knack of changing their stances in order to attract the attention of the group in power.

The second group's ideas and beliefs are in conflict with the opinion of the ruler; and when they despair of direct confrontation with the revolutionaries, they inflict their blow to the revolution at the

opportune moment from within, by changing their external appearance and penetrating the political system.

B) Gradual return to rejected cultural values: In any revolutionary society, the downfall of the political system, quickly annihilate the values dominating it. The survival of these values depends on the duration of their domination over society and influence on cultural, social and educational issues. The less the duration of revolutionary struggle, the longer the effects of past values will last.

The rejected values according to the revolutionaries are fondness of luxury, comfortable living, complacency, moral decay, discrimination and bribery. If a continual struggle is not undertaken against past values, the renewed growth of these values shall contaminate the genuine revolutionary values.

C) Complacency of the revolutionary forces and loss of revolutionary morale: Another affliction of the revolution is complacency on the side of the revolutionaries. Upon the success of the revolution, complacency and despondency takes over because of problems which cannot be solved. Pessimism, in relation to realization of ideological yardsticks, causes the revolutionaries to be marginalized. These are among the most dangerous afflictions of revolutions.

D) Corruption in the trilateral pillars of the revolution: Weakness and deviation of the leadership; hunger for power and deviation from the revolution's professed aims and objectives; deviant interpretations of ideology, or weakness of ideology in satisfying the demands of the revolutionaries; and finally, departure of the societal factions committed to the revolution from the scene of struggle. These are among the afflictions of revolutions. If the revolutionary forces do not succeed in their struggle with adversities, pressures, hostilities and afflictions of revolution, the danger of dictatorship, which shall become the demand of the majority of factions, is present.

E) Inability to transfer revolutionary values to the following generations: The first generation or the executives of the revolution, being present on the scene (during and after the revolution) have a proper understanding of the conditions and circumstances. Because of this understanding and because of the heavy price that they have paid

for the revolution, they are ready to sacrifice in order to safeguard the aims and aspirations of the revolution. However, their children, quite naturally, do not enjoy such a standing and morale. In case the revolution's first generation is not able to impart revolutionary training to the next generation and prepare them for the continuation of the revolution, it will provide motives for alienation, and create a rift between the two generations followed by serious problems for the revolution.

Second Part:Analyses of the Islamic Revolution of Iran

Chapter One:
Socio-Political Grounds Before the Revolution

Chapter Two:
Factors of Victory of the Islamic Revolution

Chapter Three:
Factors Accelerating the Revolution

Chapter Four:
Ramifications of the Islamic Revolution

Chapter One:
Socio-Political Grounds before the Revolution

- **First Statement: Political Power**
- **Second Statement: Societal Power**

First Statement:
Political Power

Societies, in which political power has distanced itself from the people and bipolar conditions dominate, are potentially susceptible to revolution. In Iran such conditions existed and seldom did the political power enjoy societal popularity and acceptance and was not in great need of such an acceptance by the oppressed masses.

In Iran, sovereigns were always the focal point of political power, and imperial dynasties had a long and ancient history. They would come to power based on tribal systems and by defeating internal and external enemies in war. Emperors were usually audacious, bloodthirsty and adventurous men; the survival of dynasties depended on the temporal conditions and capability of the emperors to crush their rivals. Throughout the history of this country, many of the sovereigns that attained power, suffered from a tragic fate at the peak of their power. In the course of the last two centuries, only three of the sovereigns died natural deaths, while the rest were either, assassinated or died in exile. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and his father were the last of them; both of them died in exile.

With the expansion of western colonialism in the past two centuries and the influence of European governments in other countries of the world, Iran too, due to its strategic location and rich mineral resources, attracted the attention of the European powers. This attention, itself, became yet another factor of change and transformation in Iran's political system. Britain and Russia's clash of interests before the Second World War, and the division of the world into blocs revolving around two superpowers, i.e. the United States of

America and the Soviet Union after the Second World War, brought the United States of America onto the scene of international politics, and transformed the world into a field of bilateral rivalries. Iran was not at peace with these rivalries, which became an extremely important factor in both the instability and stability of Iran's political power.

The Pahlavi dynasty, established in the year 1925 by an adventurous and dictatorial Cossack, ended with the downfall of his son, and brought an end to imperial dynasty in Iran. Before the reign of Reza Shah, the Qajar dynasty ruled over Iran. This dynasty, that had relatively powerful and authoritarian monarchs, became weak in the final years of its reign and the last Qajar monarch King Ahmad Shah, son of the deposed king Mohammad Ali Shah, was the weakest of them. King Ahmad Shah's reign coincided with the First World War and thereafter, with the Russian Revolution.

Before the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, the Tsarist Russians enjoyed a lot of power and influence in Iran, and the northern regions of Iran were practically under their influence and hegemony. Iran's armed forces too, that were famously known as the Cossack armed forces, were under the supervision and command of Russian officers. Reza Shah, who had joined the Cossack brigade at the age of fourteen, managed to attract the attention of the Russian officers with his courage and audacity. At the end of the First World War, when the Russian Revolution took place, he was one of the most outstanding of the Cossack officers who served directly under the supervision of the Russian commanders. With the revolution in Russia, the British, who were concerned about the spread of Bolshevik thoughts in other parts of the World, including Iran, immediately took action and prepared the grounds for the dismissal of the Russian officers from Iran's Cossack forces, and replaced them with Iranian officers. At that time, a part of Iran's territory was under the occupation of British forces, who wanted to establish a resistance force to combat the new Bolshevik regime of Russia in this region. It was during the course of these events that Reza Khan attracted the attention of the British to himself and was, upon their recommendation, appointed as a division commander of the Cossack forces.

The British colonial government therefore, because of the 1919 Treaty of Vossouqod Dowleh (the treaty that officially made Iran a protectorate of the British Empire), decided to pursue its colonial objectives in a different way within Islamic countries like Iran and Ottoman Turkey. By establishing a centralized, autonomous and apparently independent government that was under complete domination of Britain, and by adopting a cultural policy influenced by the West with apparent Islamic values governing society, it would rise in opposition to Russia and the U.S of America, and serve the interests of Britain.

The blow dealt to them by the Tobacco Movement and the strength of the *Ulema* during the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, showed them who their main opposition was, and the main reason for the failure of the Vossouqod Dowleh Treaty of 1919. They concluded that, only with the elimination of the power of religion in Islamic societies and intervention of religious leaders in politics, would they be able to safeguard their colonial interests. This was an assignment entrusted to Reza Khan in the military coup engineered in the year 1920.

With the assistance of the British, Reza Khan launched a military coup,[1] but instead of deposing Ahmad Shah, he offered him a choice between endorsing the military government and resigning. Obviously, the Qajar monarch chose to endorse the military coup government rather than to resign; but in practice, he lost all his powers and authority.

Four years later, Reza Khan, who had consolidated the pillars of his power in every respect, decided to overthrow the Qajar dynasty and present himself as the legitimate king of Iran. Transfer of monarchy apparently took place constitutionally and through the Assembly of Founders. In the constitution of the year 1907, this assembly that had established the monarchy, exclusively for the Qajar dynasty, reviewed its action and chose Reza Khan as the monarch, and made Iran's

1. For more in-depth and documented information of the manner of choosing Reza Khan for launching the military coup and role of Ardeshir Reporter in this affair, refer to book "Rise and Fall of the Pahalavi Dynasty"; Institute of Political Studies and Research , Etelaat Publishers, Tehran, 1991, vol. Two, page 144 onward.

monarchy the bequest of his family. Reza Khan was crowned King Reza Shah Pahlavi on December 18, 1925.

The choice of the name 'Pahlavi' for this dynasty was significant. 'Pahlavi' is the name of Iran's ancient language and by choosing this name Reza Khan showed that he gave preference to Iran's ancient traditions over the Islamic traditions governing Iranian society. During his reign of more than sixteen years, he took actions that were in line with the policies dictated by the British and which his son continued later on. Many of these actions were against religious customs of Iran's society; among them, the 'elimination of the Hijab' (dress code for women), forcing women to give-up the 'chador' (full-length veil) and emulate the western style of clothing; banning mourning ceremonies and religious sermons, and disrobing the clergymen.

At the beginning of the Second World War, the strategic location of Iran and the need to convey war supplies and provisions to Russia through Iran, the allies judged that it was necessary for their troops to be present in Iran, and decided to occupy Iranian territory by force or deception. In circumstances in which foreign forces – especially of Britain – were present in Iran, there was no need for a strong and centralized government, such as that of Reza Shah, whom the British had brought to power. Therefore, on the unfounded pretext of increasing German influence and Reza Shah's leaning towards the Germans, they gave a short-term ultimatum to the Germans to depart. Despite the acceptance of this ultimatum by the government of Iran, they occupied the country's territory and compelled Reza Khan to resign. The British, who had brought him to power, insisted upon banishing him into exile, and after Iran's occupation by Russian and British troops, a British ship anchored in the port of Bandar Abbas to take him to the island of Mauritius.[1]

Later on, Reza Shah went to Johannesburg in South Africa, where he died in exile a year before the end of the Second World War in July 1944.

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1. For further studies on the subject of the downfall of Reza Shah, see "A Review of Foreign Policy during The Pahlavi Reign", written by the author; Dadgostar Publishers, pages 68 – 70.

Mohammad Reza and his twin sister, Ashraf, were born from Reza Khan's first wife on October 26, 1919, when Reza Khan was still an officer in the Cossack division. After he was crowned king, Reza Khan named Mohammad Reza as the crown prince, and after completion of his primary education, sent him to Switzerland for further studies.

In his childhood, Mohammad Reza was a weak and sickly infant. Reza Shah, who wanted his son to grow up to be an earnest and vicious man like himself, sent him to a military academy. Life at the military academy changed Mohammad Reza's spirits. In the year 1941, following the resignation and exile of Reza Shah, the allies, and especially the British, after three weeks of consultations, appointed Mohammad Reza as successor to Reza Shah. He was an inexperienced and incapable young man; and needed a strong adviser in order to discharge the duties that lay on his shoulders. The British chose Mohammad Ali Farouqi to be his advisor and Prime Minister.[1]

Farouqi did not last for more than six months and stepped aside due to illness. Farouqi's successor, and the prime ministers who took over the reins of affairs in Iran after him, would mostly be chosen by the British Embassy; and Mohammad Reza Shah, who was himself a witness to the way the British dealt with his father, didn't dare to oppose them.

The reign of Mohammad Reza Shah's monarchy can be divided into four distinct periods:

- The first period: 1941-1946; Iran was under foreign occupation.

- The second period: 1946-1953; The Shah's escape from Iran, and the collapse of the Mossadeq government.

- The third period: 1953–1955; The Shah's return to Iran and the removal of Lt. General Zahedi from the post of Prime Minister

- The fourth period: 1955–1979; the period of self-rule and the rise of Mohammad Reza Shah to the pinnacle of power, until his downfall.

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1. Farouqi, the grand teacher of Freemasonry, was the same person who was Prime Minister during the transfer of the monarchy from the Qajar to the Pahlavi dynasty, and who played a prominent role in the transformation.

Generally speaking, one can say that until the year 1955, the first fourteen years on the throne, Mohammad Reza Shah was still not able to achieve his father's power, but from the year 1955 onwards, he ruled for a period of twenty-three years with the powers of a despotic and absolute sovereign ruler.

The first fourteen years of Mohammad Reza Shah's monarchy were the most stressful periods of Iran's political existence. In the initial years of this period, Iran was under the occupation of foreign forces. The Shah had practically no power and authority. More often than not, the representatives of Iran's parliament were elected on the recommendation of the occupying governments and their orders.

In this period, in addition to the activation of politico-religious forces led by Ayatollah Kashani and Nawwab Safavi, two other political forces came into being, the national-liberal front led by Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq and the Communist Tudeh party. Exploiting anti-foreign sentiments growing in the country because of interference by foreigners in the internal affairs of Iran; the communist Tudeh Party, backed by the Soviet Union, made some inroads into the Northern provinces that were under the occupation of the Red Army.

After the Second World War, the question of withdrawal of the occupation forces arose. At a conference, convened in Tehran during the war, the leaders of the allies had given an undertaking that they would leave Iran six months after the war. The Soviet Union, that had failed to gain consent to extract crude oil from Iran's north, would totally lose its influence in the country in case of withdrawal from Iran. Therefore, it decided to establish a power base for itself in the country. For the execution of this plan, it established an independent communist party in the province of Azerbaijan by the name of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. Before the promised date of withdrawal from Iran, it took control of Azerbaijan with the help of the Red Army.

At that time, Ghavam As-Saltaneh, an experienced and prominent political personality, who reappeared on the scene in the initial years of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, also his rival for power, was the prime minister. By feigning to be close to the Russians and promising them the rights to exploit the north's crude oil reserves and finally, by

inducting three ministers from the Tudeh Party into his cabinet, he succeeded in getting the agreement of the Russians, who were being pressurized and allegedly threatened by the Americans as well, to withdraw from Iran's territories. Following the withdrawal of the Red Army from Iran, the handpicked regime of the Russians in Azerbaijan collapsed.

Ghavam As-Saltaneh thought of consolidating his power base and established a party called the Democratic Party. He called for elections to the Consultative Assembly hoping to gain a strong majority in the parliament; but the Shah was apprehensive of his objectives and plotted against him covertly. The majority of the assembly representatives were candidates of his Democratic Party and, apparently, his supporters; but a large number of them were keeping in touch with the royal court as well. Consequently, after the proposal to award rights of exploration of the north's crude oil to the Soviet Union, was defeated in the assembly, the opposition against him reached a peak in the assembly and led to the collapse of his government. In this manner, the Shah's nightmares about his plots ended, but there were other problems and dangers lying ahead.

Sometime after the collapse of Ghavam As-Saltaneh, the first assassination attempt was made on the Shah's life; and the killing of the assassin after his botched attempt at assassination, prevented the solving of the mystery of this incident. The Tudeh Party was accused of masterminding this assassination plot and dissolved on this pretext. In the meantime, the liberal-national faction, led by Dr. Mossadeq, had named itself the National Front, with the new slogan of restitution of Iran's rights from the Anglo-Iran Oil Company. It expanded its activities and, the Combatant Clergy Movement led by Ayatollah Kashani, the Fedayian-e-Islam, simultaneously, demanded the implementation of Islamic canons, and condemned the actions of the government. They posed a new threat to the regime.

The assassination of Hajeer, the minister of the Royal Court in the year 1950, caused the Shah – under domestic and external pressures - to appoint Hajji Ali Razmara, who at that time was the chief of army staff, as the prime minister. Undoubtedly, Razmara became prime minister despite the Shah's preference; he feared strong personalities. Razmara, in addition to his sharp intelligence, enjoyed the backing of

the military. For the Shah, who always wanted to keep the military subservient to the government, the merger of these two powers was a big threat. Moreover, Razmara had shown a lot of expertise in his dealings with foreign powers so that, in addition to covert agreements with the British, he had won over the hearts of the Russians as well. For this reason, the Shah perceived him to be a far greater threat than Ghavam As-Saltaneh. In fact, there is a lot of evidence of Razmara's plots to depose Mohammad Reza Shah from the monarchy. Rumors said that Razmara wanted to engineer a military coup at the opportune moment to depose Mohammad Reza Shah from the throne and place his brother Ali Reza on the throne of monarchy.

The most important problem that occurred during the administration of Razmara and postponed his possible plot of launching a military coup was the question of oil, and the efforts of the National Front to annul the oil privileges of the south of the country. In order to solve this problem and sign an oil agreement that would satisfy the British, Razmara entered into negotiations with them and gained some success in this regard. However, he was assassinated before he was able to ratify his agreements with the British in the Consultative Assembly. His assassination was perhaps, conducted by an individual from the Fedayian-e-Islam faction in protest against his co-operation with the British.[1]

Razmara's assassination, after the assassination attempt on the Shah's life, was the second important political assassination in Iran after the Second World War, and spread a lot of fear in the hearts of the political elite of that time. However, the Shah appeared satisfied by the assassination of his powerful prime minister; the biggest danger that threatened his position. The Shah's joy did not last for very long for the political storm that arose in Iran following the assassination of Razmara shook the foundations of the Shah's power as well. It

1. There are numerous contradictory and conflicting reports and documents on the subject of Razmara's assassination and at times prove that he wasn't killed by a bullet fired from the revolver of Khalil Tahmasebi (member of the Fedayian-e-Islam party); rather by the bullet fired by one of the security guards of Alam and – more significant than that – with the provocation of the royal court. See book "Mystery of the Assasination of Razmara" authored by Mohammad Turkman, Rasa Cultural Services Publishers, 1991.

compelled him to appoint - after the bill for nationalization of the oil industry was passed in the National Consultative Assembly - Dr. Mossadeq, the leader of the National Front, who was among his staunch opponents, to the prime ministerial position.

Dr. Mossadeq became the chief executive power on a wave of nationalist feelings and anti-British agitations among the people of Iran. From various aspects, he became a source of anxiety and worry for the Shah. The national backing of Mossadeq combined with the support of the religious leaders, especially Ayatollah Kashani and the undisputed force that was behind him, took away the Shah's ability to assert himself and caused him to retreat to his weakest position since the beginning of the reign of his monarchy. The period of Mossadeq's government, which lasted for two years, was for Mohammad Reza Shah, the bitterest and most humiliating period of his monarchy. Mossadeq took away practically all the Shah's powers; and when, in the middle of his term, he resigned on the pretext of the Shah's opposition to his appointment of himself as Minister of Defence, the Shah faced a general uprising led by Ayatollah Kashani on July 21, 1952. After a few days, he was compelled to invite Dr. Mossadeq once again to form a government. This time Dr. Mossadeq, reinstated with greater power and authority, stripped the Shah of his authority over the military and security forces. Next, he expelled the Shah's brothers, sisters and mother from the country because of their uncalled for and unlawful interferences in the working of the government. More than others, it was the expulsion of the Shah's twin sister Ashraf, which caused the Shah's morale to weaken, because, more than any other person, she influenced the Shah and lifted his morale at sensitive and critical times. By expelling Ashraf from Iran, Mossadeq furnished the preliminaries of his own downfall as well, because this active and crafty woman did not sit idly after her expulsion and established the initial contacts with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America. Following these contacts, the CIA, with the cooperation of the British Intelligence Service, began their quest to topple Mossadeq's

government, and commissioned one of the prominent members of the agency, by the name of Kermit Roosevelt,[1] to implement the plan.

It needs to be mentioned that, at the beginning of Mossadeq's government, America was more or less cooperating with the Mossadeq government because of the influence exerted by the American oil companies and the share that they wanted of Iran's crude oil, but after mediation did not achieve success, the Americans started opposing Mossadeq's government. It is quite evident that this mediation would have secured America's interests. However, apparently, what intensified American opposition of Mossadeq and increased CIA's interference in this incident was the pretext that communists would grab power in Iran, and the danger of a communist coup in the country. At the same time, the important domestic factor that facilitated Mossadeq's downfall was the denial of support from the clergy and the people who were responsible for bringing him to power. They gradually distanced themselves from him because of the self-centeredness that Mossadeq had started to display. With the absence of the people in the political arena, the American-British coup d'état became very easy.

America and Britain had come to a complete understanding, at this stage, on the question of Iran. They chose Major General Fazlullah Zahedi, the then Interior Minister of Mossadeq's cabinet, to implement their plan. In the first stage of this plan, they compelled the Shah to issue an order dismissing Mossadeq from his position as prime minister and to then appoint Zahedi. These orders were issued at a time when Dr. Mossadeq had dissolved the *Majlis* consultative assembly by means of a referendum, and had taken away the possibility of any sort of resistance from the representatives of the government. Mossadeq refused to accept the order of his dismissal and its nightly communication through one of the officers of the royal guards by the name of Colonel Nassiri (who later became the head of 'Savak', the secret service organization), and regarded it as a military coup. The Shah, who was horrified at Mossadeq's reaction, and feared lest Mossadeq issued orders for his arrest, ran away from the

1. See "Sudden Downfall" written by Michael Ladin – William Louis, narrated in the book "Confessions of the Deposed Shah", translated by Manuchehr Mehrjou, Hafteh Publishers, 1983, PP. 74 – 75.

country. However, the planners of the military coup implemented the second stage of their plan by organizing street protests and disturbances using a division of the armed forces, and managed to topple Mossadeq's government, which had lost the backing of the religious leaders, its national support.

News of Mossadeq's downfall reached the Shah in Rome; but the fugitive and itinerant Shah would not believe the initial reports of this incident, until confirmed. The Shah, who, until then, would not even have dreamt of a return to monarchy, suddenly spoke out, justifying his running away from Iran as a patriotic and calculated step, designed to provoke the nationalist sentiments. He didn't fail to express his gratitude to those who engineered the coup and said, "I owe my crown and throne to you." In his book, Roosevelt writes that what the Shah meant by 'you' in his statement was the American and British governments.[1]

Zahedi, who after the ouster of Mossadeq, had become the prime minister by means of a written order from the Shah, in the first official step of his government, sent a telegraph to the Shah inviting him to return to the country. Mossadeq was arrested, imprisoned, put on trial, and condemned to a three-year prison term. The Shah, who returned to the country less than a week after his humiliating escape from Iran, interpreted the British-American coup as a national uprising, calling himself "the elected king of the people!"

With the installation of a strong military government and resolution of the oil issue by means of this government – in a manner that secured the interests of the British and the Americans – a long period of stability was forecasted for Iran. Zahedi imagined that he had rescued the Shah's crown and throne and enabled his return from exile, so he would remain the prime minister of Iran for as long as he wished. However, the weak and suspicious Shah, who viewed any strong prime minister as a threat to his power and monarchy, was even fearful of his own savior, so that less than a year after the military coup, he took steps behind the scene to weaken and limit his authority. In this period, the Shah had found a new ally. With the role

1. For study on this subject see: Kermit Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for Control of Iran; McGraw Hill Co., 1979.

that the Americans played for his return to monarchy, he drew himself closer to them day by day. The period after the Mordad 28 military coup (August 19) can be regarded as the starting point of a new era of Iran - American relationship (or more accurately, the Shah and America). In less than two years after the military coup, the Shah, earning the consent of the Americans, laid the groundwork for the removal of Zahedi from the position of prime minister. With commensurate pay and privileges, Zahedi, appointed as the extraordinaire ambassador of Iran to Europe, departed for Switzerland. In this manner, the Shah respectfully sent his own savior into exile.

Indeed, the period of totalitarian government of Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran, which reminded one of the totalitarian reign of his father, begins from this date. In May 1955, Hussein Ala, who was for a long time the Minister of the Royal Court and a confidante of the Shah, became the prime minister; and was replaced two years later by Dr. Manuchehr Iqbal, who, in every respect, was obedient and submissive to the Shah, considering himself to be a servant of his family. During the tenure of the premiership of Iqbal, which lasted for almost four years, the government was totally under the command of the Shah's orders – and the made-to-order *Majlis* or, consultative assembly had no power and authority.

In the year 1960, simultaneous with the changes in the international political arena, especially in the global politics of America, the Shah was forced to review the style of his administration. In order to give a more globally-acceptable façade to his egocentric regime, he encouraged his Prime Minister Iqbal and his royal court minister, Alam, to form two competing political parties called *Iran Novin* and *Mardom*, respectively. Although everybody knew that both the parties had their origins from a single source, competition erupted between the two parties in parliamentary elections, and Iqbal attempted to continue his administration by means of gaining the majority of parliamentary seats, causing a great political tumult, which forced the Shah to cancel the elections. Iqbal stepped aside from the premiership, and the second parliamentary elections for the twentieth term of the *Majlis* national consultative assembly was held at the beginning of the year 1962. In the meantime, Kennedy became the president of the United States of America and the domestic and

foreign policies of America were poised for a characteristic change. Inclination of American politics towards liberalism had an impact on America's dealings with Iran as well. The coolness of Kennedy's relations with the Shah, accused of dictatorship and suppression, created tensions in Iran that led to the collapse of the government of that time, meaning the government of Sharif Imami, and the coming to power of Dr. Ali Amini.

Dr. Amini had presented himself as an individual worthy of enjoying the trust of the new administration of America. It was rumored that he was appointed prime minister on the direct recommendation of the Americans. President Kennedy, at an official banquet, held in honor of the Shah during his visit to Washington in May 1962, had literally given credence to the rumor by describing him as a competent and merited prime minister. Despite these oral backings by the American administration, he withheld giving economic aid to Amini, and provided the reasons for his downfall. The Shah, who after twenty years of monarchy, had become adept at political games, succeeded in taking Kennedy into his confidence, and offered to implement the programs that Kennedy wanted Amini to do.

After his return from America, the Shah gradually placed impediments in the path of Amini's progress, and forced him to resign in the month of August, the same year.

One of the plans that the Americans had devised, and recommended Amini to implement was agricultural land reforms. On the other hand, the Shah, to pretend not to toe the line of Amini's government and introduce himself as the innovator of the idea of agricultural land reforms and other reformist programs, supplemented the agricultural land reforms with other programs that were of interest to the Americans. He got 'national approval' for the sum of these programs, named "the White Revolution" by means of a made-to-order referendum.

The Shah imagined that by appointing a compliant and trustworthy government and the White Revolution program, he had managed to attract towards himself the support of the majority of the people, and more important, of the Americans who had become the most important foreign influence in Iran. The Shah considered himself to be at the pinnacle of power and the undisputed ruler. With the

increase in American military aid and strengthening of the armed forces, the political opponents of the Shah, right from the National Front to the Tudeh Party, had been totally nullified and rendered ineffective.

From this date onwards, the Shah, who viewed himself as the sole contender in the field and saw nobody else challenging him, gradually took control of all the powers and became an absolute, despotic and totalitarian ruler. With his ever-increasing dependence on America, especially during the presidencies of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, with whom he had close and cordial relations, he was able to strengthen his power basis.[1]

After the assassination of Mansour, the Shah appointed one of his cabinet ministers, Hoveyda, not a very well-known figure, as prime Minister. Selection of Hoveyda as prime minister was a hurried reaction to the assassination of Hasan Ali Mansour, the former prime minister. Everybody considered his government to be an interim one, but Hoveyda left behind all his predecessors in terms of service and devotion to the Shah; and with these characteristics, managed to remain in the prime minister's office for more than twelve years, the longest tenure of premiership in Iran's modern history. This period was the peak of the Shah's absolute power, because the government was submissive, the parliament lacked the power, and the press media was under pressure of censorship. 'Savak', the secret police of the Shah would nip any kind of opposition in the bud; and nobody would

1. Here it is necessary to point out, that the daily increase of American influence in Iran after the military coup of August 19, 1954, does not mean the replacement of the colonial government of Britain with this great western power. It was a change of tactics by the British, signifying avoidance of tangible presence on the political scene. The administrative structure of Iran and the governing bureaucracy remained almost untouched throughout the rule of the Pahlavi regime; and was maintained until the collapse of the regime on February 11, 1979. For the most part, this political fabric was under the influence and control of the British and the Freemason network safeguarding the interests of this government. The American administration was never able to penetrate this structure and control it; rather, it inevitably relied on this structure and operated in Iran with the agreement of the British. For further studies on this subject see: "Review of Foreign Policy during the Pahlavi Era," written by the author.

dare to oppose; even have the courage to level the least criticism at the regime.

In this period, several incidents or changes can be regarded as accidental products or favorable international conditions, which added to the Shah's power, wealth and pride; and gradually this thought occurred to him that, perhaps, he was an extraordinary creature who was delegated to perform a mission on earth. In this period the Shah once again survived a plot to assassinate him; and because he interpreted his survival from the assassination attempts a kind of miracle and singular divine favor, he became more than ever convinced of his fate, destiny and mission that he imagined he had on earth. The Shah gave a religious color to his convictions. These convictions were more comprehensible and digestible for the common people, and by this means, he wished to gradually takeover the religious leadership of the people as well. He was never a true Muslim and did not observe the obligations that a Muslim must observe.[1] The Shah's belief in God and anything that manifested itself as his religious convictions was rooted more in the ancient religions of Iran and the pre-Islamic era. His fervor for reviving traditions and customs of ancient Iran reached the stage where he changed Iran's official calendar from the year of migration of the Honorable Prophet of Islam (SA) to the approximate and fanciful year of the crowning of the Achaeminian emperor, Cyrus.

The expensive and splendid celebrations of two thousand five hundred years of monarchy in Iran, which was held with the purpose of linking and bringing Iran's history closer to that of the ancient period before Islam, reveals the Shah's belief in that period. In these celebrations, hailed as the biggest show of the era, nine kings, five queens, twenty-one princes and a large number of presidents, vice-presidents and prime ministers of various countries of the world participated. For holding the celebrations, a city, with the most expensive decorations, was built alongside the ruins of Persepolis. In the course of these celebrations, the Shah felt that he was at the peak of his power and the undisputed sovereign; whereas, these celebrations sounded the beginning of the downfall of Iran's

1. See the book "Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Monarchy", memoirs of Ex-General Hossein Fardoust, vol. 1, Etelaat Press, second edition, 1989.

monarchical regime. The contrast between the pomp and glory of the royal celebrations with the poverty and suffering of the vast majority of Iran's people became a weapon of publicity for the opponents of the regime.

The sudden increase in oil revenues, and no proper economic program, for its beneficial consumption prepared, ostensibly, put the country's progress in top gear. However, execution of huge military projects and major purchases of armaments in line with Richard Nixon's doctrine,[1] and the rest of the ambitious, grandiose, but futile plans, caused a rise in inflation and unprecedented corruption while it created new and complex problems and difficulties.

In addition to the extensive socio-economic impact that the policy of militarization and sale of American armaments to Iran brought in its trail, it caused a disruption of the natural order of Iranian society. Presenting a blank check to the Shah for purchases of sophisticated military weapons had a profound and fundamental psychological impact on him. Gradually, he started believing that he was not a puppet of the Americans or the British anymore; rather he was their colleague and partner. This image lingered in the Shah's mind for a long time; and he even imagined himself to be the weightier pan of the weighing scale of the partnership. He reckoned himself as the patron and guardian of western interests and this caused a false sense of confidence to appear in him, increasing his egocentrism.[2]

In this period, the Shah and his aides were preoccupied with theatrical displays. The power and facilities of government, key and sensitive positions were solely in the hands of particular groups, including the freemasonry network, followers of Baha'ism, a few families and their

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1. Richard Nixon's doctrine was proposed after the humiliating defeat of America in the Viet Nam war. It proposed that instead of sending American troops to crises areas, they should make use of their handpicked governments such as the Shah's regime; and provide them with military equipment. The mission to safeguard American interests should be entrusted to them, and they be established as the gendarmes of the region.

2. For a better understanding of Mohammad Reza Shah's personality and psychic characteristics, see: "Royal Defeat: Psychology of the Shah's Personality", compiled by Harvin Zonis, translated by Abbas Mokhber, Tarh-e-Now Publishers, 1991.

dependents. These facilities were given to persons not based on talent and qualification; rather, they were more likely to be given on the basis of relationships and affiliations. Sometimes, even fresh faces would manage to enter this circle; but granting of important jobs to them depended more on their abilities to establish contact with the influential and the powerful, rather than on their talent and merit.

A Lonely Man

As the Shah and the period of his reign got older, he became more ruthless and inflexible; and gradually yearned to apply the method his late father used during his reign. However, neither the circumstances of the time of his father conformed to his time, nor did he have the inherent capability and audacity of Reza Khan. He was able to show his power only in normal situations and when things were going in his favor – meaning, what every person was capable of doing. However, in times of danger and crises, he would lose his confidence and was not able to make decisions on his own. This lack of confidence and the fear of being pulled down from the throne of power caused him to abstain from handing over the prime minister's job and key administrative and military positions to capable and strong individuals. In the last years of his reign, almost all capable and strong individuals had dispersed from around him. The circle of advisers and confidants of the Shah had become restricted to a number of submissive sycophants, only concerned about being in his good books and safeguarding their selfish interests.

Richard Helms, who was a former ambassador of the United States of America to Iran, has sketched an interesting picture of the Shah's personality and morale at the start of this period of his monarchy. In an official report, he writes:

"All leaders of countries are men of isolation, but the Shah is the most isolated of them all. He does not have good and sincere advisers in and outside the governmental machinery. Of course, this isolation is related to the behavioral characteristics of the Shah, as well as his mistrust of the ambitious aspirations of others. This suspicion, strengthened by his past experiences, has resulted in efficient individuals dispersing from around him. If at all, a knowledgeable personality is to be found among his inner circle, he desists from

mentioning matters that the Shah does not like. In brief, at the same time that he is proud and egotistic, the Shah is a hollow person…"

One of the main factors that, during the course of the Revolution assisted in ousting the Shah, was his lack of confidence in others; his interference in details of affairs and making the entire system of government and the armed forces become dependent on him. By establishing a few intelligence organizations, he placed the governmental and military apparatus under multiple controls, although it was rumored that the heads of these organizations had come to an understanding with one another and were coordinating their reports. In the organizations of Iran's armed forces, none of the forces could act independently. The Shah would receive the commanders of the forces separately and with the control system in place, implementation of any military order required passing through several channels. Commanders of the Armed Forces, and even commanders of various units of a military force, often lacked understanding with one another, and, at times, were each other's rivals. To sum up in brief, the command uniformity and unity in the army relied on the person of the Shah, and for this reason, with his departure from the country, the military disintegrated all at once.

In summing up and examining the political power governing Iran, an extremely outstanding example of shaping political power in a bipolar society and inevitably laying the groundwork for socio-political change leading to the revolution, one can enumerate the following distinguishing factors:

1. Iran's political power was concentrated around an egocentric, and at the same time, inherently weak monarch.

2. The regime relied on an armed to the teeth military and devoted to it. An army, whose commanders were subservient to the Shah; and the only reason for their loyalty was their excessive welfare and satiation of their material cravings. However, these armed forces had not been tested in the battlefield to prove the degree of their loyalty and capability in defending the political power.

3. The 'Savak' secret police organization, by means of assassination and torture, silenced any voice of opposition.

4. The regime relied on the hegemony of alien powers, especially that of Britain and America. The infiltration of the British and subsequently of America in the administrative and military apparatus, and even the secret police, was both deep and undeniable. On the other hand, the Shah considered himself indebted to them for his monarchy and viewed its survival and perpetuation to depend on their patronage.

5. Corruption and bribery was rampant in the administrative system and the growth of bureaucracy had removed its efficiency and ability to perform routine duties.

6. Although, with the rise in crude oil prices, the economic strength of the regime increased noticeably, but the lack of proper development and economic programs increased discontentment.

7. The political power was alienated from the people and the majority of societal groups and had no desire to attract their support. The Shah's only demand was that the people should not oppose the political system in power.

8. With regard to the incompetence of the bureaucrats, employing the wrong system of decision-making, restricted and condensed in a single person, the political system became incapable of solving the simplest economic, political and social problems of society.

9. In order to safeguard the regime's standing, a lot of importance was given to propaganda, theatricals, external profile, expensive and unproductive celebrations and festivals, inside and outside the country.

10. Not only was no attention paid to society's beliefs and traditions that had deep religious roots; rather, through various means, it attempted to destroy the values governing society and to replace them with values that were alien to society.

In such circumstances, societal groups despaired and became pessimistic in relation to the political system. They rallied round religious leaders, creating a potent societal force and, in a short time, succeeded in bringing about the collapse of the political system.

Second Statement:
Social Power

Societal power arises from the will of a people that live in a single territory and share values and interests. No society can possibly be established and survive without shared values; and in case it is established, it will not be long before it disintegrates. Shared values can have either material or spiritual aspects; but certainly, a society that has been established and founded purely on the basis of material values and interests, does not have the necessary cohesion, nor, in the face of possible dangers, the power of desired collective defense.

Iran, geographically, is located in a very strategic region. The people living here often faced attacks and invasions from various tribes and nations. The Macedonian - Alexander, Muslim Arabs, the Mongol - Genghis Khan, Teymur Khan of Gurkan, the Seljuk Turks etc…were among ethnic groups and nations that attacked Iran, ruled over it and were either assimilated or warded off.

As a result of these encounters, necessitated by historical factors, they, the people of Iran, became familiar with diverse tribes and nations. At times, they had friendly and, at other times, hostile relations. These relations caused them to absorb some of their traditions and transfer them to future generations; and reciprocally, they were able to transfer many of their own traditions to other nations. Iranians, deeply attached to their own nationality and values, made efforts to preserve their own identity and culture. For this reason, they merged with other nations; but never because of blind prejudice, which caused a lack of understanding and accepting reality and prevented the growth and proliferation of their culture. Their cultural interaction enriched the culture of their own society and made it more prolific.

Twenty-five centuries have passed since the beginning of the Achaemenid Empire, when Iran was ruled by a single regime. In this period, the most important and greatest cultural interaction of Iranians, for the past fourteen centuries, was with the culture and doctrine of Islam that facilitated change and a great and speedy revolution throughout the Middle East. Islam was not only a new phenomenon for the Iranians but for the Arabs as well. One cannot say that the Iranian culture has been at odds in its contact with Islam

as a part of Arab culture and civilization. In fact, the teachings and proposed new values of the Honorable Prophet of Islam (SA) were as novel and new for the Iranians , as it was for the Arabs.

Before the dawn of Islam, the Arabs had nothing to offer the civilized and progressive societies of their era, headed by Iran and Rome. The nomadic and desert-dwelling Arab clans, who lived the most basic form of existence, were not able to lay the foundations of a remarkable civilization.

The attack on Iran by the new Arab converts, and their consequent contact with each other transferred the divine and spiritual doctrine of Islam to them.

The claim by certain thinkers that Islam was imposed on other nations, including Iranians, by the power of the sword and use of force, has no historical basis. As proven by history, whenever Iranians have been disgusted with their tyrannical rulers, they have left them to fend for themselves in the face of foreign attacks and have facilitated their defeat and downfall with their non-cooperation. Towards the end of the reign of the Sassanid dynasty, the socio-political conditions governing Iran, because of corrupt and decadent authoritarian courtiers, backed by the Zoroastrian priests, with the poverty and misery of the masses, proved conducive for the defeat of Iran's army by the Muslims. They were equipped with the power of faith, believed in Divine providence and succor; and were ready for martyrdom.

The Iranians welcomed Islam warmly, to the extent that nowadays, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, no other country possesses a Muslim majority as large as Iran.[1]The reason for this is the compatibility of the Iranian morale with Islam; they had found their missing link in Islam.[2] These people who were naturally intelligent, and, in addition, possessed a history of a great civilization and

1. 98% of Iran's population is Muslim; while 90% of them are followers of the Shiite school of thought. [During that era. Ed.]
2. Detailed discussion of this topic has been included in the invaluable book "Reciprocal Services of Islam and Iran" written by the late Martyr Professor Morteza Motahhari and mentioned in the section entitled "Iranian's Acceptance of Islam".

culture, before being fascinated and intimidated by the punishing power of the armies of Islam, had taken note of the spirit and concept of Islam. For this reason, their affection for the Household of the Prophet of Islam and his prophetic mission is greater than that of any other nation. Thus, from among the various Islamic sects, they chose the Shiite doctrine and generally followed the Ja'fari School of Islamic jurisprudence. Devotion for the Twelve Immaculate Imams (AS) is deep-rooted among Iranians, because they have discovered the spirit of Islam in the Household of the Prophet (SA), and regard them to be responsive to their queries and factual needs.

However, while welcoming Islam, the Iranians did not become subservient to the Arabs, neither from the political nor from the cultural point of view and did not surrender their cultural independence, doing all they could to preserve it just as before. In contrast with the Egyptians, who accepted both Islam and the Arabic language, the Iranians preserved their national language, used Arabic to enrich Farsi, but remained Farsi speakers.

Towards the end of the Abbasid caliphate rule, the Iranians freed themselves from the control of the Arab caliphs, who ruled in the name of Islam but their actions were contrary to the true teachings of Islam and far removed from them. They fought with them and did not permit the Arabs, who following their racist traditions, and in the name of Islam, behaved with them like masters. In the course of one-thousand four-hundred years the Iranians analyzed Islam and warmly accepted it. This religion has penetrated into the core of their lives and has become part and parcel of their individual and societal living. They have grown, lived, started a family, trained their children, formed their personal and social relations, and buried their dead with its laws. Their history, literature, politics, fate, culture and civilization, social customs and finally, all things have been so inextricably linked with the religion of Islam that it forms a major, principal and inseparable part of the values governing their society. It needs to be mentioned that the Iranians have, reciprocally, been able to offer valuable services for the growth, proliferation and fruition of Islamic civilization and its progress, exaltation and propagation.[1] The profound influence of Islam among its social strata was a dominant

1. Ibid.

value of Iranian society and perhaps, the sole factor of their national unity.

The factor of 'nation' in the Arabic sense of the term cannot be the cause of proximity and establishment of a common culture among a people with diverse languages, accents, racial roots and ethnicities such as Fars, Kurd, Turk, Arab, Turkmen, and Balouch.

In fact, it can be claimed that if we were to overlook the religious laws, customs and beliefs that are the shared aspects of the vast majority of individuals of this nation, one cannot find another significant common factor that brings them close together. It is for this reason that not only can Islam be discussed as a religion of communication of Iranians with the Nurturer God; rather, this factor has impacted their culture, traditions, language and social relations in such a way that nothing can be said about the common culture of Iranians without an understanding of religion and its special characteristics. For this reason, values acceptable to the majority of the societal strata stem from their religious point of view. One of the major causes of the occurrence of the Revolution and the downfall of the Shah's regime was his attempt to undermine and disregard long-established societal values and symbols that were rooted in religion.

Religion is the most important cultural factor connecting and binding Iranians in all corners of the country; in cities, in villages and in diverse strata of society, including poor and rich, literate and illiterate. With regard to the deep-rooted influence that religion has found in their societal relations, even those who do not regard themselves to be committed to implementation of religious canons and worship, become committed to observance of religious traditions, including feasts and mourning ceremonies.

It can be claimed that the societal power of Iranian society is hidden in religion; and any other movement and agitation apart from religious yardsticks and values cannot succeed in realizing socio-political objectives.

The incident-filled and tragic history of several thousand years of the people of Iran has, in its strategic and sensitive circumstances, numerous wars and conflicts, carved a patient, tolerant, resistant and sagacious nation that, with these attributes, has managed to make

progress, and succeeded in ensuring its survival in the whirlpool of events and the adventurous vicissitudes of history.

As a result of the cultural, political and military onslaught of Europeans in the last two centuries, there have been certain events in the entire world of Islam and the Middle East region that have had a profound and widespread impact.

The gradual decline of strong Islamic governments paved the way for the infiltration of western colonialists and indeed caused renewed friction with the rival civilization. Islamic culture and civilization according to Arnold Toynbee, which was in a position of self-defense, and the civilization of the west, which was in the process of revival, awakening and combat readiness, clashed with one another. This clash ultimately, due to the weakness of Islamic societies and their self-alienation, led to the cultural-political dominance and superiority of the West.

This matter had an effect on the morale and behavior of Iranians as well. A vast section of the society, especially the masses, the poor and deprived urban and rural strata, that were intensely devoted to their religious traditions and beliefs, and who now saw their beliefs in danger, stepped aside from political-social activities. By seeking recourse to particular aspects of religion such as observance of (*taqiyya),* 'dissimulation of belief to protect oneself,' they decided to adopt the spirit of isolationism and remained indifferent vis-à-vis society's incidents and events. A small section of society, sufficiently educated and knowledgeable, could not remain idle in relation to the incidents that were taking place in society, especially those who were educated in European countries. On witnessing the scientific and industrial progress of western societies and their material glitter, they were intensely fascinated and attracted. They saw the solution to the problems of their nation and the social backwardness of Islamic societies to lie in getting rid of their own cultural-religious values and build a new society on the pillars and basis of novel western yardsticks. This group itself was divided into two factions:

The first faction was under the influence of liberalism and the French revolution. They believed in total and perfect imitation and emulation of western societies. Taqizadeh, who was one of the leading authorities of this theory, believed that one must become westernized

from top to toe in order to achieve prosperity, welfare and progress that western societies have attained. This faction, for the major part, belonged to the wealthy and prosperous urban classes with the means for more contact with western societies, especially for sending their children to the west for further education. On the other hand, this faction found liberalism to be more compatible with their morals and disposition.

The second faction consisted mainly of the intellectuals and zealous youth who were deeply troubled by the injustices governing Iran's society. From the start of the last century and especially following the victory of the Russian Revolution of 1917, this faction came under the influence of Marxist-Leninist thoughts and founded the leftist movements in Iran. This faction, while rejecting the values governing Islamic society – and in particular the religious criterion - and regarding them as superstitions, attempted to establish a Socialist society similar to the one in Russia; and by these means propagated atheistic and materialist Marxist philosophies.

Facing them was another group that was generally from among the clergy and religious scholars or *Ulema*. This group considered the reason for backwardness of Islamic society to lie not in adherence to values of Islamic culture; rather, in detachment from them. They believed that although Islamic societies have preserved their external appearance and shell, but they have emptied them of the content and essence of their true and original values. This theory, took shape with the movement of Sayyid Jamaluddin Asadabadi. It believed that the only path to salvation and deliverance of Islamic society lay in a true return to Islam. They spared no effort and started widespread sacred struggles, whose evolutionary process was witnessed in the Tobacco Movement, the Constitutional Monarchy Movement and nationalization of Iran's oil industry. Among the pioneers of this thinking in Iran after Sayyid Jamaluddin Asadabadi, one must mention the names of Sheikh Fazlullah Nouri, Sayyid Hasan Modarris, Ayatollah Kashani and Nawaab Safavi.

Now in order to understand the societal power of the people of Iran better, it is necessary to examine the social composition and framework of the people of this land.

Iran's social situation before the Revolution

At the start of the last century, rural inhabitants formed the major portion of Iran's population, most of whom led nomadic lives. Nomadic tribes comprised twenty-five percent (25%) of the total population of the country. In the year 1911, meaning at the beginning of the Conditional Monarch Movement, the total population of the country was around ten million people, of which twenty-percent lived in cities with a population of more than five-thousand residents. Two-hundred thousand people or two percent (2%) of the total population of Iran lived in Tehran. Not long afterwards, its population crossed the one-million mark, and before the Revolution, reached the five-million mark. This rapid increase in the population of urban centers was chiefly the result of the wrong and colonial policies of the Pahlavi regime that caused the destruction of rural centers and migration of rural inhabitants to big cities such as Tehran. In the year 1978, Iran's urban population had reached the twenty-million mark and had exceeded the population of the rural areas.[1]

In comparison with the urban residents, the living conditions of the rural inhabitants were extremely poor and there was a noticeable disparity between them. Iran's rural inhabitants lived in villages in which the houses were built of mud bricks and clay. The 1976 census showed that there were almost sixty-five thousand (65,000) villages in Iran, out of which only eighteen thousand (18,000) villages had more than two-hundred and fifty (250) residents. In this respect, Iran's villages were the most widely dispersed population areas in the world. Backwardness, deprivation and dispersion of Iran's rural inhabitants in the form of small communities, had created a harsh and debilitating living environment. The high rate of illiteracy and low life expectancy among rural inhabitants was the natural outcome of this situation. In the year 1974, only thirty-nine percent (39%) of rural children who had reached the school-going age could make use of government education; whereas this rate for urban children reached ninety percent (90%).[2] On the other hand, in the course of long years, rural inhabitants were constantly under pressure and exploitation by

1. Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1980, P. 27.
2. Ibid, P. 43.

feudal and dictatorial regimes. As a result of coercion by government officials, they had no feelings except those of distrust and hatred coupled with fear vis-à-vis the government and its officials – officials who would visit villages only with the intention of taking bribes and exploiting them and not with the intent to ensure their security and provide them with assistance.

In terms of foodstuffs, until the first part of the 1960's, Iran was almost self-sufficient and was able to meet its foreign exchange needs from its exports of cotton, fruit and dry fruit.

But, following the implementation of the Shah's agricultural land reforms devised by the American administration during the time of Kennedy's presidency, Iran became dependent on foreign imports of foodstuffs. After the Second World War in the year 1947, an American consultant group called Morrison Nadson, who had performed initial studies on Iran's potential resources for development and progress, had proposed that this country must concentrate its activities on improving the agricultural situation.[1] But, in the year 1962, in executing the colonialist and imperialist polices of the American administration, the Shah destroyed Iran's agriculture and established the dependent assembly-line industries on its ruins.

In the year 1946, (at a time when Iran's oil income had soared) the level of investment in the agriculture sector was only eight percent (8%) of the national income.[2]

Following the Shah's agricultural land reform and destruction of agriculture and expansion of urbanization, rural inhabitants who migrated in large numbers to the cities in the hope of finding jobs, created the daily-wage class of labor. These rural people, who were mainly single and unmarried, migrated to the cities and left their families in the villages. They were confronted with westernized urban culture to which they were quite alien, and compelled to work on construction sites in the vicinity of opulent palaces and villas that were built with enormous expenses. Although their income appeared to be commensurate, it was consumed by the high rate of inflation.

1. Ibid, P. 43.
2. Ibid, P. 43.

At the beginning of 1976, with the reduction in oil revenues, execution of construction projects decreased and consequently, the laborers joined the ranks of the unemployed, because, with the bad and depressing agricultural situation in the rural areas, their return was impossible. With regard to the religious foundations of the majority of these laborers, at the start of the political-revolutionary movement in urban centers, this stratum of the mostly young, were amongst the central core of popular struggle. They themselves would establish communication channels and coordinate the struggle between urban and rural areas.

The numerous factors of social discontent had laid the groundwork for the Revolution. Some totally disregarded the dominant, religious values and showed indifference in relation to the demands of religious leaders, excessive licentiousness, widespread corruption and immorality and lack of observance of public decorum. Besides these, occupation of key and sensitive government positions by Baha'is and Zionists; control of the economy by the likes of the capitalist Baha'I, Sabet Pasal and the Zionist Elghanians; changing the origin of the Islamic calendar, and return to ancient values and traditions, sowed the seeds for a general uprising in Iran's society. In addition to them, one must add the presence of increasing numbers of foreigners, especially Americans, deficiency of societal services, daily increasing unemployment of middle and lower classes, which widened the gap between the affluent class and other social classes. In addition to all of the above-mentioned, increasing isolation of the people from the political system and likewise, impotency of the political power to secure the minimal societal needs and wants did not make many people optimistic of being able to maintain the status quo.

However, one must not forget that despite the wide and ever-increasing gap between the people of Iran and the ruling political power, the Shah's regime was favorably poised from the points of economic, military and international potential. With the increase in the price of crude oil in the first part of the 1970's, there was a manifold increase in government revenues. The regime, in the period just before the victory of the Revolution, had earned the reputation of being a generous lender among Arab and Third World countries. Implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and the selection of the Shah as the gendarme of the region had created an exceptional situation for

speedy and quantitative reinforcement of the armed forces, seen as the principal tool of repression and coercion of the regime. Finally, in the existing atmosphere of international understanding between the big powers of the world, the Shah's government enjoyed the material and spiritual support of all the influential powers of the world (including both of the east and of the west). Naturally, standing up to and fighting such a system that was at the peak of its power and preparing the ground for its downfall needed the actions of a superior power, which must be probed in the trilateral pillars of the Revolution.

With these interpretations, why the need for changing the status quo led to the Revolution; and despite the efforts made, why did the different types of social-political changes such as reform and military coup not solve the problem of Iran's society and not prevent the realization of a great and historic Revolution? The answer to these questions necessitates a discussion that we shall undertake in the next chapter.

Chapter Two:
Factors of Victory of the Islamic Revolution

- The People

- The leadership

- The Ideology

When a society becomes bipolar and it becomes impossible for the political and societal powers to come close to one another, then it becomes an unavoidable necessity to bring about socio-political change.

The political power in Iran had become detached from Iran's society and was treading a separate path. This movement, in the last decade of the Shah's regime gained such momentum, that few would have expected that the political system ruling over Iranian society would be able to heal the existing split between itself and society. Neither did the regime have the power and ability to raise its competency, nor did the people view themselves as being prepared to accept and be optimistic of it.

Therefore, Iranian society reached the explosion stage; and any incident could have led to chaos in the status quo, halt and disrupt the normal movement of society. Any attempt at healing the existing wounds and repairing the split between the people and the political system was futile. There was always the suspicion of deceiving the people. The Shah mentioned that if the single party (Rastakhiz) system did not succeed, there was no hope for survival of the regime. However, this question was of great importance; Why was it necessary for a revolution to take place in Iran and not just the socio-political changes that routinely occur all over the world?

In a brief comparison with the great revolutions of the world in the last century, one observes that the Islamic Revolution occurred in circumstances where the domestic and international situations favored such a movement from the political-military point of view.

Two great revolutions of the last century; that occurred in tsarist Russia and China, took place in political, social and economic conditions and circumstances that were perfectly conducive for such changes. Russia's October Revolution; that triumphed in 1917, was not the consequence of a struggle with the political power or the imperial Russian army or the ruling system. Both countries had been weakened in the course of the First World War. The only task that the revolutionaries accomplished was to gain control of the situation in a power vacuum and in a situation of anarchy.

The Second World War and unceasing foreign onslaught totally weakened the Kuomintang government of China, such that, with the exception of Beijing and its surrounding districts, the central government had no control over the situation in the country. Therefore, there was no major obstacle facing the revolutionary forces led by Mao Tse Tung to move ahead and take control of the country.

The state of affairs of the world during the victory of the Islamic Revolution, as opposed to the above two revolutions, was totally unfavorable for such a transformation. In this period, the superpowers were in a phase of peaceful coexistence. They had established a global system of imperialism. The great powers had arrived at an understanding to preserve the status quo. The survival of the Shah's regime entailed benefits for both the superpowers, so they supported it to the extent of their ability and until its last days. The Shah's regime depended on a four-hundred thousand strong military force that was equipped to the teeth with the most advanced of weapons and armaments. In such conditions, without resorting to the use of weapons, the Muslim nation of Iran revolted against the system of monarchy and triumphed.[1]

In order to understand the reasons for the victory of the Islamic Revolution, one must pay attention to two primary issues:

1. In the course of the recent century, the people of Iran engaged in protracted struggles against the ruling political system using reformist

1. For more studies on this subject, see "Islamic Revolution in Comparison with the French and Russian Revolutions"; second edition, 1995 written by the author.

and moderate methods. Although they gained sufficient experience in this field, but in practice, they tasted bitter defeats. The Conditional Monarchy Movement aimed at restricting the power of Iran's sovereigns; The Tobacco Movement, and Nationalization of the oil industry intended to halt the plunder of the country's resources by externals and foreigners. This finally led to the American-British military coup of August 19, 1953, the entrenchment of the dictatorial Shah's regime and the growing influence of foreigners in the destiny of Iran.

These historical experiences proved that unless a fundamental movement totally eradicates the political system's roots of corruption, and establishes a new system based on the sincere ideals and values of the people, the remnants of the decayed system shall grow and swallow all the achievements of the people's movement. Internal and external pressures to impose a compromise, left no doubt among the people and the leadership of the movement, that they must strive with all their strength to realize their lofty demands necessary to establish Islamic rule.

2. Simultaneous, synchronized and the essential presence of the three crucial pillars of revolution (the people, the leadership and the ideology) in the Islamic Revolution of Iran:

The people

One of the most important issues that has attracted the attention of most analysts of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and astounded foreign observers was how the people almost simultaneously and synchronously rose in revolt and rebelled with one voice demanding fundamental change, and brought about the downfall of the Shah's regime and established Islamic rule.

If we look at the rest of the great revolutions of the world, we do not witness a phenomenon of this magnitude. In the great French Revolution, initially the aristocrats, and thereafter, the urban bourgeoisie revolted and toppled the Bourbon regime. It is for this reason that the French revolution is famous as the 'revolution of the bourgeoisie'.

In the Russian Revolution, known as the 'Bolshevik revolution', the striking workers of the Petrograd factories and a group of soldiers of the urban barrack, who had joined the workers, were able to overthrow the Tsarist government.

In China, as well, the peasants and farmers led and guided the struggle for the major part and achieved victory. It is for this reason that China's Revolution is known as 'the agricultural-rural revolution'.

In Iran, with the exception of a small number of people very closely affiliated to the regime, all classes and strata of society, including agriculture, labor, trade, government employees, urban and rural students and pupils all over the country, rose in revolt together. There was no need for a consensus over the different wishes of groups, all, in a single voice, chanted the same slogans. The manifest illustration of this unity and solidarity was seen in the Eid-ul-Fitr Feast, Tasu'a and Ashura (ninth and tenth days of Muharram, martyrdom of Imam Hussein – AS) rallies in Tehran in the year 1978. The residents of Tehran – a city that had lost its religious character and was built and beautified just like European cities and resembled those cities more than the cities of Islamic states – suddenly rose in revolt and rediscovered their ideals and aspirations in spirituality and religion. Even those that were not too religious would chant the cry of "Allahu Akbar" - "God is Great"- in unison with the entire nation and declared religion as their buried identity. In 1978, on the day of the Eid-ul-Fitr Feast celebrations, Tehran stood on the threshold of a movement that enveloped the entire country and rediscovered its identity in a mystical frenzy. It discarded the normal discipline of modern societies like a mirage.

On the Ashura Day protests, leaving aside children, the aged and ill, and a group of women that stayed at home, the rest of Tehran's residents were on the streets shouting the slogan 'Death to the Shah'. Everybody, (with the exception of those that had very close links to the Shah's regime and lived and were fed by him), even those individuals who sided with the regime for long periods, and, until a short while ago, were supporters of the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, were shouting the slogan "Death to the Shah."

Revolutionary movements of the masses expose the collective will, and are extremely rare in the history of the world. Collective will is a political myth with the help of which philosophers attempt to analyze or explain organizations and establishments. Collective will's theoretical aspect is seldom visible; and to quote Michel Fokou "Like God, or the soul, is perhaps never visible to the eye." However, in Tehran, and throughout Iran, such a will became visible - and left behind an absolutely clear and permanent concrete reality.[1]

In the history of Iran, a sudden unity, based on strong religious feelings emerged. These feelings emerged from issues that were troubling the nation for years. Issues, such as control and influence of foreigners, feeling of hatred for plunder and pillage of national resources and capital, dependent foreign policy, and blatant influence of the United States and Britain everywhere. Creation of such a collective will and unity of the people was the outcome of either unity or compromise among various political factions. Each of the factions had come to an understanding, concerning their various demands; either adjusting them in certain instances or submitting to them.

Although the revolutionary movement in Iran was based on values and ideals of the Shiite school of thought, but followers of the Sunni sect also supported the uprisings and participated in the Revolution.

About the discussion that he had with one of the Sunni inhabitants of Kurdistan province, Michel Fokou writes:

"When I asked him about his participation in the Revolution despite all the sectarian and ethnic differences, he replied, 'It is correct that we are Sunni, but above everything else we are Muslims.' And although I told him that he was a Kurd, he said, "Not at all. Before anything we are Iranian, and have a share in all of Iran's issues. We want the Shah to leave. Long live Khomeini! Death to the Shah!" The slogans in Kurdistan were the slogans of Tehran and Mashhad."[2]

The intensity of the Revolution in Iran was because of: one, the collective will of the people that, from the political viewpoint, was

1. Keller Brier, Pierre Blanche, "Iran: Revolution by God", translated by Qasem Sanovie, Sahab press, P. 255.
2. Ibid; P. 1 – 260.

established and which no one - not even the enemies or the Shah – doubted. The other was their resolve to bring about essential fundamental change in the socio-political order and the values governing society.

In his memoirs entitled, "Pride and Fall', Anthony Parsons, Britain's ambassador to Iran, writes: "In one of my regular meetings with the Shah in the last months of his reign, he asked me with splendid melancholy, why the masses after all the services he had rendered to them, were standing face to face with him. In reply, I told him that in my opinion there were many reasons. The mass exodus of people into cities had led to formation of an uprooted group of discontented laborers. Many of them were employed in construction-related jobs. During daytime they would construct homes for the rich and at night they would retire to their shacks or even slums that were walled by plastic materials."[1]

Parsons had overlooked the main reason for the people's uprising, which was that the Shah had wanted the destruction of the firmly established values of their society that originated from their religion. It was for this reason that with the harm done to the religious sentiments of the Muslim nation of Iran, there was no room left for showing patience and tolerance vis-à-vis the rest of the political, societal and economic excesses. Thus, it was observed that the only thing, which the people would not mention in their slogans, was material and economic demands. Under the banner of religion and its creed; and from mosques, that are the places of worship of all Muslims; and under the leadership of the religious clergy, they rose in revolt and succeeded.

Throughout history, mosques have played a sensitive and critical role in struggles against the ruling tyrannical systems as well as against infiltration of foreigners. Mosques that were the constant and permanent place of worship of the people and in normal circumstances, they would congregate in them daily for performance of religious obligations, were sites for meeting, consultation, exchange of views and information, spiritual retreat, societal

1. Anthony Parsons, Pride and Fall, translated by Pasha Sharifi, Rah-e-Mou Press, P. 125.

decision-making, struggles and social activities. In fact, the mosque binds politics to worship and this has its origins in the common tradition and ways at the advent of Islam and especially in the era of the Honorable Prophet of Islam (SA). Even the movement of the soldiers of Islam for departure to the battlefield would commence from the mosques. Naturally, during the Revolution as well, and based on historical precedent, the mosques regained their forgotten role and became the focal points of struggle against the regime. The attack on the Goharshad Mosque during the reign of Reza Shah, the slaughter of the people, and bombardment of the Holy Mausoleum of Imam Reza (AS) by the Russians are some examples. Likewise, launching an attack, setting on fire and killing people in the Jumuah Mosque in Kerman, reveals the importance of mosques in the struggle. Their use as combat trenches is a symbol of hostility of the political power in relation to this sacrosanct site. However, the role of the clergy and the scholars of religion -*Ulema* - in the leadership and management of revolutionary movements, needs to be discussed further. The Shiite clergy, especially in Iran, possesses certain exclusive characteristics that are extraordinarily effective in carrying out their popular-revolutionary role. These special characteristics are as follows:

1. **Social position of the clergy:** The vast majority of the clergy belongs to the poor and deprived classes of society and come from rural backgrounds. They have tasted the trials and tribulations of societal masses and have grown up with them.[1] The educated and intellectual classes, who in many of the socio-political movements

1. Based on statistical examination of the Golpayegani Theological School in Qum undertaken by Michael Fischer in the year 1975-76, out of 256 seminary students of the school, 128 students (50%) hailed from rural backgrounds, 56 students (22%) belonged to clergy families and 62 students (28%) from middle and lower urban classes. See: Michael Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1980, P. 80.
In a similar examination in the year 1985 -86 of the "Rah-e-Haq Theological School" in Qum, the author arrived at the following conclusions: Out of 200 seminary students of the school, 25% hailed from agriculture farming families, 15% from livestock farmer families, 10% from families of clergies while 50% came from middle-class urban strata.

were responsible for the leadership of the national struggles, would establish an elite class with its own particular culture detached from the masses and no spiritual relationship with them.

2. **Economic independence:** In contrast with the Sunni clerics, who are employed by the government and rely for their sustenance and livelihood on the government, the Shiite clerics enjoy financial independence from the political system, and their livelihood depends on various sorts of assistance that is provided for by the Muslims and devoted people. Naturally, financial independence from the political system and provision of their livelihood by the people has helped the Shiite clergy perform its politico-religious activities according to the needs of the masses, and is free from any kind of anxiety and encumbrance. Here it is essential to mention two points:

First: the clergy has tried to lead a simple and free-from-opulence lifestyle; and this by itself has resulted in its independence, freedom from want and self-sufficiency.

Secondly, securing their livelihood is not dependent on the affluent and wealthy classes of society. It is mostly realized through the impoverished masses, the middle and lower classes which, with their firm religious convictions, consider themselves obligated to pay religious tolls such as "Khums' and 'Zakat', monetary contributions, and other offerings to contribute to the limited needs of the clergy.

3. **Establishing communication:** In the Shiite school of thought, the door to analytical thought continues to remain open; and this itself has not only resulted in growth and development of Shiite jurisprudence; rather, it has given special need and importance to the question of 'ijtihad' (analytical thought) and emulation, 'Taqleed'. Muslims must either themselves be qualified religious jurists i.e. a *Mujtahid*, and knowledgeable of issues of Islamic jurisprudence, or resort to 'Taqleed' (emulate) qualified Islamic jurists or competent Islamic jurisprudents who are known as *Marja-e-Taqleed* (Shiite legal authority). It is natural that due to a lack of access of all people in various regions to a qualified Shiite religious authority, the clergy play the role of liaison and communicators of the ideas and opinions of the Shiite legal authorities to the people. Without establishing any special chain of command system, the clergy have taken up the important role of being an intermediary between the prominent

religious leaders and the people. They reiterate the opinions and *Fatawa,* or religious verdicts of the qualified Shiite religious authorities to the people and reciprocally, communicate the problems and difficulties of the people to the religious leaders.

Shiite clerics, by obtaining special powers, were able to play a sensitive and critical role in socio-political movements of the last century. It is for this reason that whenever the Shiite clergy of Iran have fought with the ruling political power, the political power has lost the battle. The power of non-religious political leaders cannot be compared to the power of the clergy, and this has aroused their envy and resentment. In spite of needing them, whenever they were able to eliminate or betray them, they have not desisted from doing so.

In the last century, Iran's national leaders, who were generally liberal, reached the conclusion, that without the support of the clergy and the *Ulema* or religious authorities, it was not possible to establish rapport with the masses and get them to move. They established a kind of tactical understanding with them so that the clergy would provoke them into activity towards achieving their national aims and objectives. The constitutional monarchy movement and the nationalization of the oil industry are among instances in which the clergy assumed the role of leadership of the people. However, non-clergy leaders were only the harvesters of the fruit of those movements. On the other hand, the clergy were more dangerous than all other opponents, because they were seldom the ones to compromise or back down. Not only were they unfamiliar with political horse-trading, they were also, not reared in the Machiavellian theory of politics; and if they did enter the political arena, it was purely because they sensed that the nation and religion were in danger.

In connection with the role of the clergy and mosque in the people of Iran's struggles, Robert Graham writes thus:

"The fact of the matter is that the clergy (Shiite in Iran) lives among the people and has a very close relationship with them and, consequently, a better knowledge of the common people's sensitivities. The mosque is an integral part of the living of the masses and the *Bazaar*. The *Bazaar* is the center of the normal life of the people. When the clergy opposes the policies of the government,

their views possess such legitimacy that the people pay attention to them even in the most trying of authoritarian conditions. On the other hand, the clergy's communication network and the mosque system, enables them to get in touch with all strata of people."[1]

In Iran's clergy system, there is no official hierarchy. In contrast to centralized political systems such as political parties, it does not follow the rigid superior and subordinate relationship. A purely cordial and spiritual relationship, based on analytical thought and emulation, binds the societal groups to the clergy and ultimately to the religious leaders within the framework of religion. The directives of religious leaders are implemented by necessary coordination. Religious leaders also do not intervene in every small and minor issue; rather, their recommendations have a more guiding and reminding aspect to them for the implementation of religious and divine obligations. Identifying the concrete applicability, conforming and carrying out their views, is the responsibility of societal groups and individuals. This style of approach prevents the rigid hierarchy of giving and taking orders and results in creativity and participation of societal groups, by applying with greater efficiency, their own initiatives and theories on the manner of combat and confrontation with the political power. In this system, blind and mandatory obedience has no meaning. The mechanism of admitting members is irrelevant, and entry into active groups does not require specific conditions and attributes. Only acceptance of aims and objectives and the general framework of the struggle are sufficient for participation in the people's politico-religious movements. The clergymen solely play the role of a permanent communication network with the leadership of the struggle. It is from within the clergy that great socio-political leaders such as Imam Khomeini appear on the stage.

Leadership

Here our aim is not to talk about the performance of the leader of the revolution; rather, we would like to speak about his personality, special attributes and characteristics. Any person closely involved with Imam Khomeini would know that this man was an ideal human

1. Robert Graham; "The Illusion of Power", St. Martin's Press, New York, 1980, P. 218.

being. His power and capability, without any doubt, far exceeded the limit of an Islamic legal authority or *Marja-e-Taqleed*. He was regarded as a full-length-mirror-image of the complete meaning of self-knowledge and return to the self (as a true Muslim). Even non-Iranian Muslims saw in him the extremely invaluable sample of Islam's perfect human being.

With these special attributes, and despite being one who, within minutes, was able to cause million-strong crowds to pour on to the streets and participate in protest rallies, one observed nothing except simplicity in his living, place of work and residence,. He would sit on the floor behind a small desk, which was the entire equipment of his place of work. One Turkish journalist, who, like many other journalists after the victory of the Revolution, had come to see the Imam in order to ask questions on subjects such as rights of minorities and women, mesmerized by the Imam's personality, abashedly, kept quiet and refrained from asking the questions. He was only able to request the Imam to offer him some advice so that he could use it in his personal life. The Imam advised him to study the religion of Islam and offer his obligatory daily prayers.[1]

When we examine the Imam and his outstanding personality, we notice that he was indeed, the traditional embodiment of Shiite theologians. This is not because of his incredible, perfect, comprehensive and extensive influence and power in political and social affairs. It is a testimony of his pure scientific-traditional dimension as well.

The life of Imam Khomeini before he appeared as leader of the uprisings is noteworthy for its simplicity. He was born in 1902 into a scholarly family in the town of Khomein. His father, the martyr Ayatollah Sayyid Mostafa Mousawi was the son of the eminent Allameh, Sayyid Ahmad Mousawi. The Imam's great grandfather, who lived in the city of Najaf, came to Khomein on the invitation of Yousuf Khan Kamareie, in order to provide guidance to the residents of that town and the Imam's father was born in Khomein. The late Sayyid Mostafa pursued his education in the city of Najaf and

1. Hamid Algar, "The Islamic Revolution in Iran", Ansariyon Publication, Qum, 1981, P. 38.

Samarra during the time of Mirza Shirazi, and joined the ranks of the theologians and qualified religious authorities of his own era. After his return from Najaf, he took over leadership of the residents of the town of Khomein. However, in the year 1902, when Imam Khomeini was just a few months old, midway between the town of Arak and Khomein, an attempt was made on his life and he was martyred. The Imam's mother who hailed from a clergy family as well, together with his paternal aunt became the guardians of the Imam. It wasn't long after that the Imam's paternal aunt also departed from her earthy abode. Although these successive tragedies brought sorrow to the Imam, however, it made him more resilient in the face of crises and difficulties.

The Imam who possessed abundant intelligence and talent, learned to read and to write when he was still a child; and when he was fifteen years old, he learned syntax and logic from his older brother, and thereafter, left for the town of Arak to pursue his education. He enrolled in the seminary of that city, which was under the management of Ayatollah Hajj Sheikh Abdul Karim Haeri-Yazdi, and studied literature under the tutelage of eminent teachers of the time.

In the year 1921, when the theological school was transferred to the holy city of Qum, he also went to Qum and completed the advanced levels. He strengthened his academic foundations, the essentials of jurisprudential and rational theology under the guidance of the late Haeri and attained the degree of 'Ijtihad' (authority on religion of Islam).

In the year 1936, when Ayatollah Haeri passed away, the Imam was in possession of substantial, independent and concrete theological principles, was ranked among the topmost qualified religious authorities, and considered one of the outstanding theologians of the Qum theological school. In addition to the topmost position of Islamic jurisprudence, he was an absolute expert and specialist in the sciences of methodology, philosophy, wisdom and mysticism, which he had achieved under eminent teachers such as Ayatollah Sheikh Mohammad Ali Shahabadi.[1]

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1. For further studies in connection with the lifetime of Imam Khomeini see the book "Examination and Analyses of Imam Khomeini's Movement", vol.

From the viewpoint of spiritual purification and self-development, right from the start of his youth, he combined theory and practice. Besides studying Islamic sciences, he strove hard to achieve human and spiritual virtues. In this respect too, he attained a special standing and eminent position among the eminent theological and spiritual personalities, religious circles and the common people of Qum, and succeeded in keeping away from discordant attributes and methods that afflict some of the higher spiritual authorities.

In terms of discipline and orderliness, Imam Khomeini lived a uniquely disciplined life, and, one can seldom find such an outstanding example among the religious elite. The time of his resting and relaxing, worship, study, teaching and strolling had a unique order to it such that the rest of the family members adjusted their daily routine in accordance with the Imam's program.

One of the interesting aspects of his personality was that his unprecedented political leadership eclipsed his outstanding position as a supreme jurist, a philosopher and a mystic.

Among modern Muslims there is the thinking that the mindset of a philosopher or a mystic moves away from the realities of society; and that they evade acceptance of any type of political and social role. It seems as if purely mental issues, or existing problems of Muslims, and the world of Islam, have no visible relationship. However, Imam Khomeini's life is a vivid example of a possible relationship of the two categories, and reveals the fact that his program was not only a political and strategic movement, but it was based, at the same time, on a divine point of view. The ethical and spiritual characteristics of the Imam had built a supreme human being who incorporated all the outstanding attributes of an ideal Muslim. Imam Khomeini was one of the exceptionally rare revolutionary leaders who lived the simplest of lifestyles and without any sort of luxury and opulence – and with very simple eating habits.

The foremost subjects that he taught at the Qum seminary were philosophy and mysticism. His lecture halls would be full of seekers of knowledge. He has written numerous books, both in the form of

1. Authored by Sayyid Hamid Rouhani, Tehran, Offset press, 1982, pgs. 19 to 76.

main texts, as well as marginal notes on the texts, which, for the most part and on his own instruction, have not been published. He has compiled books on jurisprudence as well.

In the year 1944, in response to Hakamizadeh's book "Asraar-e-Hezar Saleh" (Thousand-Year Old Mysteries), Imam Khomeini wrote the book "Kashful Asraar" (Unearthing the Mysteries). In this book the Imam openly denounced King Reza Khan's regime, and especially attacked his submission and compromise vis-à-vis the foreign powers.

His way of dealing with the regime incorporated a style that was totally uncompromising and radical. This approach was not only unpardonable from the point of view of the Pahlavi regime; rather, it wasn't to the taste of many of the elite within the Qum Theological School. This was because despite all its power, the seminary at the start of its operations was making fervent efforts at survival. In the period when Ayatollah Boroujerdi was the undisputed religious authority, the Imam was reckoned as one of his close companions, but this did not mean that his views were necessarily the dominant views of the circle of advisors of the late Ayatollah Boroujerdi. Until the time when Ayatollah Boroujerdi was alive, the Imam wasn't recognized as a politico-religious personality. After the demise of Ayatollah Boroujerdi and Ayatollah Kashani, a few months later, the Shah showed his face more openly. By exploiting the existing vacuum, the Shah wanted to take certain steps that did not conform to the religious and sectarian principles. At that sensitive moment, the Imam entered the scene and, while expressing his opposition to the law of provincial and state assemblies,[1] started a relentless struggle against the Shah's regime. When his advice and admonishments did not yield results, he launched a direct attack and criticism of the Shah's regime, broke the tradition of *Taqiyyah* or 'precautionary dissimulation of one's faith,' and issued his historical *Fatwa* about

1. According to this law, the government made certain changes that were contradictory to religious principles; in particular the condition of being Muslim for the candidates elected to the assemblies was eliminated and instead of oath-taking on the Glorious Quran, oath-taking on any other holy book was considered valid.

the prohibition of *Taqiyyah* and mandatory need to express truths.[1] From this time the Imam demonstrated his political leadership, and with a unique approach – decisiveness and lack of compromise with the enemy – chose a different path from the rest; and quickly attracted the attention of the public, who yearned for such a leadership.

The subsequent trend of events showed that with the arrival of the Imam as leader on the scene of Iran's socio-political transformation, a new page opened in the history of Iran as well as that of the dissenting Shiite clergy.

If we go back a century, we can clearly observe the evolution of the dissenting clergy movement safeguarding the singular objective using different methods. The objective of all of them was implementation of Islamic canonical law, establishing the rule of Divine justice and repulsing the foreigners and colonialists.

In order to achieve this objective, Sayyid Jamaluddin Asadabadi had concentrated all his efforts towards counseling, guiding and encouraging rulers of Islamic states to establish unity in the world of Islam. He would try hard to advise Iran's kings, the Ottoman emperors and the Egyptian Khedives to revert to the impregnable fortress of Islam's culture and civilization, in the face of the devastating flood of western culture and civilization.

The clergy of the Conditional Monarchy Movement that had separated its ways from the sovereigns was divided into two groups:

The group of the late Behbahani and Tabatabaie aimed to limit the power of self-centered sovereigns and obtain assurance of installing a democratic system and granting the right of supervision to the qualified Islamic theologians. They hoped to prevent the legislation and implementation of laws that were at odds with Islamic canons. However, they stepped aside, losing ground to the forces that supported the west.

The group of the late Sheikh Fazlullah Nouri was deeply concerned about non-Islamic ideas dominating society and made attempts to establish the rule of Islam's canonical law. Ultimately, Sheikh

1. Sahifeh-e-Imam, vol. 1, P. 40.

Fazlullah, as a sample of this group, sacrificed his life at the altar of this objective.

The late Ayatollah Kashani, in order to attain freedom and repulse the foreigners, adopted the path of cooperation and collaboration with the nationalists in the hope of succeeding in establishing a government based on Islamic canons. He was unaware that the nationalists would not grant him and the Fedayian-e-Islam faction such an opportunity, and only wanted to use the clergy as a ladder to climb to the top and grab power.

When Imam Khomeini, who was highly experienced in the history of the dissenting clergy, became the leader, he did not allow others, including liberals, to have a share in the fruit of the people's struggles. The method of the Imam's dissension was extremely simple and was free of any type of modern-day politicking. From the very beginning, his objective was not victory and realization of his own and people's wishes; rather, it was the performance and fulfillment of religious obligations. He would say that 'we are purely acting on our divine and religious obligations; we shall either attain victory or be killed; in any case we are the victors.' This method of dissension was extremely disagreeable for those, who, for years, had developed a liking for Machiavellian political methods and western political tactics in social struggles and political exchanges. Adoption of such a method not only angered the regime and his opponents; rather, it was astounding for his close companions and friends as well.

For this reason, the Imam did not establish a coherent political party and organization with an orderly cadre, nor did he have a prepared program. Only by using his own genius and charisma, while leaning on clear-cut Islamic slogans and criteria, as well as his own unique decisiveness, applied the required tactics in order to achieve the objective of an ideal Islamic society.

The Imam had a special genius for communicating with the masses seldom observed in people. He would explain the most complex socio-political issues in very simple and easily understandable – even for the most illiterate of people – terms; and with his oratory, penetrate the hearts of the faithful and pious human beings. One must bear in mind that the Imam's style of leadership and struggle in the Islamic Revolution was the result of a protracted historical tradition

that had started from the time of advent of Islam. He had a profound understanding of the glorious Quran, the tradition of the Honorable Prophet of Islam (SA) and the Immaculate Household of the Prophet (AS). His analyses of the process of history of socio-political changes in the world of Islam, especially of Iran, and studying the socio-political situations of the contemporary era, the Imam opted for his method of struggle. Initially, he got rid of the obstacles on the path of the struggle including *Taqiyyah* or precautionary dissimulation of one's faith. Next, by proposing the unconstitutionality of the monarchy, he relentlessly struggled and unceasingly attacked that institution. Thereafter, by declaring his ultimate objective, which was the establishment of Islamic rule, he decisively and firmly resisted - despite all pressures and efforts at compromise and conciliation – until victory.

The period of the Imam's leadership can be divided into four stages:

First Stage: Appearance of Imam Khomeini as a politico-religious leader and gaining immediate acceptance of the masses

This period started with his announcement of opposing the law of provincial and state assemblies, which reached its peak in his famous speech on Ashura; {tenth and final day commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (AS)} his arrest and the June 5 uprising. Consequently, and following his intense opposition to the 'Capitulation Bill', he was exiled to Turkey.[1]

In this period of the struggle, the Imam performed four essential steps:

1. He banned *Taqiyyah*, or precautionary dissimulation of one's faith. This was the biggest impediment in the direct struggle of the people against self-centered regimes, and a tool in the hands of compromising individuals, now removed from the path of the Islamic movement and struggle.

2. By linking the struggle to the main hub of religious activities, meaning the Qum Theological School, he invalidated the theory of separating religion from politics. He even compelled those who

1. On this subject see: "Stances of the Freedom Movement vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution"; P. 124.

loathed engaging in political activities to adopt a stance, and smashed the long-standing tradition governing the theological school.

3. By directing the sharp edge of his attacks at the main epicenter of corruption meaning the monarchy and the person of the Shah, he put an end to the conformist style of the struggle. In the past, opponents and dissenters of the regime, especially the liberals, and even some of the religious dissenters, launched their attacks on the inner circle of the Shah, attempting to avoid directly attacking the monarchy and the Shah. Criticizing the Shah's inner circle, including the prime minister and the government committees instead of the royal court, was to consider it as exempt from involvement in wrongdoings and offences. The Imam while censuring the legitimacy of the Pahlavi monarchy, put aside any kind of caution, and launched his attack on the chief factor of all decadences, meaning the monarchy of the royal courtiers and the Shah, and in the process emboldened and encouraged others to do the same as well.

"Only God is aware of the crimes that Iran's monarchy has committed from its inception. It has blackened the crimes of all the emperors of our history. Were there not emperors who would order the massacre of the people and without the least hesitation order beheadings? From the point of view of the Prophet of Islam (SA) the title 'king of kings' was the most despicable in the sight of God. Islamic principles are opposed to monarchy. Demolish the palaces of the tyrannical monarchy of Iran! Monarchy is one of the most shameful and meanest of reactionaries…."[1]

4. By launching a direct attack on all the great foreign powers headed by America, he rejected any type of political conservatism, which was fashionable in the past, and especially during the Constitutional Monarchy Movement and nationalization of the oil industry, and selected totally new methods of dissent. During the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, by staging a sit-in in front of the British Embassy in Tehran, the supporters of the constitutional monarchy attempted to attract the backing of the so-called "His Majesty's" government of Britain – and it led to the control of the people of

1. Brier, Keller and Blanche: Iran: Revolution in the Name of God", translated by Qasem Sanovie, P. 13.

Iran's destiny by the Freemasons. During the nationalization of the oil industry movement, to quote Dr. Mossadeq, they took advantage of the conflict of interests of the two big powers. He meant that, with the help of the American administration, the oil industry was nationalized, and sometime later, with the military coup of August 19, 1953, the American and British administrations not only gained control over the oil industries, but over the entire affairs of the country for the next twenty-five years.

With an accurate understanding of the past, with the famous phrases like, "America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America; the Soviet Union is worse than both of them and even more evil than all. However, today our involvement is with this wicked power; it is with America", he closed the way for those that promoted reliance on foreign powers, so that they would not be able to enjoy the fruit of the people's struggle by participating in the struggle.

They Imam enjoyed a unique position, that of a supreme religious authority which gave religious legitimacy to his statements and views. Despite the fervent attempts of the regime to transfer the position of general religious authority to a foreign country after the passing away of the late Ayatollah Boroujerdi. However, by gaining public acceptance, he quickly took charge of this position and made it his own. As Iran's new religious-political leader in an era of despair and pessimism, he sparked a ray of light in the heart and soul of human beings thirsting for revolt. The entire people found their lost one and rediscovered their aims and aspirations in the statements and writings of the new leader.

Second stage: In this stage the leadership of the Imam passed a prolonged fifteen-year intermission period. His fiery speech against the Capitulation law passed with the backing of the American citizens residing in Iran, resulted in his exile to Turkey. This stage of the struggle began from this very point and ended with his departure from the holy city of Najaf to Paris. In this stage the Imam once in a while, with regard to the incidents that took place in Iran, continued with his opposition and struggle against the regime by publishing communiqués and *Fatawa* and giving speeches, maintaining his spiritual communion with the people and guiding them. However, the important task that the Imam accomplished in this period, was that,

while giving lectures on Islamic jurisprudence, he discussed the topics related to Islamic rule or authority of the qualified Islamic jurisprudent. By presenting an alternate system of Islamic government that was shrouded in ambiguity for them, he made it clear to them as to what type of society and rule he intended to establish.

The Imam played the role of the Revolution's ideologue superbly. The ideology of the Revolution, founded on the doctrine of Islam and based on the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet (SA) and narratives, was never doubted. However, fourteen centuries had passed since the true Islamic state had been established in practical form. During the period of the Greater Occultation of the Savior, the Twelfth Imam, Imam Mahdi (may Allah expedite his blessed reappearance), and with regard to the enormous societal changes that had taken place in the course of the past fourteen centuries, it wasn't clear to the people what sort of Islamic rule must be founded on the ruins of the monarchical regime. They wondered how it would deal with the diverse issues and in particular, the new phenomenon of the present era. It was not clear what the basis of selection would be. They did not know how the authority of leadership of the government and division of responsibilities would be worked out. They wondered whether this government would be a form of theocracy, western democracy or totalitarian. The Imam presented the principle of authority of the Islamic jurist or *Wilayat-e-Faqih,* and clarified the main framework of Islamic rule and presented it to the people.

Third Stage: The leadership of the Imam began from the time the first sparks of the Revolution, in the month of December 1978-January 1979 in the holy city of Qum, caused an inferno from beneath the simmering ashes. It was not long before its flames razed the entire edifice of the system ruling over Iran to the ground, and put an end to 2500 years of monarchy forever

In this period, judging the moment to be right, and with the awakening and agitation of the people, the Imam did not consider hesitation to be permissible and carried the banner of leadership of the Revolution on his shoulders. Without any sort of compromise and a correct understanding of the wishes, determination and capability that the people displayed with fervor and self-sacrifice in the protest rallies and clashes with the governmental forces, the Imam declared,

and pursued with a steely and unshakable resolve, his decision to continue the relentless struggle until the overthrow of the Shah's regime.

With the Imam's departure to France and the possibility of greater accessibility, the small town of Neuphle le Chateau[1] became the place of pilgrimage of his fervent devotees and those Iranians who were eager to see the leader of the Revolution. For a time, this place became the second administrative capital of Iran, or better still, the de facto capital of Iran. It was here that the Islamic Revolution moved from the theoretical to the practical stage, and exterminated the Shah's regime.

The method used by the Imam, in this period, to carry the Revolution to victory, included the following:

1. He prevented the access and penetration of all opportunists that, sensing imminent victory, were trying to get close to him. "The Imam has no spokesman. We have not arrived at an understanding or entered into a coalition with anybody. Whoever speaks our language is with us and is with the people." In this manner, the Imam prevented any type of misuse of his position and of the achievements of the Revolution.

2. His firm, uncompromising and unforgiving method of realizing the objectives of the struggle, neutralized many attempts by the liberals and the moderates from compelling the Imam to adopt more moderate policies or go 'step-by-step', or, in the words of Engineer Bazargan ;former interim prime minister, adopt the "bunker – to – bunker" approach. The Imam categorically rejected all of them and would always declare that the Shah must leave and the Islamic Republic be established in his place with the vote of the people.

3. In Paris, access to mass media was easy. The Imam made maximum use of this situation to communicate the Revolution's message to the people of the world. Despite his old age, he would participate in several newspaper and television interviews and give answers to the diverse queries of journalists. In this manner, the Imam succeeded in giving an extensive global dimension to the aims and

[1] The Imam's town of residence whilst in France

objectives of the Revolution and opened yet another chapter at the international level of struggle against the Shah and his patrons. Thus, the Imam was able to lead and guide the zeal and will of the people in a way that the aims and objectives of the Revolution were realized in the shortest possible time and without resorting to use of weapons and violence. As the movement of the people gained momentum, the genius and power of the Imam's leadership reached its peak and, with the departure of the Shah from Iran, and triumphant return of the Imam amidst the people, the pulse and heartbeat of the Revolution increased rapidly. On Saturday February 10, 1979, the Imam ordered civil disobedience of the martial law regime. The last hours of the Shah's regime and the moment of victory of the Revolution had arrived.

The Fourth Stage: This stage was the most sensitive and difficult. It was a period when the leader of the Revolution, as the head of the government, would have to calm down the hysteria of the Revolution. It was a situation where the political and military power of the evil regime had collapsed. Millions of human beings were set free and the possibility of every type of chaos and the movement getting out of control existed. Besides controlling the excitement and hysteria of the public and preventing anarchy, the leader of the Revolution had to, like an able and merited architect; build the new edifice of Islamic rule, whose plan was devised previously, on the ruins of the deposed regime.

It was in this period that any sort of inattention to detail and negligence could provide the motives for misuse of taken-for-granted freedoms. It could lead to indolence in the zeal and fervor of the people, who were the main locomotive of the Revolution. It could rob the Revolution of its achievements and cause it to deviate from the main drawn-up route.

The clear method that Imam Khomeini applied in the form of struggle with the Shah's regime, condemned any type of modern-day politicking. An illusion had been created in the minds of many analysts that the Imam did have the ability to fight with the regime and topple it; but was incapable of structuring and organizing the society and government after it, and would hand over most of the tasks to the technocrats and the experts. Again, the Imam, with his

unique sagacity and capability, dashed the hopes of many of the technocrats and filled them with despair. He showed his aptitude and capability at perpetuating the leadership of the people's movement and struggle on the one hand, by going after and smashing the remnants of the former regime and new anti-revolutionaries, whilst on the other hand, he monitored the people's readiness and circumstances with indescribable patience.

In only one year, with a speed that was unprecedented in all of the world's revolutions, he strengthened the foundations and structure of the Islamic system by holding numerous elections, including the referendum to establish an Islamic republic; elections in choosing the Assembly of Experts, presidential elections, elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly (legislature), and a referendum on the constitution. In this manner, he revealed his incomparable competency and ability at building and managing the post-revolution society.

From the victory of the Revolution until his demise, a period slightly more than ten years, Imam Khomeini ensured the survival of the newly-established Islamic system and saved it from various plots, deadly dangers and deviations, each of which could, on its own, have been enough to topple a political system. By solving many of the complex ideological and jurisprudential problems that could have lead to the deadlock of the system, he provided the motives for the permanence of the system and survival of the Revolution after his death. In the subsequent chapters we shall discuss these instances further.

Whether we believe in Karl Marx's saying that "Human beings and heroes are the creations of history", or in the statement of Thomas Carlisle, "Human beings and heroes are the ones who create history", is a discussion that may perhaps not be appropriate to deal with here. However, on analyzing the evolutionary trend of the Islamic Revolution and the leadership of Imam Khomeini, in particular, one can say that he himself was a product of the history of Islam, and, at

the same time, is also considered to be a maker of history with the establishment of the Islamic Revolution.[1]

Ideology

The foremost duty of a leader is to compile and present the revolution's ideology. To gain extensive social acceptance, the ideology must take into account the rejected system and the rejected values, while envisaging a bright future ahead for the revolutionaries. In Iran, three diverse ideologies from the start of the last century summoned social groups towards themselves: nationalism, socialism and Islam. Their promoters aimed to attract a greater number of followers by putting their preferred society on display.

Nationalism, as defined by westerners, was a group of people gathered together within defined geographical frontiers having a common race, historical past, language, culture and traditions, to be reckoned as a single inseparable unit and principle. Whatever is placed within the jurisdiction of interests, expediencies, honor and credibility of this unit, be regarded as friendly, while the rest be considered foreign and hostile.

In other words, national feeling or nationalism consists of the presence of a mutual feeling among a group of individuals that make up a political entity or nation. Although this idea has been inspired by the liberalist society of the west, in the countries of the Middle East it is used as a weapon to fight the invasion and hegemony of colonialists and foreigners. This ideology was able to attract the attention of the intellectual and educated classes to itself. It was the dominant and overriding theory in the Constitutional Monarchy Movement and the movement for the nationalization of the oil industry as well, and achieved notable success in presenting its desirable yardsticks and values. However, this doctrine was not able to establish itself firmly among the masses because, on one hand,

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1. Hassanein Heikal (the renowned Egyptian journalist) compared Imam Khomeini to a candle that is burning and is on the verge of being extinguished, but has the power of a thousand nuclear bombs. Arab media have remembered him in the following words: "Truly, Khomeini astounded the east, shook the west, placed the Arabs in a tight situation and preoccupied the thoughts of all peoples of the world with himself."

nationalism was at odds with the religious beliefs of the people, as the western definition of nationalism, which claimed racial and hereditary distinctions, had no place in Islam. On the other hand, the unique characteristics of Iranian society did not conform to the yardsticks of nationalism, because the majority of the people of Iran that speak the Iranian and Farsi language are either Arab or Turk or Mongol, just as many Arab nationals who claim to be of Arab descent are either of Iranian, Turkish or Mongol descent. If we are to define Iranian descent as of race and regard those that are of Aryan race as Iranian, then we must consider a relatively large population of Iran as being non-Iranian and relinquish a large part of our glories. With regard to its non-religious essence, liberalism was also not able to establish itself firmly among the people, although for many years after the Revolution it continued to exist as a rival.

Socialism was the only viable revolutionary ideology, which after the October Revolution of Russia attracted the attention of radical and youthful revolutionary forces. This ideology, because of the proximity of the Soviet Union had a great impact in Iran, The socialists tried to further their aims and objectives towards changing Iran's social system and establishing a socialist system through publicity, and by establishing disciplined organizations that were covert, overt and at the same time cohesive. The crystallization of this movement and effort was observed in the formation of the Tudeh Party and in its relatively long past.

In spite of a lot of activities and efforts, this ideology was less successful than that of nationalism for two reasons:

1. The atheistic nature and materialist base were seriously opposed to the nature of Iranian society and profound religious beliefs of the people of Iran, and so it could not enjoy general acceptance.

2. The intense dependence of the Marxists on Moscow and the bitter record of historical relations of Iran and Russia made them feel that it would cause them to be recognized only as a dependent and foreign-affiliated faction, also, they might become a victim of Russia's international policies.

However, as a Divine religion, Islam had a historical place deep inside the hearts and souls of the vast strata of society. It dominated

the traditions and customs of individuals and their private lives. 98% of Iran, traditionally Muslims, and most of them abiding by the instructions of their Holy Book and practice its teachings, was far better prepared to accept Islam as the ideology of political-societal revolution.

The unique feature that distinguished the ideology of Islam all other political doctrines and gave it a special appeal, lay hidden in the global perspective of Islam, whose clear-cut lines consisted of the following:

1. Truth and existence are not the same as material and nature. (The material is a reflection of the absolute non-material truth)

2. The material world is a phenomenon that originates from absolute existence and truth. It possesses a knowledgeable, wise and omnipotent source that has control over all natural relations and factors; and the entire universe, natural factors, movements, actions and reactions in the material world are the actions of Almighty God and the scene of manifestation of His Will.

3. In a divine global perspective, the world of existence is placed under Divine supervision and guardianship; and material creatures with the guardianship and management of Almighty God are moving from imperfection towards perfection – and unto Him is the return of all.

4. In this global perspective, a human being is not in possession of a material dimension only; rather, he possesses a spiritual dimension as well. He is in motion towards the Absolute Perfection; meaning the Creator of Existence and his perfection lies in his reunion with God.

5. Man is an eternal and immortal creature; and he does not become mortal with death. He has other worlds ahead of him, in which he finds the results of his deeds that he performed during the life of this world.

6. Man is a free creature. Sometimes he chooses to move towards God and sometimes towards Satan.

7. The life of this world is performed in stages in which a human being achieves perfection; and with his deeds, secures eternal life and immortality.[1]

The following problems were major drawbacks in the application of this ideology to the Revolution:

1. In the past , it was propagated by the west that religion does not have sufficient ability to resolve the complex social-political problems of the time. This propaganda had left its mark on the people – even on some of the clergy and the Islamic scholars.

2. Actualization of the perfect society by Islam belonged to an era fourteen centuries ago. For many it was unimaginable that it would be possible to carry out its instructions in today's advanced industrial societies and the so-called 'atomic age', and that Islam could resolve the complex issues of the present era.

3. The idea that Islam could be used as an ideology of revolution and transform the ruling values, did not exist for most people and even for some of the believing Muslims.

Despite the sacred struggles and efforts of men such as Sayyid Jamaluddin Asadabadi, Ayatollah Naeini, Ayatollah Nouri, Ayatollah Modarris, Ayatollah Kashani and the Fadaiyaan-e-Islam faction led by Navvab Safavi, Islam as an ideology of revolution did not enjoy any success in the belief system of the masses and especially the youthful revolutionaries.

It was not until the year 1962 that the leader of the Revolution, with an accurate understanding of these difficulties, took step-by-step actions to eliminate the obstacles along the path, and succeeded in fighting the baseless fears existing in the people's minds, and put forward its new methods as the most preferred ideology of revolution in society.

As the qualified legal authority of the Shiites, Imam Khomeini initially outlawed *Taqiyyah* (precautionary dissimulation of faith) and made it mandatory to speak out the truth.[2] He solved this problem,

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1. Authority of the Islamic Jurisprudent and Sovereignty of the Nation; Taheri-Khorramabadi, Pages 18 – 19.
2. Sahifeh-e-Imam, vol. 1, page 40.

which itself was a major impediment in the path of the Revolution and an excuse for the complacent.

As the great theological authority (Marja-e-Taqleed) and main lever of the Qum Theological School, he proved the notion of segregation of religion from politics as incorrect. During the period of his exile to the holy city of Najaf, he created a fundamental change in the perception towards Islam by proposing it as a dynamic and pragmatic ideology of revolution in the present era. He rejected the existing administration and questioned the values governing the system. He rejected the much promoted belief that the sovereign ruler was the shadow of God, and that monarchy was a Divine trust and obeying the sovereign ruler meant obeying God. He remarked:

"Where in Islam have all these articles of the constitution and their clauses related to monarchy, the crown prince and so forth been mentioned? All of them are anti-Islamic; they violate the style of government and tenets of Islam. Monarchy and heirs to the throne are the things on which Islam put the seal of cancellation and threw out its trappings when it reached Iran, the Eastern Roman empire, Egypt and Yemen. The Honorable Prophet of Islam (SA), in his blessed letters wrote to the emperor of the Eastern Roman empire (Heracles), and the emperor of Iran, to desist from monarchy and imperial forms of government and allow the people to worship the singular and sole proprietor God, who is the true sovereign. Monarchy and inheritance to the throne is the inauspicious and invalid form of government that the Doyen of the Martyrs, Imam Hussein (AS), rose in revolt against to prevent its establishment, and was martyred."[1]

For the first time the leader of the Revolution proclaimed a value to be invalid that, for a long time, was promoted and inculcated among the people, and recognized as a main component of the constitution.[2]

The next duty of the ideologue of the revolution was not only to envisage the ideal society, but to show the practical means of achieving it as well. For the believers in Islam, it was an accepted fact that Islamic rule, implemented by the Honorable Prophet of Islam (SA) and the rightly-guided caliph (for the Shiites, solely the period

1. Imam Khomeini: "Authority of the Islamic Jurisprudent", Pages 10 – 11.
2. Article 35 addendum of the former constitution of Iran.

of the rule of His Holiness Imam Ali (AS)), could be regarded as a role model for the government of the future. However, the important point was to show the means of establishing such a rule after fourteen centuries, considering the complexities of modern-day society.

On the other hand, a large number of people believed that the world must saturate with immorality, injustice and tyranny for the promised Savior His Holiness, Imam Mahdi (may Allah hasten his blessed reappearance) to appear and fill the world with justice and equity and to establish Islamic rule. They considered the possibility of establishing such a regime, during the time of Occultation, to be absolutely impossible, and reckoned all attempts to make such a move to be in vain.

By presenting the principle of *Wilayat-e-Faqih* or 'Authority of the religious Jurisprudent', the leader of the Revolution proved that the commandments of God were not subject to cancellation. He showed that under no circumstances – not even during the period of Greater Occultation of the Savior – could one desist from carrying out the Divine commandments, and this responsibility rested on the shoulders of the Islamic jurists, theologians and especially the Supreme Islamic Jurisprudential Authority. The Imam, while addressing the seminary students, stated:

"You can only claim to be the vicegerents of Islam if you teach Islam to the people; and not say 'leave it till the reappearance of Savior Imam (may Allah hasten his blessed reappearance).' Do you ever postpone your mandatory prayers for the time of arrival of the Savior Imam Mahdi (may Allah hasten his blessed reappearance). After all, to safeguard Islam is a greater obligation than the mandatory prayers. Do not follow the logic of anyone who says that sins must be allowed to become commonplace so that the Savior Imam (may Allah hasten his blessed reappearance) arrives; that, if sins do not become commonplace, His Holiness won't appear."[1]

Two conditions are necessary for the ruler to govern Islamic society:

He must have complete and comprehensive knowledge of the commandments of God; and secondly, he should follow the path of

1. Imam Khomeini: Authority of the Islamic Jurisprudent, P. 75.

justice in carrying out those commandments. In other words, as the successor to the Prophet of God (SA) and the Immaculate Imams of the Household of the Prophet (AS), the just jurisprudential authority bears the responsibility of leading Islamic society and implementing the commandments of Islam. It is mandatory to obey him, as obeying him is obeying the Prophet of God (SA).

Concerning the ruler and guardian of the affairs of the Muslims in the Islamic system, the vote of the people only has the role of actualizing the principle of *Wilayat-e-Faqih* or 'authority of the Islamic jurisprudent' to the implementation stage. This means that guardianship of affairs is a position bestowed on him by God, and its substantiation is not conditional upon public opinion. Even though people do not accept him as leader and guide; but granting objectivity and actualizing guardianship is tied to the opinion and general acceptance of the people.

On the other hand, it is possible that more than one person has the qualifications and attributes of guardianship. This means that we have several just, intelligent and knowledgeable Islamic jurists in the society and one person among them must take the responsibility of leadership and guidance. It is evident that one of the practical ways for actualizing the guardianship and leadership of a single individual from among several persons, is the vote of the majority. That, as a matter of course, after election and assumption of responsibilities of leadership and guardianship, absolves others of the duty of leadership.[1]

Through this principle, the leader of the Revolution determined and presented three important aims of the Revolution:

1. Toppling the evil *Taghuti* (monarchical) regime

2. Establishing Islamic rule

3. Guaranteeing such a rule by applying the 'guardianship of the Islamic Jurisprudent' principle

Imam Khomeini on this subject has said:

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1. Ibid.

"In these social and political conditions, the pious and faithful human being has two options in front of him: he does not commit a deed by coercion nor submit to "evil" directives and laws; fights and opposes them till he eliminates those corrupt conditions. We have no alternative but to destroy the corrupt apparatus and overthrow the treacherous, corrupt, unjust and tyrannical ruling committees. This is a duty that all Muslims in each and every Islamic state must perform and take the political-Islamic revolution to victory."[1]

"And in order to liberate and free the homeland of Islam from occupation and infiltration of colonialists and their hand-picked governments, we have no choice but to establish an Islamic government."[2]

On another occasion, he stated:

"How can we remain silent today, sit idle and watch a group of traitors, profiteers and agents of foreigners, with the help of outsiders and with the power of the gun, usurp the wealth and labor of hundreds of millions of Muslims and deter them from the use of a minimum amount of bounties. The duty of Islam's religious authorities, the *Ulema*, and all Muslims, is to put an end to this cruel situation; and on this path, which is the path of well-being and happiness of hundreds of millions of human beings, overthrow the unjust regimes and establish Islamic rule."[3]

Thereupon, comparatively analyzing, the Leader of the Revolution explained the nature of the Islamic government:

"The Islamic government is unlike any other existing forms of government. For instance, it is not authoritarian; the head of the government cannot be self-centered and dictatorial. He cannot toy with the lives and property of the people and consume and own it to his own liking; kill whoever he pleases and reward whoever he likes; distribute land to whoever he wants and give away estates and properties to anyone. Even the Honorable Prophet of Islam (SA), His Holiness, the Leader of the Faithful, Imam Ali (AS) and the rest of

1. Taheri-Khorramabadi; Ibid, P. 86.
2. Imam Khomeini: "Authority of the Islamic Jurisprudent", P. 35.
3. Ibid, P. 36.

the caliphs, did not enjoy such powers. The Islamic government is neither authoritarian nor totalitarian. It is constitutional; not in the conventional sense of the term in which ratification of laws depends on individuals and a majority vote. Constitutional in the sense that, in both administration and execution, the administrators are committed to a set of conditions, that have been specified in the glorious Quran and revealed by the traditions of the Honorable Prophet of Islam (SA). The set of conditions are the commandments of Islam, which are mandatory to observe and implement. In this sense, the Islamic government is a government of Divine Law over the people…in this form of government, sovereignty belongs exclusively to God and the law is the commandment and decree of God."[1]

Imam Khomeini believed that the method of struggle and establishing a government of Divine Justice lay in the revolutionary and core movement of the masses; and for this purpose the foremost duty of the clergy, in his opinion, was to educate the people. He recommended the mode of struggle to be peaceful, coupled with mass protest; and though he did not reject armed movements, he did not recommend and prescribe it at the start of the struggle.

"If a mass protest is held against tyrants who commit an offence or crime; if several thousand telegraphic messages are sent to them from all across the Islamic lands in protest, asking them to desist from committing that offensive deed, certainly they shall desist from doing so. When they carry out a task or give a speech that is opposed to Islam's honor and interests of the people, if from all over the country, from all regions and districts, they are denounced, they shall soon retreat from their position…I know them. I know what they are up to; they are in fact extremely gutless; they retreat very quickly. However, when they see that we are clumsier than them, then they show off."[2]

"Our foremost activity comprises of propagation. We must move ahead through propagation…There will be no power and military involved right from the beginning, and we will move ahead only by means of propagation. We will condemn the bullies and the dictators. We will educate the people and explain to them that their strong-arm

1. Ibid, P. 38.
2. Ibid, P. 141.

tactics are wrong. Gradually our propagation will spread and embrace all of society's groups. People will wake up and get going – and come to our conclusions."[1]

Propagation and teaching are two of our important and essential activities. It is the duty of Islam's religious authorities to promote the beliefs, commandments and disciplines of Islam and educate the people on them."[2]

He then described the practical plan and strategy of the struggle to weaken and eventually overthrow the political power:

1. Sever your relations with governmental institutions and refrain from cooperating with them.

2. Avoid doing anything that is of help to them.

3. Establish judicial, financial, economic, cultural and political institutions.[3]

In this manner the widespread involvement of the Muslim nation of Iran in the struggle led by its foremost religious authority, who, with his unique genius and sagacity and under the banner of the revivalist and global doctrine of Islam, led the process until the incredible victory of the Islamic Revolution.

The question, as to which factor or factors sped up the movement of the Islamic Revolution and the course of events related to it, is what we shall discuss within the next chapter.

1. Ibid, P. 151.
2. Ibid, P. 152.
3. Ibid. P. 179.

Chapter Three:
Factors accelerating the Revolution

- Implementation of Jimmy Carter's Human Rights Policy

- The Shah's affliction with cancer

- The Shah's attempts at rapid modernization of the country

- Publication of an insulting article

One issue that attracts the attention of analysts of revolutions and supporting and opposing political groups after the victory of any revolution are the factors that caused the elements that bind the affairs of states to disintegrate, and disrupt the ruling system. What made affairs get out of the hands of the political power and accelerate the agitation of the masses? What was the main factor that accelerated the occurrence and victory of the revolution? These are all known as 'accelerating factors.'

Many books have been written in connection with the quick and unpredictable victory of the Islamic Revolution. In the western world, and in particular, the United States of America, various theories have been presented to identify the chief factors responsible for the collapse of the Shah's regime; and the American officials of that time, in order to defend their actions, have resorted to publishing their memoirs of that period. Among them, one can name the memoirs of Jimmy Carter, the then President of the United States; Brezinski, the former National Security Advisor; Vance, the Foreign Secretary; Sullivan, the Ambassador of the United States in Tehran, and Hamilton Jordan, the Chief of Staff of the White House. The ousted Shah has written on the subject as well. Each analyst and each political faction, while offering the particular factor of his own consideration as the primary factor, does not overlook the other factors as secondary and subordinate factors.

Most of them wonder how a country, which Jimmy Carter considered as an island of peace and stability in January 1978, and addressed its ruler as the most powerful and capable leader of the Middle East,[1] became so turbulent in a matter of one year and transformed, bringing in its wake, the victory of the Islamic Revolution. For many of the people both inside and outside the country it was quite unpredictable.

All socio-political phenomena naturally contain relatively detailed historical grounds without which the probability of their occurrence ceases to exist. However, here the discussion is not about which period one must go back to in order to have an accurate understanding of the cornerstone of the Islamic Revolution. Attention is focused on the immediate factors that inevitably caused the victory of the Revolution to take place on a particular date: February, 11, 1979.

Based on diverse points of view and analyses, four major factors are deduced:

1. Implementation of Jimmy Carter's human rights policy

2. The Shah being afflicted with cancer

3. The Shah's efforts at rapid modernization of the country

4. Publication of an insulting article in the *Etelaat newspaper* about the leader of the Revolution, hurting the religious sentiments of the people

Implementation of Jimmy Carter's human rights policy

The first theory opines that Jimmy Carter's policy of supporting human rights and the pressure he exerted on the dictatorial rulers allied with America in the Third World including the Shah of Iran, led to a reduction in the pressure necessary for controlling the opponents. As a result, the liberalization policies in societies that

1. On the night of the New Year January 1, 1978 (one year before the downfall of the Shah) at a banquet held in his honor in Tehran, Jimmy Carter applied the following phrases in praise of the Shah: "Iran is an island of peace in the most turbulent region of the world. It is a great honor for Your Majesty and is indebted to your leadership and the respect, love and affection that your people have for you."

were not prepared to use freedom correctly, led to disruption of the normal process of living and Iran's political system.

The theory, that American liberalism was imposed on the Shah, had a large following not only in America but in Iran, as well. In America, the Republicans and the conservative faction, and even some of the liberals, accepted this theory as a principle. They felt that attempts of the American administration to implement human rights and serious departure from the policies of previous American administrations vis-à-vis Iran, was the chief factor in the downfall of the Shah. This imposition of the liberalization policy on the Shah had a profound effect on his morale, encouraging his opponents, and ultimately leading to his downfall.

In Iran, a number of the Shah's supporters and even a significant section of the liberals linked the Shah's downfall to the implementation of Carter's human rights policy. This is one of the rare instances where the liberals of Iran are in agreement with the conservatives of America.

Kirkpatrick, the permanent representative of the United States of America to the United Nations during the Reagan administration, is among those who leveled this accusation on the Carter administration. He states:

"The Carter administration halted the regulated policies of the past and began a new term on the basis of fighting to secure human rights. The outcome of this discontinuity in America's foreign policy caused friendly regimes to become unfriendly. The Carter administration, while being actively involved in the downfall of non-communist autocratic regimes was indifferent to the expansionism of the Communists. The foremost victims of Carter's human rights policies were the Shah of Iran and Somoza of Nicaragua."[1]

While endorsing this view, Mehdi Bazargan, the interim Prime Minister of the revolutionary government writes:

"The bold and innovative step that was started in the year 1977…in support of the freedom-fighters and political prisoners was the

1. C.P. Ioannides, "America's Iran: Injury and Catharsis", University Press of America, 1984, pages 13 – 14.

establishment of the Iranian Society for Defense of Freedom and Human Rights. This institution, by making use of the new 'human rights' policy of the American administration, which was enacted in their own self interest and rivalry with the Soviet Union in the world and based on the same subject, exerted pressure on the Shah to reduce repression and mistreatment. They pressured him to observe people's freedom and rights, earning for itself a type of relative immunity and limited practical possibilities that were unprecedented…"

In endorsement of his views, he then adds:

"Henry Kissinger in his subsequent memoirs has included the implementation of human rights policy in Iran among Carter's betrayal of America and the factor for deposition of the Shah and victory of the Iranian Revolution."[1]

Here, two questions arise:

What caused America to force the Shah to impose liberal policies?

Which faction or group benefited from such a policy and was dependent on it?

Concerning the first question, it can be proven that not only was there no reason to impose such a pressure; rather, there are numerous evidences to prove quite the opposite. The Shah's open political atmosphere program had no connection with Carter's human rights policy. The Carter administration had made Iran an exception to the general principle of implementation of human rights.

Anthony Parsons, the then British Ambassador to Iran opines thus:

"Many people would say that this restoration of freedom was the direct result of pressure exerted by the Carter administration on the Shah…I did not subscribe to this theory at that time and neither do I accept it now. Indeed, the first rays of freedom became visible towards the end of 1976 two or three months before ceremonies of transfer of the presidency to Carter. I have no doubt that the Shah, with his usual opportunism, had interpreted that a more humane and

1. Engineer Mahdi Bazargan; Iran's Revolution in Two Moves; Freedom Movement of Iran, 1984, P. 25.

democratic perspective from his side would make him dearer to the American president."[1]

William Sullivan, the then ambassador of the United States of America to Iran, writes:

"At the time of my departure to Iran, in my meeting with Carter, the president emphasized the strategic importance of Iran for the United States of America and our western allies. Thereafter, he called the Shah a close friend and a reliable ally of America and backed him warmly. Likewise, Carter reiterated the importance of Iran as a factor of stability for the security of the sensitive Persian Gulf region and at the end, reminded me of the price of oil and other issues of interest to Iran and America; and asked me if I had any question to put forward."[2]

Sullivan observes that despite the fact that Carter gained entry into the White House on the human rights slogan, and during his election campaign had pointedly criticized the previous Republican presidents for their support of the Shah and sale of armaments to Iran's autocratic regime, now did not make the slightest reference to this subject. Out of surprise, he questioned Carter for his view on the subject. Carter reluctantly replied:

'Of course, concerning human rights there are certain problems.' and he asked me that I should try to convince the Shah to alter his overall policies on this subject in my meetings with him."[3]

More important is the fact that Carter had promised that he would regulate his economic-political relations and military-security policies with the rest of the countries in line with the observance of human rights in those countries. However, in case of the relations with Iran, this basic principle of Carter's policies was overlooked and made an exception.

Apart from the military services and exchanges, in the other field of economic exchanges, America's exports to Iran were far greater than at all times. Under the Carter administration, exports to Iran reached

1. Pride and the Fall, P. 89.
2. Mission to Iran: pages 14 – 16.
3. Ibid.

the US$3.86 billion mark, and in addition, Carter signed a several billion-dollar contract for construction of five nuclear power-stations with the Shah. At the signing of this contract, he remarked:

"We signed the nuclear deal with Iran so that it would provide billions of dollars' worth of business for American industries and create plenty of jobs for the American people. At the same time, it does not violate the principles of our policies about non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

The only thing that Carter did not refer to is the observance of human rights in Iran.

Concerning the sale of weapons, Carter even forged ahead of his predecessors, former presidents Nixon and Ford, in satisfying the Shah's objectives. In the first year of Carter's administration, delivery of weapons to Iran reached its peak (US$2.4 Billion). In addition, from January 1977 to December 1978, the yearly average worth of the armaments delivered to Iran was more than in any year of the Ford and Nixon administrations.[1]

In the field of sale of weapons to Iran, the discussions held between the government officials and representatives of the Congress are interesting and reveal the actual policy of the Carter administration vis-à-vis the Shah's regime. They show that Iran's relations with America in the new administration had not changed an iota in relation to the past. The question of sale of espionage and intelligence planes and AWACS to Iran was a suitable opportunity for testing Carter's human rights theory. In the negotiations of the Senate foreign policy sub-committee of America, Alfred Atherton, representative of Foreign Affairs and Eric Von Marbod, representative of the Ministry of Defense, when asked whether the Carter administration had established any connection between sale of weapons and human rights in Iran, they replied that as far as sale of weapons to Iran was concerned, the Carter administration had absolutely no intention of changing past policies, and Iran was an exception to the two policies.[2]

1. Ioannides, Opcit, PP. 17 – 23.
2. Ibid, PP. 17 – 23.

Christos Khandis, the researcher of Cypriot origin, who lived for some time in Iran during the Revolution, after conducting extensive research of the existing documents and records in America and documents from inside the American Embassy in Iran, concludes as follows:

"Carter's human rights were not Carter's Trojan horse concerning the Shah, nor was it considered to be the chief factor causing the Revolution. The Revolution would have taken place with or without Carter's human rights. In fact, it arose from the internal contradictions of Iran's society. Contradictions had increased with the extensive role that America had in the course of 25 years in Iran, and shattered an apparently stable and solid regime, and demolished it under the waves of the most authentic popular revolution."[1]

One must not overlook the fact that from December 1977, drawing inspiration from Carter's support of human rights, there was excitement among Iran's liberals and westernized individuals, and many associations were established. Open letters and harsh articles were published. Everybody hoped that by exploiting the open political atmosphere and with the help of America, the liberal faction would be able to come to power, and while maintaining relations with America and under its patronage, a reformist change would come. The best-known of these groups was, "The Society of Supporters of Freedom and Human Rights", whose executive committee consisted of Mr. Bazargan, Hasan Nazih, Abdul Karim Lahiji, Ali Asghar Hajj Sayyid Javadi and Mr. Moqaddam Maragheie. In the open political atmosphere, they got the opportunity to publish articles and give speeches. The local and foreign media would mention them as a group that was influential among the people and a serious opponent of the regime! Ali Asghar Hajj Sayyid Javadi was the most radical among them. A group called 'The Society of Writers' organized nights of verses at the invitation of the Goethe Institute in the gardens of the Iran-Germany Club, under the protection of a foreign country.

In the words of Khandis, Carter's human rights campaign was of particular significance only for a segment of the Shah's opponents – meaning the liberals. The illustration of human rights by the

1. Ibid. P. 36.

opposition liberals created opportunities for them in a country that had earlier entered a revolutionary process; and, towards this end, only assisted in intensifying the illegitimacy of the regime. However, the role that the opposition liberals played in the Revolution was a second-hand one. The fundamental role was played by the 'Bazaar' small businesses, and the lower strata, Opposition liberals did not enjoy much popularity among those that drew their inspiration and leadership from the clergy. For them, Carter's human rights and the Shah's policy of liberalization was applicable in a marginal form - and that too, with the airing of their grievances and protests.[1] In his interview with Hamed Algar, Mr. Bazargan pronounced the strategy of the liberals to use Carter's human rights and stated:

"When Sharif-Emami was the Prime Minister, by using Carter's human rights doctrine truly a lot of freedom was granted and there was the possibility that two people coming together and speaking out could try to… At that time the discussion was about the elections and whether we should participate or not. The Freedom Movement and the rest were of the opinion that the election was a Divine covenant. When the government reaches a stage where it says that it wants to grant freedom of election, what could be better than that? The elections will be held and from this side, meaning the opposition front - whether of the clergy or the national or Freedom Movement or such and such political party, etc. - ten or twenty persons shall either enter the Consultative Assembly or not. If they do not enter the assembly, then again we shall disgrace them right here. We shall tell Mr. Carter, Mr. America that their human rights are a lie."[2]

The Shah's Affliction with Cancer

The second theory pertains to the issue of the Shah's affliction with cancer. In the year 1974, while on a pleasure skiing trip, the Shah felt a tumor in his stomach, which on clinical examination by two French specialists, was diagnosed as cancer of the lymph glands. Right from that time the Shah was under chemotherapy treatment. With regard to his inherent weakness, he did not permit any person to know of his

1. Ibid. P. 36.
2. Muslim Women's Movement, Stances of the Freedom Movement Vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution, 1982, P. 128.

condition. Even his twin sister Ashraf, who influenced his morale and decision-making was apparently uninformed of this issue.[1] Even more interesting was the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), despite all the controls and information it had about the Shah's condition and morale, was unaware of this issue. The impact of this disease on the Shah's morale has been discussed in two ways:

1. With full knowledge of the fact that he was not going to be alive for more than a short period, The Shah had decided to make Iran's political environment conducive and favorable for transfer of power to his son, both in his lifetime or after his death. He knew that with his departure from the scene things would be thrown in disarray; like at the time of the resignation of his father. It would create problems for his son and may take years to control the situation. While confessing to this, he remarked:

"I wanted to transfer the monarchy in my lifetime to my son in favorable conditions of cultural and economic development; and I could not attain this objective with bloodshed and violent actions."[2]

2. Yet another effect that this ailment had on the Shah was that of the sedatives and tranquilizers. (These drugs cause the user to suffer from a kind of indecision and instability of will.) It made him more firm than ever before in his past convictions in fate and destiny.[3]

3. One of the problems that even Brezinski refers to and was disturbed by, was the inability of the Shah to take a firm decision to use harsh means and for a time withdrew his support for the Shah when he despaired of the survival of his regime. He was among those persons who reckoned that the main and immediate factor for the Shah's downfall and victory of the Islamic Revolution was his indecisiveness, and opined that despite Carter's support for his actions in suppressing the opposition, he wasn't able to show the necessary resolve because of taking sedatives and tranquilizer drugs.

Referring to the theory of Karen Brinton, the late professor of history at Harvard University, she concluded, that more than the power and

1. Marvin Zonis, Opcit, P. 606.
2. Confessions of the Shah, Page 21.
3. Ibid P. 78.

resolve of revolutionary forces, the victory of any revolution is the result of weakness of the regimes in power. According to this theory, any regime that used harsh measures vis-à-vis the revolutionary forces and confronted them without hesitation and irresolution, managed to defeat the revolution. Conversely, regimes that compromised and made peace with the revolutionary forces, and retreated from their positions in order to calm them down, emboldened the revolutionaries and finally, toppled.

Based on this theory, Brezinski regarded the use of harsh measures and bloodshed to be the only path to the Shah's salvation; but the Shah who was suffering from a fatal disease and saw death close in on him was incapable of taking such a decision.[1] Disciples of this theory believe that because the Shah was unable to deal decisively, as he did in 1963, and started making concessions, he suffered from such a fate.

This theory like the previous one has no firm basis and foundation because the Shah was essentially a person of weak character. Only the backing of the big powers boosted his morale and gave him artificial power. His regime enjoyed the unstinted and all-out support of the big powers right until its final moments.

On the other hand, in carrying out their wishes and demands, the Shah did not desist from taking harsh measures and shedding blood. Throughout the year 1978, seldom did a day or a week pass without a number of innocent individuals being killed. The incidents of 'Rex' cinema in Abadan on August 19, 1978, and Black Friday on September 8, 1978, are crimes that the Shah committed in this period with the help of the police and military forces, killing and wounding thousands of people.

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1. Please refer to the book "Carter and the Fall of the Shah." First-hand narration, written by Michael Ladin, William Louis; translated by Nasser Irani, 1982, Amir Kabir Press, P. 67. Likewise, see "Collapse of the Peacock Throne," from William Fovobis, Translated by Manuchehr Mehrjou in the book "Confessions of the Shah," P. 80.

Shah's attempts at rapid modernization of the country

Another theory, that is put forward by the supporters and backers of the Shah, and supports him while admitting his mistakes but not sins, is that because the Shah aimed to serve the country, he wanted to quickly compensate for its backwardness and take Iran to the gates of 'the Great Civilization.' In carrying out modernization policies for Iran – a country that until then still lived in traditional circumstances – he made efforts to speed up and accelerate things. Because Iran's traditional society was incapable of digesting the carrying out of all the projects in a very short time, it faced complex problems. Consequently, discomfort and discontent grew, resulting in the collapse of the system. On this subject, the Shah stated:

"I wanted to make-up for centuries of backwardness of my country by means of a crash 25-year plan – and all the problems were due to the speed of action and haste in implementing this plan. For the implementation of this crash program we needed to have a period of emergency."[1]

Among other disciples of this theory was Anthony Parsons, the British Ambassador to Iran in the latter part of the Shah's rule. He writes thus:

"In my discussions with him (the Shah) of my analyses, I would always emphasize the point that intense and sudden outpouring of public sentiments was the natural consequence of fifteen years of pressure that he had imposed on the people by insisting on the modernization of the country. This modernization had crushed Iran's traditional forces and caused intense inequality of wealth, placing the poor citizens in a miserable situation. Therefore, one must not be surprised that these waves of people's sentiments led to the waves of resistance."[2]

Few, if any, doubt the groundlessness of this theory and indeed the hollowness of the Shah's modernization policy. A look at the facts and ramifications of the Shah's policy in the last ten years of his rule are themselves strong reasons for the rejection of this theory.

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1. Confessions of the Shah, P. 12.
2. Pride and Fall of the Shah, P. 150.

Despite the manifold increase in oil revenues that reached the twenty-billion dollar level, this added revenue was placed entirely, without it being paid into the national treasury, at the disposal of financial and monetary systems and western bloc monopolies in the form of bank deposits. Some of it, as renewable and practically permanent credit facilities or loans to the countries of the western bloc, or in the purchase of shares of industrial units and bankrupt companies of Europe and America, More than all else, frantic purchases, that were profitable for their sellers, meaning armaments and nuclear reactors. All this generosity, favors and deference to foreigners was being done by a country most of whose rural areas and villages were lacking hospitals, doctors, schools, educational institutions, communications network, electricity, sanitation and roads. The remaining oil revenues were wasted and consumed without any sort of national planning by an economic system of domestic 'squander and waste' policy. These were often in the form of unaccounted and made to order bank credits and artificial loans to companies owned by the Pahlavi Foundation and the royal family or their dependents, and that too, for establishing assembly-line factories that were fully reliant on foreign countries.

Agriculture and livestock farming of the country was obliterated by means of a calculated and pre-planned program. The remaining oil revenue spent on purchasing wheat from America, rice from Thailand, onions from Pakistan, potatoes from India, oranges from South Africa, chicken from Holland, eggs from Israel, cheese from Denmark, sheep from Turkey, frozen meat from Australia and bananas from Ecuador. The outcome of the economy of the country on the threshold of a great civilization and so-called rapid modernization was that inflation with an annual rate of 25% swallowed the entire income of the wage-earning and salary-drawing societal groups. More than 85 % of individuals belonging to the blue-collar and white-collar groups were in debt and owed to the banks and the big and small capitalists.[1]

1. Iran's Revoltuion and Principles of Leadership of Imam Khomeini; written by Cyrus Bram, translated by P. Shirazi, pages 14 – 15.

Publication of an insulting article

The fourth theory which has a large number of supporters among the revolutionaries, religious factions and neutral analysts, is that the principal factor of acceleration of the Revolution must not be sought in Carter's human rights policy or in the Shah's illness or in his so-called plan of rapid modernization. As was discussed earlier, Carter's human rights doctrine was not applicable in Iran. On the contrary, when the Shah increased the harsh measures and resorted to the killing and massacre of people, he enjoyed the open backing of the Carter administration. In particular, in the September 8, 1978 tragedy that followed the massacre of thousands of people, Carter declared his unstinted support for him from Camp David. More interesting is that certain individuals in the Carter administration such as Brezinski were unhappy that the Shah was not resorting to greater use of force and repressive measures. Documents and written proofs reveal convincingly the lack of Carter's insistence on observance of human rights in Iran. Carter even supported the installation of a military government and increased repression of the people.

The best testimony to the issue is the American ambassador Sullivan's memoirs concerning the subject about which he writes:

"When I questioned Washington about the installing of a military government, I received a quick and categorical reply within 48 hours that said America shall support any decision that he (the Shah) takes for consolidation of his power and position. From the text of the message it was understood that America supported any action towards ending the critical situation in Iran and repression of the opponents."[1]

Even if some persons had pinned their hopes on human rights and exploiting the open political atmosphere, they were not those that had played any role in the raging agitation of the masses nor were they in agreement with the overwhelming revolutionary movement. Their actions not only had no effect on the acceleration of the Revolution, rather, by insisting on conciliatory ways and so-called 'bunker by bunker' policy, they attempted to reduce the speed of the revolution's

1. Ibid.

movement which, the sagacity and sharp-sightedness of the Leader of the Revolution squashed.

However, concerning the effect of the Shah's indisposition and struggle with cancer, it wasn't his capability that managed and sustained the regime; rather, it was the support of foreign governments headed by Britain and the United States that boosted his morale and compelled him to implement policies that they dictated to him.

The fourth theory is that, following the martyrdom of Imam Khomeini's son, mourning ceremonies that were held in Qum for this purpose and the insulting article published in the *Etelaat* on January 7, 1978, ignited the first sparks of the Revolution.[1] The religious sentiments of the people were hurt, and the fire of the masses' fury raged. With a single concerted move and seeking recourse to religious traditions and ceremonies (holding mourning ceremonies commemorating fortieth day of martyrdom) it demolished the monarchy and carried the Islamic Revolution to its victory.

The publication of the insulting article was said to have been printed on the direct orders of Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Minister of the Royal Court. The question has always been raised as to whether this action was yet another of the countless mistakes that the regime made, or was it a calculated plan of total suppression. The Shah wanted to show America and the western world that the movement of opposition to the regime had a purely religious aspect to it and that the opponents of the regime were a bunch of reactionary clergymen. Granting freedom in the present circumstances would lead to chaos, threatening the security and stability of the region, the oil resources and international investments. The Shah believed that he was in a position to control the situation and did not imagine that he had got himself into such a perilous situation that the enormity of its dimensions would lead to the destruction of the pillars of his reign and the monarchy.

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1. For detailed study of the events and circumstances that took place from this period onward, see "Contemporary History of Iran", second volume, authored by Sayyed Jalaluddin Madani, P. 240.

The protest rallies of the residents of the holy city of Qum, on January 9, 1978, ended in bloodshed and killing. A large number of individuals were martyred. On the fortieth day mourning ceremonies held in honor of the martyrs of Qum, on February 18, 1978, the residents of the city of Tabriz rose in revolt. They performed such a widespread and unpredictable move that for a period of time the regime's officials lost control of the city. The people vented their anger at the regime by setting cinema houses, wine shops and the headquarters of the Rastakhiz Party on fire.

Finally, the army trucks laden with soldiers and its tanks created a bloody scene and martyred tens of people. On the fortieth day commemorating the martyrs of Tabriz, in yet another corner of the country, the people of Yazd rose up in revolt. On March 28 - 29, 1978, the incident in Tabriz was repeated in the city of Yazd. The chain of events continued on an extensive scale all across the country. This chain witnessed bloody and at the same time splendid days, such as the Eid-e-Fitr Feast, Black Friday, rallies and marches on Ashura and Tasu'a (commemorating the day of martyrdom of Imam Hussein (AS) and his companions at Karbala) heralding tidings of the Islamic Revolution's victory.

The prominent reasons observed in the popular movements, reveal that the chief factor accelerating the Revolution had a religious aspect to it, and was related to the publication of the insulting article about the Imam, hurting the religious sentiments of the masses. They are:

1. From January 9, 1978 until the victory of the Revolution, all the popular demonstrations had a religious aspect to them and resorted to religious traditions, (Ashura and Arba'een – tenth and fortieth days commemorating martyrdom of Imam Hussein (AS) and his companions at Karbala) feasts and ceremonies, and had no other aspect at all.

2. The starting point and gathering place of the people were the mosques; and the regime showed its animosity towards religion by attacking the Jame Mosque in Kerman, the Habib Mosque in Shiraz and the Lorzadeh Mosque in Tehran, and tried to prevent these gatherings.

3. The call to hold rallies by their leadership was solely given by the clergy; and non-religious leaders never had any role in organizing and leading these protest marches. Even when the National Front wanted to test its strength during the fortieth-day mourning ceremonies of the Black Friday martyrs and announced holding of protests and rallies, it was met with failure.

4. All these movements had no link with the open political atmosphere and Carter's human rights doctrine; rather, they were responded to with increasingly stiffer and more ruthless measures. Even the American sponsors of human rights encouraged and persuaded the Shah to adopt harsh measures.

5. The demands and slogans of the people were religio-political in their essence, and revolved around two principal axes: One, departure of the Shah and downfall of the Pahlavi regime; and the other, establishment of an Islamic government.

6. Non-religious groups had no alternative but to join the roaring mainstream of the Muslim masses. They were compelled to abstain from promoting their own slogans in order to avoid confrontation with the people.

Finally, it could be said without reservation, that victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran was based solely on the leadership of the combatant clergy that began from the year 1963. It was headed by the strong leadership of Imam Khomeini, the great religious authority of Muslims and Shiites, and enjoyed the unstinted support and backing of the Muslim 'Ummah' of Iran. It was centered on the religion of Islam and the doctrine of martyrdom, so that any attempt to connect it to issues such as Carter's human rights doctrine, coalition of various forces and national movements are futile and do not conform to the documented historical realities.

Chapter Four:
Ramifications of the Islamic Revolution

- First Statement: First Decade of the Revolution

- Second Statement: Second Decade of the Revolution

First Statement: First Decade of the Revolution

Introduction

The victory of the Islamic Revolution on February 11, 1979 was a big surprise. A nation with bare hands and without the backing of any foreign power, relying only on faith, sacrifice and selflessness, brought an ancient monarchy supported by the big powers and the superpowers, to its knees and caused its downfall. Yet another period in Iran's history began – a period that was fundamentally different from the eras before it in terms of both form and content. However, the big surprise was that in this modern era and towards the end of the twentieth century, an Islamic system was established. Despite almost all ideologues of the west, holding the view that the era of religion and faith had come to an end and societies were moving towards pragmatic individualism, a revolution, formed on the basis of religious beliefs triumphed, and a political system, whose framework and principles were founded and consolidated on the pillars of religion and piety, was established.

In this manner with the passing of two decades, it proved its practicality and potential. This did not happen easily; rather, the Revolution was able to overcome innumerable obstacles, successive conspiracies, as well as the internal and external conflicts. Despite being in its earliest stages, it managed to diffuse all conspiracies and take its message far and wide beyond the frontiers of the country; to manifest itself as a powerful system on the scene of international relations, and to influence international exchanges and order.

With regard to the nature and content of changes after the Revolution, we will examine the ramifications of the Islamic Revolution in two

parts, each of it comprising a decade. The first part will cover the history of the Revolution until the demise of His Eminence Imam Khomeini, and discuss those events and incidents that occurred in this period. We will name this period the 'period of creating stability and confronting conspiracies." In the second part, we shall discuss its ramifications.

As mentioned, after most political revolutions reach fruition, moderate elements come to power for a temporary period. In Iran, too, they came to power. The reasons for their taking office include the following:

1. Leaders of Iran's revolution did not have a proper understanding of the young revolutionary forces that were capable of managing the country; and the recognized faces among the revolutionaries were of those that by accepting administrative responsibilities during the brief period of Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq's administration had made a poor impression on the minds of the people.

2. The leader of the revolution did not approve of the idea of the clergy accepting governmental responsibilities directly; and on the other hand, they had not passed the necessary test to prove their ability to run the country as well.

3. Mr. Mahdi Bazargan and his companions were the only faces amongst the nationalists and liberals that had a religious aspect to them, and were, to a certain extent, acceptable and enjoyed the confidence of the various factions.

4. Based on the directive of the leader of the revolution; and that the foremost government after the Revolution was an interim government, one concludes that the mission of this government was temporary and was considered for a period of transition.

Before we discuss the term in office of the moderates, it is necessary that we examine the unique features of liberalism in Iran.

The term 'liberalism' in its western context means defense of the freedom of the individual from the hegemony of a group, and dictatorship. Liberalism surfaced with the French Revolution of 1789. Philosophers such as Benjamin Constant, Montesquieu, John Locke,

Emmanuel Kant and John Stewart Mill have written on topics dealing with the various dimensions of liberalism.

Liberalism is a theory that seeks to safeguard individual freedom vis-à-vis the control of governments. The limit of individual freedom is infringement of another's rights. Political liberalism is based on individualism (primacy of individual and rejection of any type of societal system and constraint) while economic liberalism is based on 'utilitarianism' (primacy of utility). Religious liberalism is based on right of belief of any person in choosing the method of worship of God, or faithlessness. Rationalism (principality of thought and idea) is the philosophical foundation of liberalism and it rejects any sort of source other than the source of the mind for gaining knowledge. To what extent the convictions of Iran's liberals conformed to the yardsticks of western liberalism is not the subject of our discussion here; however, assigning the term 'liberal' to a moderate faction in Iran's Revolution is accepted and applied by almost all their supporters and opponents as well as by the western researchers and analysts of the American administration.

It is natural that the liberals of Iran, under the influence of the society in which they lived, proposed peculiar ideas considering the phenomenon around them, which is not seen in western liberalism. On the other hand one must bear in mind that Iran's liberals are not an organized and uniform clique like their western counterparts. They comprise a spectrum of religious liberals (Freedom Movement), non-religious materialists, and even social democrats; whom in many instances have no understanding with one another in terms of choosing method and strategy. As an example, a group of them arrived at an understanding with the Shah, and like Shapour Bakhtiyar, accepted the post of premiership of the regime and confronted the people. Some others, such as Matin Daftary's faction, became standard-bearers of the anti-revolutionaries, immediately after the victory of the Islamic Revolution; while the Freedom Movement cooperated for a long time with the revolutionaries and came to power in the Islamic Republic system.

One can say that liberalism in Iran incorporates the following characteristics:

1. Iranian liberalism is intensely influenced by the culture of the west and many of its views have been inspired by European society. Mr. Bazargan's statement on this subject is interesting:

"The lifestyle that we lead today is entirely European. Our way of thinking, our education, our struggle, our Revolution, our opposition to colonialism and exploitation are all souvenirs of the west."[1]

2. It believes in the principality of the individual and individual freedom to the extent of no intrusion of one from the other.

3. Views scientific progress not only with admiration; rather, tries to prove scientifically many of the societal-religious phenomenon including understanding of origin and resurrection. Religious books published by Mr. Bazargan reveal the excessive importance he attached to scientific progress.

4. Believes in fighting against the oppressive regime within the framework of law; and during the term of the regime, by seeking recourse in the constitution, has a reformist approach, and never believes in adopting revolutionary methods, but the step-by-step or 'bunker-to-bunker' policy.

5. It believes in nationalism and for most, Islam is of significance within the framework of nationality and nationalism; and in the words of one of them, they are 'Iranians first and Muslims next."

6. For most of them religion is a personal issue. Religion and politics are separate. While believing in non-separation of religion from politics, the religious-liberals do not approve of giving priority to religious issues and executing its decrees in all political and social fields. According to Mr. Bazargan, they consider it their duty to serve Iran through Islam.[2]

7. In terms of strata, the liberals belong to the educated and affluent urban class. They have no base and influence among the poor and rural masses.

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1. Stances of the Freedom Movement Vis-à-vis The Islamic Revolution, P. 24.
2. See "Revolution in Two Moves", Mr. Bazargan, P. 111.

8. The liberals are divided from the mainstream of the population, because of their class and cultural standing; it is not feasible for them to establish rapport with the masses and to get their views across to them. They do not reckon any role in government for the masses and would like the people to endorse their positions and help them to come to power.

9. Liberals do not have appropriate relations with the clergy; and if they establish a relationship with them, it is in order to gain the support of the masses and to come to power. They do not believe in involving them in government.

10. They intrinsically do not agree with the principle of guardianship of the supreme religious authority and believe that this principle leads to religious dictatorship.

11. They insist on appointing government officials on the basis of specialization, and they prefer it to piety and faith in the system.

12. They emphasize administrative bureaucracy and observance of regulations and respect for the administrative system. They do not have a positive opinion of revolutionary institutions that have sprung up from the core of the Revolution and are annoyed by their activities and so-called 'interference' in state affairs.

13. They give preference to the principle of accommodation, amnesty and tolerance over the principle of punishment and retribution of criminals. For this reason, they objected to the condemnation and sentencing of agents and collaborators of the Shah's regime by the courts of the Revolution, considering it a big leap towards international Marxism, and opposed to the radiant Muhammadan image of "divine infinite mercy."[1]

14. While accusing their opponents of monopolist tendencies, they themselves are excessively monopolistic in appointing their colleagues. In the list of the members of the interim government's cabinet, all the members were from among liberals and nationalists, supporters of Dr. Mossadeq.

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1. The Revolution in Two Moves, Mr. Mahdi Bazargan, P. 115.

15. While believing in the principle of neutrality, they seek support and close relations with the western bloc.

16. Their understanding of politics and the slogan 'Neither East nor West' is Dr. Mossadeq's policy of negative equilibrium. They opine that this slogan has a totally national and defensive meaning to it and with its alteration, has gained political variance and an anti-western aspect.[1]

17. Most of them regard themselves to be followers of Dr. Mossadeq and accept him as a national leader.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and termination of the monarchy, political activists of Iranian society divided into the following groups:

A) Religious revolutionaries and believers in Islamic ideology led by the clergy headed by the Great Leader of the Revolution Imam Khomeini, which from now on we shall call "followers of the Imam's policy line.'[2]

B) Moderates or nationalist liberals that opposed the Shah, opposed a tough approach before the Revolution and a revolutionary approach after the Revolution; and regarded themselves to be more qualified to manage society.

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1. Ibid, P. 104.
2. Considering that we shall often refer to this group, below we enumerate their unique characteristics briefly:
A) Followers of the Imam's policy line believe in jurisprudential Islam. With belief in the principle of authority of Islamic jurisprudent, they regard leadership of the clergy as guaranteeing the success of the Revolution.
B) More than thinking of the intermittent victories, they insist on preservation of the ideological-doctrinal yardsticks and principles.
C) They believe in Islam as a comprehensive, perfect, capable and universal doctrine for securing the demands of societies at any time and place.
D) By relying on the principle of sacrifice and martyrdom they have unrivalled power and strength towards attainment of objective.
E) They seek to dissociate themselves from both the east and the west and consider it their duty to fight them until the extermination of global arrogance.

C) Leftist groups that opposed the Shah, opposed the establishment of an Islamic Republic; and after the downfall of the regime joined the opponents of the Islamic Republic, such as the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization, guerillas of the Fedayian-e-Khalq and the Peykari combatants.

D) Groups that supported the former regime and were eating out of its hands. Now, because their interests were under threat, they joined the ranks of the opposition, such as the monarchists, the 'SAVAK' secret police agents, Freemasons, and, those dismissed from military and governmental organizations.

Although the former group had a fundamental role in carrying the Revolution to its victory, after the fruition of the revolution their attempts were directed more towards controlling the situation and preventing the deviation of the executives and bureaucrats. The leadership of the Revolution continued to maintain its constant relation as an arbitrator of the masses and the governmental and revolutionary authorities, and held the actual power in its hands. The Council of the Revolution and Government were appointed by the Imam. They would not enjoy the necessary legitimacy without his approval; nor get the support of the people.

The revolutionary clergy were generally active in the institutions that had arisen from the Revolution, including the Council of Revolution, revolutionary courts, 'Komiteh' revolutionary setups, revolutionary guards corps, reconstruction Jihad organization, leading the congregational and Friday prayers and as members of the Islamic Republic Party of Iran. In these institutions, young revolutionaries and pious and devoted Muslim masses were actively involved and as a religious and revolutionary obligation; they would continue with their sacrifice and selflessness in safeguarding the achievements of the Revolution, especially, their fight to deter the anti-revolutionary and to serve the downtrodden.

The second group (liberals) with their peculiar characteristics, took over the control of the government and the official institutions. They tried to organize the post-Revolution society to suit their own style. A section of the Council of Revolution, the cabinet, the broadcasting network, mass media and most of the newspapers were in their control.

The third and fourth groups began to engage in destructive activities; and with management, attracting manpower and arranging weapons, tried to prevent the establishment, development and administration of the newly-formed Islamic Republic, and challenge it.

The period of evolutionary changes after the Revolution until the passing away of the Imam can be divided into four distinct phases:

First phase: This phase was the period of official rule of liberalism in which the followers of the policy line of the Imam had a minority role. This phase began with the victory of the Revolution and formation of the interim government and ended with the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran (espionage den) and resignation of Mr. Bazargan.

Second Phase: The second phase can be called the period of joint rule. It began with the mission of the Council of Revolution for administration of the entire country after the resignation of Mr. Bazargan and ended with the official conclusion of the work of the Council of Revolution and the beginning of the premiership of Martyr Raja'i. In this phase, although liberalism had become less of a potent force, but almost half the members of the Council of the Revolution comprised of liberals; and following the election of Bani Sadr as president and head of the Council of Revolution, their position strengthened. They continued to enjoy considerable power while the top governmental positions were divided among various groups.

Third Phase: The third phase, which began with the election of Martyr Raja'i as Prime Minister, continued until the dismissal from presidency of Bani Sadr and the tragedy of Haftom-e-Tir (June 28, 1981). This period can be named as the period of the officials of the forces of the Imam's policy line coming to power and liberals in a minority position. In this phase, the decisive majority of the legislative assembly, the Guardian Council, the Supreme Judiciary Council[1] and the cabinet was in the hands of the followers of the

1. In the constitution ratified in the year 1979, administration of the judiciary was entrusted to a council comprising of five members. Members of this council included the head of the State High Court, the prosecutor general who was appointed by the leadership and three others who were elected with the vote of the judges.

policy line of Imam Khomeini. All the same, the liberals continued to hold the post of President, and the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. They remained a minority in the legislative assembly, national broadcasting network and the Central Bank. They would oppose the government and the followers of the Imam's policy line.

Fourth Phase: This phase began with the dismissal of Bani Sadr from office of the presidency and total elimination of liberals from governmental responsibilities. This phase is the period of complete control of the forces of the Imam's policy line and official elimination of liberalism from the system.

First Stage:
Rule of Liberal Forces (Interim Government)

At the start of the Islamic Revolution, a moderate government came to power that was neither revolutionary nor believed in any revolutionary movements, and nor did it have the right understanding of the Revolution. The vast sections of the liberated masses that, after centuries, had been freed from the yoke of dictatorship and colonialism, reckoning themselves to be controllers of their own destiny, were not prepared to let go of all that they had achieved and return to the security of their homes. The perception of the interim government was quite the opposite.

From the point of view of the government, the Revolution had reached its conclusion and victory achieved. The people and even the clergy had played their respective roles and no longer had any duty to perform. Now they needed to clear the field and leave the scene open for the entry of technocrats and bureaucrats so that with their leadership, they could do their job without botheration and anxiety so that the country returned to normalcy. Now the people needed to get back to their respective jobs and restart their normal living. The clergy also had to return to the mosques and theological schools and continue with their teaching, debates and guidance of the people. In the words of Michael Fischer:

"For the nationalists and especially for the members of the National Front, with the collapse of the Shah's regime, the Revolution had reached its conclusion. What remained was to enable the bourgeoisie and the specialists to take control of the governmental institutions.

However, for Imam Khomeini, if the basis was the continuation of the policies and methods of the past, the Revolution had still not ended. For him the Revolution was not simply a political or economic revolution, rather, it was a spiritual revolution that needed to change the values and yardsticks dominating the government and societal behavior as well."[1]

The natural expectation of the people from the government, after the Revolution, was that 2500 years of suffering, torture, oppression and cruelty perpetrated on the people avenged. The injustices wiped out with the same speed as the Revolution had occurred, and deprivation of the poor and downtrodden class of society be remedied and the regime be a regime of the deprived and the downtrodden. This was in a situation where the interim government did not believe in revolutionary and harsh approaches but believed in gradual and constitutional means, left behind by the former regime, to resolve and restore deprivations. It even gave no priority to these demands in the sphere of its own responsibilities. The interim government felt that it must direct its efforts within the framework of the directive of the leader of the Revolution in carrying out the particular assignments entrusted to it.

The people expected that with the culmination of the Revolution, the governmental offices would undergo a fundamental change and undertake revolutionary change in terms of relations and criteria, and bureaucratic red tape be done away with. Also, those persons who were involved, one way or other, in the survival of the Shah's regime replaced with forces committed to the Revolution. The interim government believed in forgiveness and looking the other way; and in this connection was so liberal-minded, that even employees of the dreaded 'Savak' secret police, instead of running away and fleeing the people's wrath, dared to gather in front of the Prime Minister's office and demand their rights. Concerning the appointment of individuals to key positions, the interim government aroused the ire of the people and the revolutionary forces.

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1. Michael Fischer, Iran From Religious Dispute to Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1980, P. 216.

The order of the premiership of Mr. Bazargan consisted of the following responsibilities:[1]

1. In the appointment of governmental officials, political party affiliations to a particular faction not to be considered.

2. Hold a referendum and refer changing the political system of the country from monarchy to an Islamic Republic to the public vote.

3. Convene a founding assembly to ratify the constitution of the system.

4. Hold elections to the House of Representatives of the nation.

The point worth mentioning here is that the interim government pursued the opinions and demands of its own faction even in carrying out the assignments stipulated in the directive of the supreme leadership. A glance at the list of ministers of the provisional government reveals that all members of the cabinet without exception

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1. Text of the appointment order of the Prime Minister of the interim government was as below:
"His Excellency Mr. Mahdi Bazargan, Based on the proposal of the Council of Revolution and religious and legal right resulting from the ballot of the decisive majority of the people of Iran that was expressed in the course of huge protests and widespread and numerous rallies all over Iran for the leadership of the uprising; and based on your unshakeable faith in the religion of Islam and the knowledge I have of your past record in Islamic and national struggles, I assign you with the task of forming a government without taking into consideration your party affiliations or attachment to any particular group. You are thus assigned to prepare the means for administration of the affairs of the state and in particular, holding of a referendum and seeking recourse in the general franchise of the people concerning changing the country's political system to an Islamic Republic one and formation of an assembly of founders from the elected representatives of the people in order to ratify the constitution of the new system and elect the house of representatives of the nation in accordance with the new constitution. Government staff, the military and individuals of the nation shall cooperate fully with your interim government and shall observe discipline and order for attainment of the sacred objectives of the Revolution and organization of the affairs of the country. I implore Almighty God to grant you and your interim government success at this sensitive historical stage.

were from among the liberals and nationalist supporters of Mossadeq and not even a single person chosen from among individuals other than members of the National Front or the Freedom Movement.[1]There were other groups who had taken part in the struggle and who had educated individuals and executives in their ranks; individuals, most of whom, later on took over the reins of administration in their hands. It is true that coordination and understanding among members of the cabinet is essential for the success of a government; however, at the same time, it should not be forgotten that the mission of Bazargan's government had been ascertained from before, and this government had not come to power because of its political programs. All this occurred at a time when the revolutionaries – especially the leadership of the Revolution and the clergy – contrary to the propaganda of the liberals, had shown patience in granting them positions of responsibility and tolerated conflicting views, to such an extent that all strata of society could participate in the new political power. This was one main reason why the liberals were able to attain the presidency. It was quite evident that, with regard to the fact that they had no popular base, it was impossible for the first president to be chosen from within their ranks without the endorsement of the Revolution's leadership and obtain more than ten million votes.

On the subject of holding the referendum for an Islamic republic, the liberals wanted to act contrary to the opinion of the leader of the Revolution and the people. In the leadership directive it was clearly stated that the objective of the referendum was establishment of an Islamic republic. In all of Imam Khomeini's interviews, declarations and speeches, only an Islamic republic was mentioned as the future system of the country. Even the slogans of the people mentioned an Islamic state and an Islamic republic.[2] However, the liberals and, especially the interim government, insisted on putting forward

1. See the pamphlet published by the Azadi (Freedom) Movement named "The Revolution and the Interim Government", P. 35 & 36 and "Stance of the Freedom Movement Vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution." P. 86 – 87.
2. Among the popular slogans, two slogans were more conspicuous than all: "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic" and the slogan "Neither East nor West, Only Islamic Republic."

'Islamic Democratic Republic' and until the Leader of the Revolution categorically and decisively proclaimed, "I will vote for an Islamic republic; neither a word more nor a word less."[1] The interim government continued to insist on its position and viewpoint.

The leader of the Revolution came to know that, according to the old constitution, the Founding Assembly could be formed with that specific number of representatives,[2] or else the constitution would not be drafted within the suitable timeframe. Also, due to most representatives of such a legislative assembly's lack of familiarity with jurisprudential principles and Islamic decrees, it was likely that the compiled constitution would not be much different from the erstwhile constitution. Thus, he decided that by changing the name of the 'Founding Assembly' to 'Assembly of Experts' and reducing the number of members, it would add to the efficiency and speed of compilation of the constitution of the Islamic Republic.

The liberals strongly opposed this change of form of the legislative assembly. By presenting the draft of the constitution in which they had divested a major part of powers of the president-elect of the people, they imposed the same limit on the control of the qualified religious authorities mentioned in Article Two of the constitution. When they came to know that the Assembly of Experts had pushed aside the draft presented by them and had prepared the constitution with a new form and content on the principle of authority of the Islamic jurisprudent, they were mortified. By presenting the issue in the cabinet, they decided to dissolve the Assembly of Experts without consulting anybody. However, because of the Imam's decisiveness, their decision remained ineffective.[3]

Another dispute between the liberals and the revolutionaries was the method of their dealing with the anti-revolutionaries. It was evident that with the collapse of the Shah's regime and disintegration of the ruling political order, the groups in favor of the toppled system,

1. Sahifeh-e-Imam, Vol. 5, P. 181.
2. Based on the constitution before the Revolution, the number of representatives of the Founding Assembly was equal to the total of the representatives of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate meaning that 330 representatives would have to be chosen.
3. See "The Freedom Movement Vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution", P. 172.

would try to take action towards furthering their own objectives, with the help of foreign powers, whose interests had been harmed by the Revolution. The foremost action of the anti-revolutionaries began in the province of Kurdistan and pursuant to it, in Khuzestan and the Turkmen-Sahra region. Choice of frontier regions and emphasis on lingual and religious differences had not been without reason.

The interim government and the liberals were not in favor of decisive and harsh measures; and in the words of Mr. Bazargan himself, "neither possessed the justice of Imam Ali (AS) nor the decisiveness of Imam Khomeini."[1] In the same way, in their dealings with the monarchical system they believed in a moderate and peaceful approach. So, they adopted the lenient approach together with the procrastination approach. They tried giving concessions to the anti-revolutionaries to dissuade them from causing trouble, believing that compromise and consensus would force them into submission and compliance. When the Chief of the Army Staff Major General Gharani decided to deal with them firmly, they called him to account and forced him to step aside.

Weakness and leniency of the interim government in relation to the problem of Kurdistan, especially the town of Paveh, was so glaring, that it compelled the leader of the Revolution to intervene directly. He issued an order addressed to the military, and mobilized and rescued the besieged forces in the town of Paveh under the command of the late martyr Musthapha Chamran.

With a timely understanding of the rightful needs of the revolutionary people, and the interim government, the leader of the Revolution, concurrent with the official formation of government, took action to establish revolutionary bodies that began their activities in revolutionary style.

The courts of Revolution to punish traitors, the Foundation for the Oppressed (Bonyad-e-Mostazafan) to expend the confiscated properties and wealth for the benefit of the deprived masses, and the Housing Foundation (Bonyad-e-Maskan) to allocate housing units to the downtrodden were established. The Revolutionary Guards Corps

1. See the Freedom Movement publication entitled "Council of Revolution and the Interim Government". P. 33.

and the 'Komiteh' Islamic Revolutionary committees to ensure the security of the people and combat anti-Revolution activities, the Construction Jihad (Jihad-e-Sazandegi) to provide services to rural inhabitants and deprived regions, were gradually established. Revolutionary voluntary forces with a sense of religious obligation began their activities, considering the needs of society.

Instead of welcoming the revolutionary actions – that compensated for many of the weaknesses of the official governmental system and eased their burden - the interim government began to oppose and sabotage the working of those institutions. By putting forward issues such as multiplicity of centers of power and decision-making, vengeful actions of the courts of Revolution instead of Islamic mercy and forgiveness, and spontaneous popular actions not creative and constructive, they set the tone for complaints, and prevented the required material resources from being placed at their disposal.

The interim government raised the initial call opposing the execution of four senior military heads of the Shah and the head of the dreaded 'Savak' secret police. When the trial and execution of former Prime Minister Hoveyda was decided, the government became nervous. By recourse to different sorts of measures, it was able to postpone the implementation of Islamic and revolutionary justice for a short while. Concerning a person who was the Shah's Prime Minster for thirteen years – and regard it as a great victory for itself. For them, the activities of the Construction Jihad (a major organization involved in post-Revolution reconstruction and development) was like those of a young scouting group, who performed charitable but unimportant tasks, and for this reason, the necessary budget and financial resources was not allocated to them. On this subject, in a televised message broadcast on February 28, 1979, Mr. Bazaragan alleged that, "the Imam's Komitehs and radical groups pose a great danger to the government and the Revolution." A few days later he remarked that 'we must first go after the Komitehs and clip their wings.'[1]

The most critical and glaring difference between the ruling liberals and the revolutionaries, led by the Leader of the Revolution, was the

1. Stances of the Freedom Movement vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution, Pages 24 & 25.

question of objectives and the styles of implementing the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. What ultimately led to the removal of the interim government from power included the following:

A) Policy with America: The theory that America was a superpower was acknowledged by the liberals as well as the outlawed Mujahideen-e-Khalq and the Fedaiyaan-e-Khalq. From the point of view of the leader of the Freedom Movement, the Shah was a puppet in the hands of America, and it was presumed that the Shah's liberalization policy was the outcome of America's direct pressure. The Revolution had announced that launching simultaneous attacks on despotism and colonialism was inadvisable, and that, we must not confront American imperialism, as they were a solid barrier opposing the atheistic Communists. There are many similarities among the western type of democracies and Islamic democracy, and often these two were the counterpart of one another. Therefore, despite the blows that they admitted America had dealt to the people of Iran such as engineering the military coup of August 19, 1953 and Dr. Mossadeq's downfall, they believed in maintaining and continuing relations with America at all levels – and they actually established these relations in the military and intelligence spheres as well.[1]

Moreover, the interim government according to William Sullivan, the last American ambassador in Iran, did not approve the suspension of the military advisory committee's mission, and departure of all its members from Iran. It wanted to continue America's military cooperation with Iran and considered it necessary to preserve the efficiency of Iran's armed forces – especially of the air force.[2]

B) Export of Revolution: By referring to the accepted international regulations, the interim government considered the export of the Revolution and support for liberation movements to be contrary to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It opined that instead of exporting the Revolution, it was better to build a model society for others to adopt as a role model.

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1. See Documents from the Den of Espionage (American Embassy in Tehran) published by Muslim student followers of the Imam's policy line, vol. 9 - 10, P. 91 – 93.
2. Mission in Tehran; P. 189.

Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, the foreign minister of the interim government declared categorically, "We do not intend to sell the Revolution abroad."[1] This statement was contrary to the explicit opinion of the leader of the Revolution, who declared, "We will export our Revolution to the entire world."[2] On this subject, an intense dispute occurred between the interim government and Martyr Mohammad Montazeri, who actively entered the fray and launched the first congress of liberation movements in Iran.

C) Negative Understanding of the "neither East nor West" policy: The understanding of the interim government and in general of the liberals from the 'neither East nor West' policy was purely a negative one. They would not accept a struggle against global arrogance. In reality, they regarded the principle of 'neither East nor West' to be the same principle of negative equilibrium that Dr. Mossadeq had adopted. However, supporters of the 'neither East nor West' policy would not accept the principle of equilibrium, whether in its negative or positive form, as a strategic objective of foreign policy. They regarded the powers of the East and West to be a unified setup of global arrogance, and that rejecting and fighting them as one of the main objectives of their policy.[3]

D) Differences and disputes among liberals and the interim government and leader of the Revolution and revolutionary forces intensified day by day. A dispute peaked in the course of the Shah's departure to America and the compromising attitude adopted by the interim government. Pursuant to it, was the meeting of the Prime Minister of the interim government with the National Security Advisor of the United States, Mr. Brezinski in Algiers that culminated in the occupation of the United States Embassy in Tehran. Later, it became widely known as the 'den of espionage.' In as much as this action enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the people, the clergy and the leadership of the Revolution, it contradicted the

1. Stances of the Freedom Movement vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution, P. 27.
2. See Sahiefh-e-Imam, Vol. 12, P. 284 – 285.
3. For further research on the subject see first chapter of the book "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic: Principles and Problems" compiled by the author, Dadgostar Publishers, P. 103 – 109.

policies of the liberals. The interim government saw that the only option left for it was to resign, and in this way, the lifespan of the nine-month old government ended.

Although Mr. Bazargan in his writings has attempted to show that the issue of his resignation was unrelated to the occupation of the American embassy, but few would believe that, since the interim government resigned on November 5, 1979, just one day after the occupation of the American embassy on November 4, 1979.

The interim government could not have acted otherwise, and it wasn't expected of them to have a revolutionary approach towards the country's problems. The big problem of the liberals was that they did not have sufficient knowledge of the great revolutions of the world; a series of issues shocked them that naturally occur in any revolution.

One year after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Mr. Bazragan complained that at the start of the Revolution they had unity and no ideology, whereas now they had an ideology but no unity. He also once remarked: "Basically, ideology cannot come to terms with unity. Just as monopoly is anti-unity and personifies egotism and dictatorship, only one type of unity can be compatible with ideology; the unity that the Shah announced at the establishment of the Rastakhiz Party."[1]

His remarks also showed his perception of the process of changes of the Islamic Revolution. He reckoned the coalition of the diverse groups that acted in unison for toppling the Shah's regime to be the cause of the victory of the Revolution, although this does not conform with the historical truth.

Firstly, the various leftists and rightists factions that did not hold an Islamic point of view did not have a popular base and had no alternative but to join the vast majority of the masses who were uprising under the leadership of Imam Khomeini. For any person to challenge the movement of the people would lead to a similar fate as that of the next Prime Minister Bakhtiyar. The day when Dr. Sanjabi and Mr. Bazargan went to Paris to modify the views of the Leader of

1. Refer to book "Stances of the Freedom Movement vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution", P. 90.

the Revolution and failed in their attempt to create the smallest chink in the firm stance of the Imam, had no alternative but to obey the leadership. They would have eliminated themselves had they not done so.

Despite the efforts of the western media to indoctrinate the issue of coalition of various factions, the Imam proclaimed explicitly that he would not agree to a coalition with anybody. "Any person who speaks the language of the people is with us; otherwise, he is not with us."[1]

Secondly, all groups whether religious or non-religious agreed on the issue of toppling the Shah; and in order to be able to install their desired system at the opportune moment after the downfall of the Shah, they put a lid on their true intentions and joined the ranks of the people without mentioning their actual slogans. The Revolution did not triumph because of the coalition of diverse groups; rather, the majority of the revolutionary people, before or after the Revolution, had both unity as well as religion. Under the shelter of their unity, acknowledgment of leadership of the Imam and acceptance of the principle of guardianship of the supreme religious authority, they were able to resist and overcome all plots and crises.

The second mistake of Mr. Bazargan was that he said the clergy and leaders of the Revolution used the moderates as a ladder of success. He mentioned this in response to the words of the late martyr Beheshti and Ayatollah Khamenei, who had said in those

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1. In response to a questioner of the radio and television broadcasting service on November 16, 1978, he states thus:
Question: Your Eminence Ayatollah, you had an important discussion with Karim Sanjabi from the National Front in Paris. Will you be in a joint struggle with this political party, meaning will you enter into a coalition?
Answer: I did have discussions on certain problems and issues; and it is impossible for me to go back a single step from them. I told them…and we have no coalition with any particular front. The entire nation is with us and we are with the entire nation. Any person who supports the independence of the state, all-round freedom and an Islamic Republic succeeding the monarchical regime is from our group, and if he does not agree, then he has taken a step which is contrary to the interest of Islam and the nation, and we shall have no connection with him. Those that agree with us, we shall unite with them; but we have no particular relations with anybody."

circumstances that they did not know of any other person to be more suited for government. This was quite understandable, and if Mr. Bazargan at that time would ask the leaders of the Revolution why they had chosen them, he would have received the same reply. Obviously if more suitable and better individuals would have been found in those peculiar circumstances, the leaders of the Revolution would not have bothered to ask the liberals.

The liberal forces played their role - and nothing more was expected from them. But the problem is that they still imagined themselves to be the best and most appropriate bureaucrats of the Revolution. The first few years of experience of the Revolution had proven to them that they neither had the potential, nor standing, nor the necessary base for managing the revolutionary society, nor enjoyed the support of the public; thus, it was better that they considered their role in the process of revolutionary changes to be over.

Second Stage:
Joint Rule

The occupation of the American Embassy by student followers of the Imam's policy line on November 4, 1979 in protest against the Shah's right of entry into America and Prime Minister Bazargan's meeting with Brezenski, the National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, had widespread ramifications throughout Iran and the rest of the world. The support of the revolutionary people of Iran for the action of the students was immense; it was unprecedented after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Suddenly, the people, with their constant vigil in front of the American embassy and holding demonstrations, released themselves from the shackles of frustrations that they harbored because of the compromising moves of the interim government. Like a sudden explosion, it halted the normal routine of the past nine months and gave an unprecedented and revolutionary fillip to the process of socio-political changes after the Revolution. This action of the people was named "the Second revolution" and in the words of the Leader of the Revolution, it was a bigger revolution than the first one.

The occupation of the American embassy, from the domestic point of view, put an end to the rule of the liberals and the moderates. A process that had started in the period of their governance was slowing

down the speed of the Revolution and gradually causing the people to leave the scene and make their efforts and sacred struggles seem to be in vain. Like the constitutional monarchy and nationalization of the oil industry movements, it was about to deviate from its main and declared path. Suddenly, this action put the wheels of the Revolution back on track in another form and restored its initial momentum.

On the other hand, with the revelation of the embassy's documents, the true essence of some of the ruling liberals was exposed to the people, who, until then, had not recognized the real face of this group. It became clear to them that in the event that liberalism managed to gain a foothold for itself in the administration after the Revolution, it would no longer be possible to bring them down easily from the throne of power. The genuine Revolution of the people would once again and for at least sometime, be put back on the shelf.

America had especially pinned all its hopes on the ruling liberal forces and was optimistic of preserving its past interests in another manner with their government but it lost hope as a result of the movement of the students.

The domestic anti-revolution forces, including the leftist factions, were also disappointed by the embassy's occupation. This was because the only weapon, of branding the Revolution and the revolutionaries anti-American and western, that they had in their possession was taken away from them by the actions of the interim government. They could not imagine that revolutionary Muslim groups could undertake such a potentially dangerous mission and that too at a time when the post-Revolution society needed peace to consolidate the position of the new system. Thus, for some days, they avoided expressing any kind of opinion, because they saw their position threatened in the minds of the public. They had no choice but to support the action of the student followers of the Imam's policy line.

Disclosure of secrets from the American embassy caused thirty years of untiring efforts of the American administration and the CIA, to penetrate Iranian society and deploy suitable forces to reap the harvests at the opportune moment, to be in vain. For Iran's society, it meant to be rendered safe from the dangers of penetration by foreign elements.

On the other hand, with this action, many of the secrets and links of the CIA with other espionage organizations and the prominent students of these organizations were disclosed, causing the disruption of almost the entire American intelligence and espionage network in the region.

The collapse of the interim government and disclosure of the secrets of the American Embassy caused the non-revolutionary and anti-revolutionary forces, that had somehow managed to infiltrate the ranks of governmental institutions, or were remnants of the past, to lose support, and clear the path for the dominion of devoted and pious *Hezbollah* individuals.

On the other hand, occupation of the embassy facilitated the solidarity of the united and pious *Hezbollahi* forces for confronting the greater threats and more widespread struggle with all their strength. It revived the memory of America - which was gradually being totally forgotten - as the number one enemy of the country in the minds of the revolutionary people.

However, from the international point of view, the occupation of the embassy of one of the two superpowers and access to their sensitive and crucial secrets, and inability of the power to resolve the crises, left behind deeper effects. On the one hand, this action smashed the reverence of international yardsticks totally fabricated by western society to facilitate the perpetuation of the hegemony of powerful western colonialists. On the other hand, from then onwards, it would no longer grant diplomatic immunity or allow the place of a foreign embassy to be on the soil of that country and enable its misuse by engaging in destructive espionage activities and hatching plots. There was no security for it anymore, as earlier imposed on global governments.

A small country like a Third World country could not take undue advantage of this privilege on the soil of countries such as the United States or the erstwhile Soviet Union. The superpowers could take advantage of this privilege to transform their embassies into bases to give orders, impose their hegemony, hatch conspiracies, engineer military coups and interfere in the internal affairs of small countries. With the occupation of the American Embassy, such operations dropped to a minimum in all countries; and the superpowers and their

satellites no longer possessed the necessary security for engaging in plots.[1]

With the occupation of the American embassy, the Islamic Revolution of Iran was drawn towards a face-to-face confrontation and direct struggle with America. With their resistance, steadfastness and defusing all the American conspiracies, they brought great humiliation for the politicians of America and especially for the Carter administration, and subsequently for the Reagan administration. A government that had still not freed itself from the fatal blow of losing the Shah and losing Iran, was dealt yet another blow more fatal than the first one; and despite all its military and material power and capability, it was incapable of dealing a blow in return.

This matter was enormously humiliating for America's make-believe power in the world; and for the first time it proved that a smaller but determined power has the potential to confront and resist a superpower such as America, and can even render it impotent and force it to accept defeat.

In this manner, Iran showed the way of challenging the great powers to the rest of the down trodden and oppressed nations. It proved that through unity, steadfastness and fearlessness, it is possible to triumph over the giants of global arrogance.

On this subject, Mac Ferguson and Holbrooke, who occupied key and sensitive posts in the Johnson and Carter administrations, write:

"In fact, the hostage crises, like a pressure cooker, took the country, which had been baffled (by the Iran Revolution) to a boiling point. Helicopters burning in the sands had become the symbol of the lack of capability of America in achieving an extremely limited objective

1. Basically, by substantiating their claims on the disclosure of secrets of the American Embassy in Tehran, countries of the Third World can review diplomatic rights and privileges. They can facilitate the possibility of carrying out a kind of continual supervision and control in order to prevent misuse of the aforesaid rights and privileges.

which was the freedom of its citizens from the hands of a third-class country."[1]

In relation to the occupation of the American Embassy, the liberals divided into two groups:

The first group consisted of members of the interim cabinet and those who had been previously removed from office. This group expressed its open opposition to the actions of the student followers of the Imam's policy line. Among them, Mr. Bazargan strongly condemned the action of the students and remarked that from the point of view of administrative and political responsibility of the state and preservation of rights of foreign citizens according to international conventions, the interim government could not refrain from opposing such an action. In another instance,[2] he remarked:

"This is an extremely ugly and offensive action that the students have taken; and all are opposed to it; and their action is anti-revolution, anti-Islam, anti-Imam, and everything. A part of the past, present and future disclosures of the students are lies."[3]

In this connection, he remarked a year later:

"The incident of hostage-taking occurred with all its implications. I have nothing to do with it, but its implications and dangers that occurred after it; Iran's political isolation almost throughout the world and even among the Muslim states; the economic siege, the events of Tabas, that even now one cannot explain how God Almighty safeguarded the country, the Imam and the nation; and following it, the abortive conspiracy and other things."[4]

In an interview a day after the incident, Dr. Yazdi, the Foreign Minister of the interim government said;

1. C. P. Ioannides, Opcit, P. 130.
2. Mr. Mahdi Bazargan, Revolution in Two Moves, P. 94.
3. Stances of the Freedom Movement vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution, P. 29.
4. Ibid, P. 98.

"The government of the Islamic Republic has an obligation to protect the property and lives of the foreign residents…as the government we express our regret for the occurrence of such an incident."[1]

Another group of liberals were those that had yet to come to power, and had stepped aside from the activities of the interim government, and would once in a while criticize it. To protect their own future and gain popularity, they acted in a more sophisticated way. At the outset, they implicitly endorsed the matter of occupation of the embassy and even delivered speeches in front of the embassy gates for the demonstrators and gatherings. In this regard, one can name Bani Sadr and Qutbzadeh in particular, as two individuals who harbored ambitions of becoming president. Others, such as Admiral Madani, who would not express their views openly to the public, were not in favor of this move.

Bani Sadr put forward his Three-World theory and viewed the backing of Europe and Japan to be crucial, so he adopted a different approach. On the one hand, he would deal with the foreign journalists from the position of a guilty party and say:

"I fully understand the question of imprisonment of human beings; however, this issue, is an issue of imprisonment, whereas the Shah was the issue of the suffering of our nation; the future of this nation and mankind."

In another instance, he said:

"Now we are faced with an action that has already taken place; and we cannot clear the American Embassy by using force."[2]

Whereas in his dealing with the revolutionary people, he would deceptively say:

"The truth is that occupation of the American Embassy is other than the act of a small group for an objective. This act is a protest by the entire nation."[3]

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1. Reserves of Imperialism, P. 77.
2. Reserves of Imperialism, P. 72.
3. Editorial in Jomhuri Eslami daily dated November 6, 1979.

However, it didn't take long for this group of liberals to oppose this move by the students and condemn their action. For example, in November 1981, two years after the incident of the embassy's occupation, Bani Sadr revealed his true inner feelings and criticized the action of the students:

"Never do I regard the invasion of a foreign embassy as a courageous act. Hostage-taking has prevented the message of the Revolution from reaching the world. Hostage-taking has distorted the image of Iran's Revolution, because we revolted in the name of rights, preservation of human rights and freedom. At the same time hostage-taking has caused the American administration to fail to understand an extremely humane revolution; an extremely beautiful revolution and has resulted in the disruption of the revolution of a poor nation."[1]

Another important point is that each of the ruling liberals in order to attract public opinion and American consent would strive, by various means, to resolve the question of the hostages.

Initially, Bani Sadr, who was in charge of the Foreign Ministry, decided to take action by making an appearance at the Security Council of the United Nations, proposed and accepted the views of its members. However, the Leader of the Revolution, knowing the stances of the Security Council's members and considering the probability of Iran's condemnation, prevented the visit from taking place. Consequently, he resigned from the Foreign Ministry without mentioning any reason.

Sadiq Qutbzadeh was appointed Foreign Minister after Bani Sadr's resignation. He began a secret attempt to resolve the hostage issue as well. Without informing any of the members of the Revolutionary Council and the Supreme leadership, he established contacts with the White House officials through a Frenchman by the name of Christian Bourges and an Argentinean named Villalon. On a visit to Europe, he secretly met Hamilton Jordan, the White House Chief of Staff and tried to find a solution in order to attract the support of the local revolutionary forces and the student followers of the Imam's policy

1. Reserves of Imperialism, P. 90.

line on the one hand, and the officials of the American administration on the other.[1]

Another liberal who established contacts secretly with the Americans was Sadiq Tabatabaie. He met Warren Christopher, the Assistant Foreign Secretary of the United States and tried to find a solution to the problem. All three persons were presidential candidates, and while competing with one another, were optimistic that by finding a solution to the hostage crises, they would be able to attract the required popularity to garner the people's ballot and support of the global community.[2]

In defending the actions of this faction, Mr. Bazargan writes:

"Iran's government officials, who were more concerned about the reputation of the Revolution and the country within the international community, and the dangerous economic, military and political reactions that would be unbearable for the country, embarked on efforts and agreements on principle."[3]

The tenure of the Revolutionary Council that did not last for more than nine months was officially spent on two important and basic issues:

1. The manner of resolving the hostage crises

2. Holding the referendum on ratification of the constitution of the Islamic Republic, and presidential and parliamentary elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly

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1. For more information on the details of the subject see the book, "Crises" written by Hamilton Jordan; translated by Mahmoud Mashreqi, Hafteh publishers.
2. On the subject of the hostage-taking, numerous books have been written by the involved officials and most have been translated into Farsi. In particular, one can name Jimmy Carter's book entitled "Keeping Covenant"; Zbigniew Brezezinski's book entitled "Power, Principles and Memoirs of Cyrus Vance. Likewise, Pierre Salinger in his book "Hostage-taking in Iran and Secret Negotiations of Tehran translated by Saqatol Eslami, Novin Publishers, details the 'behind closed door' activities of the liberals for obtaining the freedom of the hostages.
3. Revolution in Two Moves, P. 98.

In this period, an intense competition began between the forces of the Imam's policy line and the liberals for the sensitive and important state responsibilities, including the presidency and representation in the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

With the stepping aside of Jalaluddin Farsi, the Islamic Republic party candidate for the presidency and their lack of endorsement of the candidacy of Martyr Dr. Ayat, the field of electoral challenge became the monopoly of the liberal candidates. With regard to the precision planning beforehand and the large number of tactics that he applied; and with the people's perception of him being backed by the Leader of the Revolution, Bani Sadr was able to obtain the clear-cut majority of the votes cast and be elected as the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, liberalism continued to remain in the presidential position in the administrative and political system.

However, the forces of the Imam's policy line, on the recommendations of the Leader of the Revolution, spent all its energy on gaining the seats to the legislative assembly. Towards this objective, despite the reciprocal challenge posed by the liberals and the leftists, they were able to win a decisive majority of the seats to the legislative assembly. As a result, the main positions of power were divided between two groups, and an intense competition and rivalry for choosing the desired government ensued between the president and the legislative assembly. By leaning on the guidelines of the Imam, the legislative assembly put its foot down for the selection of a committed and religious prime minister.

On this subject the Imam stated:

"Right from the beginning, based on the obligation that I perceived we had placed on the interim government, we had erred. From the beginning a government that was decisive, young and able to manage the country – not a government that was incapable…but at that time we didn't have an individual that we could (place our trust on); a familiar face who we could elect. He was elected and it was a mistake and…now also, that government wants to install a government in the Consultative Assembly…now we must announce this to the Consultative Assembly that a pious, hundred percent Islamic and decisive government must be elected. They must not accept a minister who is like one of the ministers that we now have. All the ministers

must be examined one by one – he should be religious, one-hundred percent revolutionary, educated and decisive. If our government should be like the former one and have those attributes and hold those views, then we must hold the mourning ceremony of this movement…the legislature must be decisive."[1]

With this solid assurance, the legislative assembly decisively insisted on its position; and despite the fact that the foremost candidate proposed by Bani Sadr for the premiership belonged to the Islamic Republic party, the legislative assembly refused to accept him. Finally, after prolonged efforts, investigating and forming a joint committee, they agreed on Martyr Mohammad Ali Raja'i.[2] He was elected as the second prime minister of the government of the Islamic Republic and took charge of that office.

The conflict between the liberal forces and the followers of the Imam's policy line continued as before; this issue became more obvious over the selection of the cabinet ministers between President Bani Sadr and Martyr Raja'i, the Prime Minister. On one hand, by leaning on the eleven million votes that he had received, Bani Sadr opined that the Prime Minister must coordinate his programs with the President. On the other hand, according to the constitution, the government headed by the Prime Minister was liable and answerable to the legislative assembly, and the President did not have any sort of obligation in this regard. This problem delayed the appointment of the Commerce, Finance, and Foreign Affairs ministers for quite some time. Until the dismissal of Bani Sadr from the presidency, Martyr Raja'i's cabinet was without a minister of foreign affairs.[3]

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1. Sahifeh-e-Imam, vol. 12, P. 4 & 253 – 254.
2. Mr. Mohammad Ali Raja'i, was a secondary school teacher and a pious and devoted fighter of oppression, who joined the Imam's movement in the year 1963 and began his struggle against the Shah's regime alongside martyr Bahunar. He bore years of persecution, torture and imprisonment at the hands of the dreaded 'SAVAK" secret police. After the Revolution he was put in charge of the Ministry of Education and Training.
3. This problem was resolved by reviewing the constitution and eliminating the position of Prime Minister and appointing the President as the head and in charge of the executive power.

During the administration of the Council of Revolution, new conspiracies by foreign powers and their local operatives came forward. Some of the most important of them included the following:

A) The Tabas Incident: When America lost hope of resolving the hostage-taking crises through peaceful means and political negotiations, it decided on carrying out a rescue plan, and under its cover, a plot to topple the Islamic Republic system. With a precise and pre-planned program, on May 5, 1980, it invaded Iran's territory with the help of eight helicopters and three C-130 aircraft. However, right from the outset, the American administration suffered a humiliating defeat to top its earlier defeats when it lost the helicopters, one of the aircraft and eight of its military personnel.

B) There is no doubt that America's defeat was a miracle. It was Divine succor alone that, on that dark fateful night, when all the Muslim revolutionary forces were asleep, rushed to Iran's help and by means of shifting sands and a sandstorm, dislocated the most sophisticated technology system, and once again revived the story of the Year of the Elephant in the minds of the Muslims.

The only thing that can be added in this connection is to refer to Bani Sadr's treacherous act as president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He ordered the bombing of the remaining helicopters and destruction of the confidential documents left behind by the invaders, and deprived the people of Iran from gaining access to them.[1]

C) Noujeh Military Coup: Another plot to overthrow the government was enacted by a group of military personnel affiliated with the former regime. The forces of the Imam discovered and quashed the Noujeh military coup planned by a faction of the liberal forces and supported by the CIA organization. The entire secrets were not made public, but the confessions of those involved in the coup, including Captain Rokni, disclosed that the military coup was aimed at the revolutionary forces and the Leader of the Revolution. It was

1. For detailed study of the Tabas Incident refer to the same aforesaid sources of the question of occupation of the 'espionage den'.

not against the liberal faction and the President, who, it was recommended, be retained.[1]

D) Cultural Revolution: A few months before the Revolution, the universities and Tehran University, in particular, had become the arena of the leftist forces, leftist groups and organizations including the Peykaris, Fadaien-e-Khalq and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq guerillas, who based their political-military activities in the universities. They resorted to anti-governmental activities using government facilities. This not only disrupted the routine activities of the universities, rather, it prevented the universities from being cleansed and purified of the forces faithful to the former regime as well.

In general, one can say that until the launching of the Cultural Revolution, the universities were not under the control of the Revolution's government. For this reason, with a move initiated by Muslim students of Tabriz University and thereafter, pursued with the support of revolutionary and people's forces in May 1980 in Tehran, the universities were cleansed of opposition forces. They were closed down temporarily, to launch the Cultural Revolution. Thereafter, the Cultural Revolution Staff Committee supervised the working of universities and implemented the necessary changes for Islamization of universities. Forces of the Imam's policy line administered the universities through an institution named 'University Jihad.'

Although the initial move for cleansing universities was a political one, but this move laid the groundwork for fundamental changes in universities. As regards to what extent the Cultural Revolution was successful is another subject that is beyond the scope of this writing.

A point that is interesting and worth mentioning here is Bani Sadr's opportunism. At the time of this move, Bani Sadr was visiting the province of Khuzestan. Simply because he didn't wish to be left behind the bandwagon and be able to extract the necessary benefit from this move, he returned to Tehran. Despite his sincere reluctance and loathing, he was placed at the head of the people's forces responsible for political cleansing of the universities.

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1. For more information of the circumstances of the military coup, see the book "Noujeh Military Coup" printed by the Center for Political Studies and Research.

Third Stage:
Administration by Forces of the Imam's Policy Line

With the formation of Martyr Raja'i's government, forces of the Imam's policy line moved from a position of weakness to a position of power. Now the decisive majority of the Islamic Consultative Assembly representatives, members of the Higher Judiciary Council and government cabinet that comprised the three chief pillars of the three powers of the state belonged to the forces of the Imam's policy line. Liberals became weak and despite controlling the presidency, became the opposing minority. They were in minority in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, management of the Central Bank, the radio and television broadcasting network and most important of all, the presidency and commander-in-chief of the armed and military forces, delegated by His Eminence Imam Khomeini to Bani Sadr.

When the moderates lost hope of gaining the majority of the parliamentary seats and the ministries, they decided on bringing the government to its knees. The entire opposition forces including the liberals, the conservatives (status quo supporters), the leftists and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization arrived at a tactical understanding and, under the auspices of the President-elect of the nation, regularly gathered at the Office of Coordination of the People and the President and organized activities aimed at creating disturbances.

It is interesting to note that the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization, during the time of the interim government, had opposed the liberals, now that the liberals were resisting the Imam's policy line, they joined their coalition. By exploiting the free environment that governed society; and by using the promotional facilities, like *Mizaan* and *Islamic Revolution* newspapers, and the radio and television broadcasting network, the liberals succeeded in creating a tense and turbulent atmosphere. This process started with Bani Sadr's speech at a ceremony marking the anniversary of the September 8, 1980 martyrs of Shuhada Square in Tehran, and continued until the end of his government on June 22, 1981. The liberal's perception was that the government of Martyr Raja'i was incapable of managing the country and if pressurized, it would collapse quickly. Also, the Reagan administration had announced that it was necessary that a moderate government should come to power to resolve differences

between Iran and the United States. The Iran-Iraq War began with the pre-planned aggression of the government of Iraq led by Saddam Hussein on September 22, 1980, and changed the scene of rivalry and clash of opposition forces inside the country.

As Commander-in-Chief, Bani Sadr was the head of the armed forces. Thus by leaning on the trained combat forces of the army and by means of classic war methods, he attempted to pave the way for domestic exploitation aimed at strengthening his own position by reviving the military and its power.

On the other hand, forces loyal to the Imam's policy line, with faith in people's forces, wanted to change the war from that of a national-religious war to that of a popular-ideological one. From the start of the war to the dismissal of Bani Sadr from office, this dispute was the most basic factor that weakened the position of the armed forces and led to successive defeats and loss of vast tracts of Iranian territory.

Herein, it is not possible to give in detail the causes of the outbreak of war and the trend of its changes, because this issue demands a separate book.[1] Martyr Raja'i's government, that had just begun its rule, was suddenly confronted with the enormous problem of losses because of the enemy's aggression. The displacement of more than two million citizens and the need to secure financial, weaponry and logistical needs of the armed forces, demanded serious attention, although it did not have much say in managing the affairs of the war.

The other issue placed on the shoulders of Martyr Raja'i's government was the issue of the American hostages. After the political maneuvers of the liberals failed and the Shah died, the question of him being returned to Iran to face trial ceased to exist.

The Leader of the Revolution entrusted the task of determining the conditions of resolving the issue to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. It specified four conditions:

a) Release Iran's assets and properties

b) Return the nation's wealth stolen by the Shah and his family

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1. For more studies see "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic; its Principles and Issues", P. 135 – 137.

c) Lift the economic siege

d) Undertake not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs

The assembly also delegated the task of engaging in necessary negotiations through the Algerian government to resolve the matter. The start of the aggression by Iraq overshadowed the subject of the hostages. In order for all energy to be concentrated in confronting the forces of aggression and repulse them, the quick solution of the hostage issue acquired greater urgency.

On the other hand, with the arrival of America's presidential elections, Jimmy Carter's defeat and Ronald Reagan's victory, this was the only remaining opportunity they had to resolve the matter before transfer of power to the new American president. The political objectives of occupying the 'espionage den' i.e. the American embassy, achieved, America admitted defeat in this incident at the hands of a small government. Its domestic implications inside the United States had led to the collapse of the Carter administration and the Democrats. Keeping the hostages for a longer period in war conditions was not expedient anymore. It was interesting to note that the liberals opposed the takeover of the American embassy right from the start and regarded it to be against the interest of the Revolution. They tried to resolve the matter by political shenanigans and secret negotiations without the knowledge of the Leader of the Revolution and the nation. However, they now created a restless atmosphere. They leveled accusations of treason and compromise on Martyr Raja'i's government, delegated to resolve the matter. Even the president submitted a written statement against them to the legal authorities and the head of the Central Bank of Iran, saying he would shun any form of cooperation with the government on the subject of gathering the necessary information. Nevertheless, the issue was resolved on the last day of Carter's presidency while handing over the presidency to Ronald Reagan. The signing of the Algeria Declaration by the governments of Iran and the United States lifted the hostages from Tehran's Mehrabad Airport after 444 days of captivity.[1]

1. For further studies on this subject see Ibid, Fourth Chapter, pgs. 137 – 147.

The conflict between the two opposing factions in the government continued as before. The Leader of the Revolution, without directly taking a stance in favor of any party would counsel, give advice and offer his recommendations to both parties. Each of the parties would interpret his statements and opinions according to their own particular understanding and print his message differently. Contradictory titles appeared in the newspapers under their respective control, but it was clear that the advice, counsel and admonishments were directed more at the liberals and, he would allusively or directly, censure them. The daily newspapers had become the scene of conflict between the parties. It jarred the nerves of the challenging and revolutionary people. The situation demanded that all attention be focused on the war, whereas, the energy of the revolutionaries of the country was being consumed in this fashion. The 'rumor-mongering' by the liberals reached its peak when Bani Sadr delivered a speech in Tehran's Azadi Square on '*Ashura*' (tenth day commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (AS) in Karbala), which was followed with clapping and applause by the left and non-religious forces on the final day of mourning Imam Hussein (AS), thereby showing their true colors. Intense clashes erupted on March 5, 1980 in Tehran University between the forces of the Imam's policy line and the militias of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization, who now officially belonged to the liberal faction. When the country was getting out of hand and chaos reigned all over, the Leader of the Revolution gave an ultimatum to the liberals, placing them effectively in a situation in which they were compelled to disobey the directive of the supreme leadership and take up an opposing stance.

On March 16, a meeting was organized in the presence of the Imam to solve the differences between the officials and petitioners. The same night, the Imam presented guidelines concerning the affairs of state, in a ten-article communiqué. Article six of this communiqué declares:

"In order to attend to the complaints concerning the question of the war and other issues of dispute among the authorities of the Islamic Republic, a committee comprising of one representative of the President, one from the other party (late Martyr Beheshti, Mr. Rafsanjani, Martyr Raja'i) and one from this person (the Imam) shall endeavor to resolve the grievances. The opinion of the majority of the

committee representatives shall be valid and binding; and in case of breach by one of the officials, the offender must be introduced to the people and taken to task."[1]

This committee, comprising of Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani as representative of the Imam; Ayatollah Yazdi representing the government, the judiciary and the legislature; and the late Ayatollah Eshraqi, representing the President, was formed. It continued to operate until the dismissal of president Bani Sadr from office. The petitioners were asked to avoid giving interviews until removal of tensions.

At this time, the Freedom Movement faction, contrary to the constitution, demanded a public referendum, by putting forward the issue that the country had reached a deadlock. Their demand was reminiscent of Dr. Mossadeq's move towards the end of his government. Despite having the majority of the National Consultative assembly's votes, he had taken away the legislative powers from the Assembly, because he judged the Assembly to be an impediment. By holding a notorious referendum, he dissolved the assembly and paved the way for the return of dictatorship.

It is interesting to note that the liberals, despite claiming to support freedom and democracy, would never hesitate to destroy freedom and democracy whenever they saw the two of them opposed to their objectives and intentions. Based on Mr. Bazargan's proposal, an assembly formed with the ballot of the people and the representatives of the people, had to be dissolved by means of a referendum. In this case not only did the three-man committee of the government take a stand and castigate him, rather, the Leader of the Revolution reproached them and stated, "It is you that has reached a dead-end; the nation never reaches dead-ends."[2]

Bani Sadr also was no longer in a situation where he could ignore his only weapon, which was to aggravate the already tense atmosphere. Thus by giving speeches and interviews, he compelled the arbitration committee to introduce him as the offender and blameworthy.

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1. Sahifeh-e-Imam, vol. 14, P. 243.
2. Sahifeh-e-Imam, Vol. 14, P. 243.

Now the grounds for dismissal of Bani Sadr were fully prepared. All those individuals who had voted him into office because of a lack of knowledge, or to repel evils with evil, took back their votes and sought to dissociate themselves from him. By launching an attack on Islamic teachings (Retribution Bill) the National Front entered the arena; and while directly attacking the government on June 16, 1980, announced holding protests and meetings in Tehran's Ferdowsi Square. This was met with the decisive declaration of apostasy by the Leader of the Revolution which made a huge impact on the masses such, that on the day of the demonstration, the nationalists and their allies were forced to flee from the scene.[1]

The leader of the Revolution dismissed Bani Sadr from the position of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and sequel to it, the Islamic Consultative Assembly with a decisive majority, voted in favor of disqualifying the President. Endorsed by the Leader of the Revolution, Bani Sadr was ousted from the presidency. With it, the presence of liberal forces ended in the governmental apparatus. This brief but hectic chapter in the history of the Revolution closed another chapter but an even more eventful and hectic one was about commence.

Fourth Stage:
Third Revolution

Dismissal of Bani Sadr from the post of President took away the last executive bunker from the liberal forces and ended their presence in the government completely. It ended all hopes of the domestic anti-revolutionaries and arrogant global powers of coming to power through political means. This matter shocked the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization as it showed how easy it was to remove a president who had been elected with approximately eleven million votes. This action not only did not bring in its wake any kind of protest, rather, it brought happiness to those individuals who had voted him into office.

The major mistake of the liberals, Bani Sadr and likewise, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization was that they thought he really enjoyed an exclusive popular base, independent of the supreme leadership of the Revolution; and that he could face up to the clergy

1. Ibid, vol. 15, P. 10.

and even the Leader of the Revolution. They were also under the impression that just as Dr. Mossadeq was able to eliminate Ayatollah Kashani from the scene and isolate him, they could create such a situation and isolate the clergy and leadership of the Revolution as well. They were unmindful of the fact that this time the clergy was awake, and Imam Khomeini was quite different from the late Ayatollah Kashani.

The Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization[1] planned to grab power because of the preoccupations of revolutionary forces with the routine affairs of the country.

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1. Founders of this organization (Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saeed Mohsen and Asghar Badiezadegan) gained their initial political experiences in the bedrock of the Freedom Movement during their student days at Tehran University (1960 – 1964). In addition, the religious ideas of the leaders of the Freedom Movement, especially Ayatollah Taleqani and Mr. Bazargan, created new horizons in their Islamic perspective. Emphasis by Mr. Bazargan on the scientific basis of religious teachings had convinced them that in Islam there is no contradiction between religious convictions and scientific laws. The new perspective that had emerged in the Mujahideen's thinking, gradually went beyond the thinking and global vision of their initial tutors and the Mujahideen, by drawing inspiration and impression from Marxist ideas, gradually took steps towards blending some of the Marxist views with Islamic beliefs. For instance, they made Marx's theory of 'value-added' propounded in his famous work 'Capital', the basis of their "Islamic Economy" and aligned it with their own interpretation of the Quran and the Islamic narratives. With the daily expansion of Marxist culture among the Shah's opponents, greater emphasis was placed on that part of the Islamic teachings and beliefs that seemed to be on the same track as the Marxist ideas and was taught more while the other part, which did not enjoy the same accord, was abandoned and not incorporated in their ideology. In fact, principles of Marxism were recognized as a science for combating "the science of evolution of society" and the border between this Marxist global perspective and Islam was obliterated.
With the removal of the foremost leaders and cadre of the organization in 1971, the inclination towards Marxism spread further; and the duality of thinking of the past between Islam and Marxism finally came to an end with the banishment of Islam from the organization. In July 1975, the arrested leaders of the organization, in a television interview officially and categorically announced that they were Marxists and had practically armed

It embarked on enlisting members, organizing and arming itself. By relying on emotional factors, it worked on the young generation in schools and managed to attract and organize a relatively substantial number to its covert political-military organization. Because of the chaotic situation after the Revolution's triumph, the organization was able to penetrate the most sensitive of the country's institutions.

After the removal from office of Bani Sadr, the organization declared an armed struggle on flimsy grounds, launched its acts of terrorism and dealt the first horrendous blow by bombing the head office of the Islamic Republic Party, martyring seventy-two of the most senior officials of the state, including the country's head of the Supreme Court, Dr. Beheshti. In the month after that incident, it bombed the Prime Minister's building causing the martyrdom of both President Raja'i as well as Prime Minister Bahunar.

The terrorist activities of the organization did substantial damage to the Revolution. The revolutionary government which, after almost two and half years of problems and clashes with the liberal forces and anti-revolutionaries, had managed to employ a number of competent forces devoted to the ideology of the Revolution, was suddenly faced with the loss of more than a hundred of its most competent leaders and bureaucrats. This was a massive blow to the Revolution and it was far more difficult to bear than Iraq's invasion of Iran's territory. The planners of these actions perceived that with the loss of this group of individuals, the Revolution would collapse and pave the way for their coming to power. Indeed, if such a loss would have occurred in any country, it would be impossible for the regime to save itself from the perilous situation.

Factors that transformed the hopes of the anti-Revolution elements into despair and protected the achievements of the Revolution were; firstly, the sagacious action of the Leader of the Revolution taking

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the organization with Marxist ideology and beliefs. In addition to breaking down the sanctity of the Mujahideen, confession of the organization of becoming Marxist caused the more religious elements to separate from the organization. Some independent individuals of the Mujahideen separated from it while another group branched off and rallied around Lutfullah Meysami under the heading of 'Salavatiyoun' and 'rebel' (A'teraziyoun) elements.

charge of the situation and filling-up the vacuum caused by the martyrdom of the officials, which boosted the morale of the people and the officials. Secondly, it was the extensive presence of the people on the political scene eliminating the possibility of any further type of maneuvering from the opponents. Irrespective of the losses inflicted, the dismissal of Bani Sadr created substantial opportunities for the Revolution and ensured it for years on end.

1. Liberalism, the great affliction of the Revolution, caused the gradual deviation of the Revolution. Incidents of the first year of the Revolution disclosed the true face of the liberals to the entire nation, forcing them to accept their certain political defeat. They lost the chance of deceiving the public with any false propaganda. A number of them conspired with the anti-revolutionaries and started to engage in plots against the Islamic Republic regime, leading to the execution of one and exile of two. Of the three candidates to the first term of presidency, Qutbzadeh was executed, while Bani Sadr and Madani fled the country.

2. By starting armed confrontation, the anti-Revolution groups stood face-to-face with the nation, and on losing their apparatus and organization, disintegrated very quickly. A great danger that could have led to the collapse of the Revolution was removed.

3. Forces devoted to the Revolution, but occasionally influenced by the rumor-mongering of the liberals and hypocrites were overcome with doubt and hesitation. After the disclosure of their true nature, they were no longer in doubt and joined the rest of the revolutionaries and defended the Revolution with their heart and soul.

4. The superpower of the west, the United States, or in the words of the Leader of the Revolution, 'the great Satan' despaired, having pinned all its hopes on the liberals and domestic anti-revolutionaries for a return to its former position.

5. The most outstanding achievement of the Third Revolution was the beginning of successive defeats of the invading forces of Iraq and the splendid victory of the soldiers of Islam. Bani Sadr, who was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, was sowing discord and creating differences among the armed forces, and especially between the army and the Revolutionary Guards Corps of the Islamic

Revolution. By using his powers and position, and giving leeway to some of the liberal officers and commanders, despite his unfamiliarity with military issues, attempted to gain acceptance among them. In particular, by denigrating the actions of the political-ideological departments of the army and their heads who were under management of the clergy and the supreme religious authority; and by excessively emphasizing specialization, attempted to advance his political line.

On the other hand, by relying on the Parthian method of war, he wanted to cover-up the weakness of command and blamed the defeats on the interference of 'uninformed and amateur' individuals. The prevalence of this atmosphere caused Iran's forces to suffer successive defeats in most of their attacks on enemy forces.

After the dismissal of Bani Sadr, the armed forces, the Guards Corps, and the 'Baseej' volunteer mobilization forces were placed under the direct command of the Leader of the Revolution. They not only experienced unimaginable cohesion and unity, but their morale, which had been weakened as a result of the rumor-mongering and seditious acts of Bani Sadr and his friends, was boosted to such an extent that it yielded immediate results. In the military operations conducted within a couple of days the operations were code-named "Spirit of God", "Commander-in-chief" and "Samenul A'imah", the warriors of Islam attained impressive and unprecedented victories. Amazing victories were achieved in the 'Fath-ul-Mobeen', 'Baitul Moqaddas' and other operations within one year, and the Muslims of Iran celebrated the retaking of the city of Khorramshahr; and, following their string of victorious military operations, entered and occupied Iraqi territory.

These victories continued until the conquest of the town of Halabjah by the warriors of Islam because of a unity and solidarity attained by the Third Revolution. This placed Iran's armed forces in a situation, which few friends and enemies would have doubted. Had it not been for the intervention of the superpowers, the collapse of Saddam and the Baathist Party of Iraq would have been a foregone conclusion.

6. Among the other splendid victories that were attained by the forces of the Imam's policy line after the removal of Bani Sadr, was the discovery and disbanding of networks and plots to topple the government, some of which we will refer to briefly:

a. Discovery and extermination of the semi-clandestine Tudeh Party organization and the KGB espionage network and its infiltrating elements

The Tudeh Party of Iran was not only the oldest established political party of Iran, but the first organized communist party in the Middle East. The first communist party of Iran was founded in the year 1921 and was active until the year 1931, when it was banned by Reza Shah because of propagating its Marxist ideology. In the year 1941, after the occupation of Iran by the allied powers and deposition of Reza Shah, the communist party of Iran started a new era of its activities under the name of Tudeh Party of Iran. Selecting the name 'Tudeh' (masses) for the party, despite its Marxist-Leninist ideology was that the Muslim society of Iran did not have the necessary background to accept communistic ideas. This step was taken, purely, to deceive the people.[1]

Forty years of overt and covert activities and the experiences of the communist parties of other countries especially, its longstanding relationship with the Communist Party of Soviet Russia and the chaotic situation in Iran, enabled this party to earn a relatively powerful base in Iran after the Second World War. However, in view of the fact that this party was an involuntary tool of Soviet Russia's policies and took its orders from there, it wasn't able to adopt a clear-cut, coherent and independent policy vis-à-vis Iran's issues. Consequently, a number of the sincere members of the party became disillusioned and stepped aside, while numerous offshoots sprung up from the party.

On the other hand, whenever a consensus was arrived at between the central government of Iran and the big powers, especially Soviet Russia, and the international situation became favorable; Iran's government would take steps to pulverize them.

Such a situation occurred for the Tudeh Party twice: Once, after February 4, 1949, following the assassination attempt on the Shah blamed on the Tudeh Party. It suffered a severe blow on being disbanded. The military coup of August 19, 1953, and discovery of a

1. Farhang Jahanpour, "Iran: The Rise and Fall of the Tudeh Party, April 1984, P. 153.

clandestine network of the officers of the Tudeh Party culminated in the disintegration of the party domestically, and the central cadre of the party was forced to flee from Iran.

Because of the close ties between the Shah and Soviet Russia, the Tudeh Party had endorsed the Shah's actions during the religious uprising of the people in the years 1962 and 1963. This caused the total loss of its credibility and respect even among the youth who had Marxist leanings, including the Fedayeen, Peykar and Ranjbaran guerillas.

With the revolutionary struggle of the Muslim nation of Iran reaching its peak in 1978, the Tudeh Party gradually emerged out of isolation. Its members, after years of residing in Communist countries, gradually returned to Iran and restarted their activities. Until this time, the Tudeh Party lacked a formal and open organization. Towards the beginning of the year 1978, Behazin (Etemadzadeh) – who was in charge of its leadership in Iran – published a detailed declaration that while analyzing the country's situation, proposed the creation of a front called 'the anti-dictatorship front', but received no response from the revolutionary people and their leaders. When the victory of the Islamic Revolution became a foregone conclusion, they changed the direction of Soviet Russia's policies, and endorsed the revolutionary struggles of the people of Iran.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Tudeh Party stood at the crossroads. If it wanted to stand firm on its ideological standing and pursue its past, it would have to confront the Revolution and the people. The party's extremely weak base inside the country could not have yielded any other result except its decimation. The other alternative was to forego their ideological positions and endorse the position of the Islamic Republic fully. They could take advantage of the open atmosphere prevailing after the Revolution and continue with their existence by reorganizing the party. This was the path that the Tudeh Party chose, with the stamp of approval of Soviet Russia. By selecting this method, two of their aims and objectives were taken care of. The first was that it made it possible for their forces to infiltrate the rank and file of the executive institutions and organizations. They intended to bring down the Islamic Republic system in the long term at the opportune moment by plotting the

overthrow and eventually throw the country into the lap of Soviet Russia. Another was that with their presence in the country, it would make it possible for the KGB espionage organization to infiltrate and obtain information of the country's secrets as well as of its important and sensitive issues.

By choosing the second path, the Tudeh Party announced that it was toeing the Imam's policy line and the Islamic Republic and claiming what was not compatible with the ideological essence of that party. In any case, as it endorsed the Islamic Republic and exploited the provisions of the constitution and other current rules and regulations of the country, it was able to continue with its half-open and half-hidden life. By taking advantage of the system's troubles and the post-Revolution chaos and disorder, it managed to achieve part of its twin objectives and infiltrate the system to the extent that one of its elements (Admiral Afzali) became chief of the naval forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The important victory of the forces of the Imam's policy line, in the Third Revolution, was the unearthing of the Tudeh party's secret organization with its infiltrating elements and their subsequent disintegration. This success had an extensive dimension. It enabled the government not only to discover their covert organization, rather, to arrest the entire membership of the party's central committee as well. With their long record in political struggles, they confessed to their misdeeds, including spying for the Soviet Russian government.

Confessions of Ehsan Tabari, the well-known ideologue of the party, and especially his repentance for the wrongs he had committed, is on its own, unprecedented in the history of international communism.[1] Yet another point was that many of the untold secrets of the Tudeh Party and the espionage organization of the superpower of the East were disclosed, so that subsequently, eighteen Russian diplomats were expelled from the country.

On the other hand, with this victory, the only weapon of the liberals, who claimed that the Islamic Republic was being influenced by the Tudeh Party, was taken away from them. The Islamic Republic

1. See: "The Crooked Path: Chronicle of the Tudeh Party's History", authored by Ehsan Tabari, Amir Kabir Publishers, 1987.

literally proved that it was totally committed to carrying out the 'neither East nor West' policy. Thus, while grappling with the superpower of the West, it was eradicating the roots of infiltration of the superpower of the East as well.

b. Detection of foreign minister Qutbzadeh's American military coup, known to Ayatollah Shariatmadari, was among the significant victories of the Third Revolution. Ayatollah Sayyid Kazem Shariatmadari was one of the qualified Shiite religious authorities. After the demise of Ayatollah Boroujerdi, he gained prominence as one of the succeeding religious authorities. Soon after the death of Ayatollah Mohsen Hakim and with the message of condolence sent to him by the king, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, he was recognized as the Supreme Shiite religious authority (source of emulation) by the regime.

Ayatollah Shariatmadari was among the moderate and reformist clergy of the Qum Theological School who was opposed to revolutionary methods. He believed in a gradual movement towards an Islamic government.

He began his revolutionary struggle against the Pahlavi regime together with His Eminence Ayatollah Khomeini in the year 1963. At the peak of revolutionary struggle, he demanded preservation of the monarchy and full implementation of the constitution, opposed by the clergy supporting Imam Khomeini.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Shariatmadari, regarded as a high-level personality, attempted to establish the Muslim Peoples Party as a challenge to the Islamic Republic Party. This party caused some disturbances in the city of Tabriz and for three full days took over the radio and television network offices in the city. In 1982, following leakage of the conspiracy to overthrow the government, it became clear that Ayatollah Shariatmadari had been aware of the conspiracy but had not endorsed it. In a television appearance, he confessed his knowledge of the coup. Following this, the seminary teachers association of the Qum Theological School, in a move unprecedented in Shiite history, dismissed him from the rank of supreme religious authority. From then on until his death, he remained confined to his home.

c. Among the longstanding and dangerous conspiracies that were uncovered in this period was the deviant movement of Sayyid Mohammad Hashemi. By misusing his ties of kinship with Ayatollah Montazeri – the deputy leader of the Revolution – and his record of adventurism and ambition, both before and after the Revolution, he had managed to gain access to his inner circle. This could have influenced his position and paved the way for his coming to power and carrying out his objectives after the demise of His Eminence the Imam. In carrying out his objectives, he would resort to any conspiracy, including murdering his opponents, collecting arms and ammunitions, getting in touch with domestic and foreign anti-revolutionaries, and forging documents in the safe haven of the household of the Revolution's deputy leadership.

The sagacity of His Eminence the Imam and the information collected by the Ministry of Information resulted in the arrest of Sayyid Mahdi Hashemi and his companions in October 1986, with the direct intervention and action of the Leader of the Revolution. They confessed to their crimes and were punished accordingly, so that once again a grave threat to the Revolution was eliminated. This incident was not without casualties. The Leader of the Revolution was ultimately forced to dismiss Ayatollah Montazeri, whom he regarded as the product of his lifetime efforts and years of political struggle, suffering and torture, for the cause of the Revolution.[1]

d. Yet another victory of the Revolution and the recurring disgrace for the American administration was the 'MacFarlane incident'. After the defeat and humiliation of the Carter administration, the Ronald Reagan administration was elected to office with the promise of reviving the global honor of the United States and deal with the Islamic Republic from a position of strength. He would apparently address Iran as a terrorist nation, while behind the scenes he would engage tirelessly and at the same time amateurishly to establish contacts with the Islamic Republic. These efforts ultimately led to the release of American hostages in a deal in Lebanon, using the good offices of the Islamic Republic in exchange for sale of armaments needed by Iran. The secret visit by MacFarlane, the Reagan

1. We shall discuss this subject in greater detail in the second part of the book.

administration's former National Security Advisor with a forged passport to Tehran, and the dispatch of a copy of the Bible signed by Reagan was part of these attempts made by the United States.

The leakage of this incident reminded everyone of Watergate, which led to the resignation of Richard Nixon, the American president at that time. As a result, numerous investigation committees were established in the United States culminating in the resignation of a large number of high-ranking officials of the United States including the White House Chief of Staff, secretary of the National Security Council and the attorney general. Macfarlane's action led to the suicide of the head of the Central Intelligence Organization. If it were not for the consensus of the two mainstream parties of the United States, the subject would have continued and might have led to Ronald Reagan's resignation as well.[1]

e. Among other victories was the uncovering of the espionage and intelligence network of America's CIA organization in the military and the rest of the administrative establishments. This network was created in Iran at great expense by the CIA, after the occupation of the American Embassy that provided information to the enemy in the course of the Iran-Iraq war, and did a lot of damage to the country.

f. Acceptance of Resolution 598 of the Security Council by the government of the Islamic Republic in August 1988, and the ending of the Iran-Iraq War are among other important events of the last years of the 1980's. Although the bitterness of the event was like 'drinking a cup of poison', subsequent events, especially Iraq's involvement in another war, turned the tables in favor of the Islamic Republic. Not only did Iran not lose a single square meter of territory, rather, it was reckoned, militarily, as one of the most powerful countries in the Middle East region.[2]

The success which the forces of the Imam's policy line achieved in the fourth stage after victory of the Revolution was far greater than

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1. For more information see: "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran", Fifth chapter, P. 147.
2. For more research on the subject and factors responsible for the acceptance of Resolution 598, see "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran" compiled by the author.

one can describe in this chapter. The things that have been mentioned were only the group of political-military successes that were undoubtedly worth mentioning and tangible. In addition, by exterminating the anti-revolutionary agents, humiliating the liberals and eliminating tensions, the Imam's policy line was able to restore calm over society, which was critical for reconstruction, creativity and innovation in various economic, scientific and cultural fields. Towards these objectives, it achieved notable successes.

It needs to be mentioned that the Islamic Revolution paid an exorbitant price for the achievements of this decade and suffered heavy losses which none of the world's Revolutions had suffered after their respective triumphs. Martyrdom of more than two-hundred of the prominent clergy and revolutionary government officials; and similarly, martyrdom of several hundreds of thousands of selfless warriors of Islam on the war fronts was the heavy price that the Islamic Revolution of Iran paid in this period.

Second Statement: Second decade of the Revolution

Introduction

The Iranian calendar year of 1368 (1988-89) was the start of the second decade of the Revolution. This decade began with important incidents, which require another chapter to be opened in the history of Iran's socio-political changes and the Islamic Revolution. These important changes were associated with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar order in the sphere of international relations.

In the Middle East and the Islamic world, the most important incident being the beginning of another war with more extensive dimensions, named the Persian Gulf War.

Domestically, the most important incident was the passing away of His Eminence Imam Khomeini. With regard to the Imam's passing away at the beginning of the second decade of the Revolution, there was the tendency to name this period as the post-Imam period instead of the second decade. This was because he had a unique and incomparable personality and his amazing impact on the changes before and after the Islamic Revolution, coupled with his charismatic

influence, made everyone think that with his passing away, an extraordinarily huge vacuum would be created in the country. Based on predictions made by western political analysts, it would lead, not only to domestic disputes and fighting, but rather it would have a deep impact on the course and direction of the Revolution as well. Like with many other societies in which outstanding leaders played prominent roles, Iran was thrown into difficulties and crisis with the passing of Imam Khomeini, just like it had occurred in other revolutionary societies with the passing of their leaders.

A comparison of the events of this decade with the first decade reveals that the incidents were strikingly different in nature and substance from one another.

Iran's revolutionary society was faced with enormous challenges in the first decade. While endeavoring to institutionalize and establish the structure of its political system, it needed to confront various domestic and foreign plots. The most important of them was a protracted eight-year war with Iraq that eclipsed the country's problems. This event and the others could each facilitate the collapse of this newly-established system; whereas, both from the domestic and international point of view, the second decade of the Revolution was not faced with any serious challenges. In fact, because of the earlier changes, the situation of the Revolution and the political system arising from it had been strengthened and consolidated. It had become capable of eliminating the weaknesses of the previous period and at the same time, achieved amazing victories in the sphere of international relations, and now continued on its path of development and progress.

We will analyze the Islamic Revolution in the domestic, regional and global spheres in order to present a clearer and more transparent picture of the events that took place in this period and were, either directly or indirectly, connected to the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic system.

First Stage:
Domestic Political-Social Changes

Whatever we shall discuss in this chapter under the heading of socio-political changes are issues that have had an important impact on the

Islamic Revolution, without which, the Islamic Revolution would have moved in another direction and faced totally different events and there was a possibility that these deviations could have caused deep and remaining losses to the core of the revolution.

These incidents can be chronicled as follows:

A) Dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri:

In the first days of the new Iranian year 1368 (1989-90) a circular was communicated to governmental offices and organizations on behalf of the then Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, the text of which read as follows: "On the orders of His Eminence Imam Khomeini, all photographs of Ayatollah Montazeri be removed from government offices and organizations." This circular, was received by the public with shock and astonishment. It was not long before Mr. Montazeri's letter dated March 27, and the Imam's reply the following day, was broadcast over the radio and television network. Mr. Montazeri's letter referred to the Imam's letter of March 26, without publication of the text of that letter. This incident not only evoked the public's shock, it shrouded the future of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic system in a halo of uncertainty as well.

A people who had recognized and accepted Ayatollah Montazeri as the deputy leader and his successor; who in their supplications remembered him as hope of the nation and the Imam, were faced all of a sudden with the question of his abrupt removal from office – and that too by Imam Khomeini. When people would look at the record of revolutionary struggle, religious jurisprudence and standing of Ayatollah Montazeri, who was chosen by the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership as deputy leader, whom Imam Khomeini had delegated a substantial part of his powers of leadership and references, they had every right to be shocked. Even the representatives of the then Islamic Consultative Assembly and the ministerial cabinet could not hide their amazement at this incident, such that His Eminence the Imam was compelled to address a letter to them in which while giving brief explanations, assured them that he would soon inform them of the untold facts.[1] Following it, a booklet

1. Text of the Imam's letter to the representatives of the legislative assembly read as follows:

entitled "Letter of Sorrow", was published by Sayyid Ahmad Khomeini, the Imam's son, that, to an extent, revealed the issues backstage. Ayatollah Muhammadi Reyshahri, the Minister of Information at the time, published in his political diary another part of the troubling issues behind the curtain.[1]

Now that it is more than a decade since that date and we review the incidents of that period and the subsequent events, we come to know of the importance of this timely decision. It can be claimed that if Ayatollah Montazeri had not been removed from his post, the Revolution would have taken a different turn. Even if it would not suffer the same fate as the other revolutions, such as the French and Russian revolutions that ended in dictatorships after ten years, then certainly it would have suffered from civil wars and disputes, whose outcomes were unknown.

"In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful
My dear children, respected representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the respected Ministers – May Allah's blessings endure,
With greetings of peace, I have heard that you are not aware of the matter concerning His Eminence, Ayatollah Montazeri and do not know what the issue is. It suffices for you to know it is more than two years since your aged father has tried hard by means of circulars and messages so that the issue would not come to where it is now – but unfortunately, he did not succeed. On the other hand, religious obligation necessitated that he take the needed decision for preservation of the system and Islam. Thus, with a heavy heart, I have removed from office the harvest of my lifetime for the good of the system and Islam. God willing, in the future the sisters and brothers shall to an extent become aware. It is not necessary to overly emphasize that defense of Islam and the system is not a subject to joke about; and in case of infringement, any person in any position shall be immediately introduced to the people. I pray to God Almighty for the success of one and all.
Peace, blessing and mercy of Allah be upon you,
April 15, 1989,
Ruhollah Musawi Al-Khomeini
(quoted from Sahiefeh-e-Imam, vol. 21, P. 350)

1. For more research see the booklet 'Letter of Sorrow' published by Sayyed Ahmad Khomeini and likewise, Political Diary written by Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri in 1989.

In his letter of April 15, 1989, while expressing his regret and distress at the occurrence of such an affair, Imam Khomeini mentions Ayatollah Montazeri's support for certain infamous characters such as Sayyid Mahdi Hashemi and the hypocrites 'Munafiqeen' (former Mujahideen), as being the main reasons for his decision to remove him from deputy leadership.

Despite Imam Khomeini's insistence on publication of this letter at that very instant, on the pleas of the senior officials of the system, he consented not to publish the letter. In keeping with certain considerations and expediencies, its publication was postponed until ten years later.

B) Review of the Constitution:

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, establishing of the Islamic Republic system was declared through a referendum held on April 1, 1979. With the formation of the Assembly of Experts of the Constitution through elections, the government immediately drafted the first constitution of the Islamic Republic and got the peoples approval through a public referendum. This constitution had to be based on Islamic teachings and conform to the prevailing circumstances of the country and did not have a previously-experienced pattern. Moreover, there was no consensus between the clergy and the university elite concerning its theoretical framework, as the initial draft presented to the Assembly of Experts by the interim government and its liberal members was lifted from the constitutions of France and some other European countries. Thus, undoubtedly, it could not be compatible with a system that was to be based on Divine Islamic laws and in particular with the principle of guardianship of the religious authority.

This draft was, therefore, ignored, and the Assembly of Experts took over the task of preparing its framework and principles. Naturally, as a first-time experience of the Islamic government, preparing the draft for such a constitution could not be free of flaws and weaknesses. The most important of its flaws was its undue emphasis on councilor management that had its origins vis-à-vis the bitter experience of dictatorship and individual egotism of the Pahlavi regime. However, throughout the first decade, experience showed that the councilors could not efficiently manage their powers.

In May 1989, the conditions in the country necessitated reviewing the constitution in order to do away with the shortcomings. Unfortunately, in the constitution of 1979, even the basic conditions for its review had not been envisaged. Perforce, the legislators and Supreme Judiciary Council requested the Imam to issue the necessary order for such a review using the powers of his absolute religious authority. Finally, through an order, he commissioned a twenty-five member committee to review the ascertained subjects mentioned below and to put their approved recommendations before a public referendum:

1. **Leadership:** There were two problems concerning the leadership: one, that the scope of election of the leader or the leadership council had been restricted to the qualified religious authorities; and the other, that in case of lack of seniority, a council comprising of three or five persons had been envisaged. Considering the dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri from deputy leadership, the appointment of a religious authority or authorities for leadership, especially with regard to the old age of the qualified religious authorities of that time, seemed to be a difficult and impossible task. In a letter to the Council for Reviewing the Constitution, the Imam declared the need to select a leader from among the qualified religious authorities to be null and void. He stated that: "analytical thought and expertise (Ijtihad) alone is sufficient from the scientific point of view for the leader." Thus, article 107 of the constitution was amended, facilitating the selection of a leader from among the Islamic jurisprudents and qualified religious authorities.

Regarding the controversial nature of the leader's powers as the guardian religious jurisprudent and the Imam's belief in the principle of guardianship of the absolute religious jurisprudent, the 1979 constitution was silent on this issue. Article 57 of the constitution was amended with the sovereignty of the absolute guardianship clearly stated, and all the three powers to follow his directions.

2. **Elimination of the post of Prime Minister:** In the constitution of 1979, the president was elected through the direct ballot of the people, while the prime minister was appointed on the President's proposal and with the vote of confidence of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The ministers were appointed after going through three

stages: introduction by the prime minister, endorsement of the president and approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. At the same time, the prime minister was responsible for the executive power and after appointment of the prime minister and the cabinet; the president would have a ceremonial role to play. This matter was not compatible with the election of the president by the people and their expectations from the promises made by him during the election campaign. Therefore, a kind of duality had emerged in the executive power, which had created certain problems during the first decade of the Revolution. Therefore, in the amendment to the constitution, the post of prime minister was abolished, and the president took over the prime minister's responsibilities as the head of the executive power.

3. **The Judiciary:** According to the constitution of 1979, the administration of the judiciary was under the supervision of a council consisting of the head of the country's supreme court, the state prosecutor general, both appointed by the leadership, and three jurists chosen by the state judiciary. This matter had created serious problems in the administration of the judiciary's affairs and its policy-making and similarly, in the accountability of the council's members as well. With regard to the fact that the judiciary must be under the control of the plenipotentiary of the Muslims, the electoral appointment of three members of the council was inconsistent with this article. Thus by amending the article related to the judiciary, the Council for Amendment of the Constitution handed over the administration of its affairs to a qualified religious authority as the head of the judiciary, appointed by the leadership.

4. **Administration of the Radio and Television Broadcasting Organization:** In the constitution of 1979, the radio and television network was managed under the joint supervision of the three powers (legislative, executive and judiciary), such that the director of the radio and television broadcasting organization was appointed by representatives of these three powers and accountable to them as well. Naturally, with regard to the change of government, representatives of the legislative assembly and the higher council of the judiciary, administration of this national medium could not enjoy stability and permanence. This was especially true when there were differences among representatives of the three powers and each would try to run the national medium in line with their own political and factional

wishes. These differences led to the intervention of His Eminence the Imam, and the problems of its administration and policy-making were exposed. The amendment to the constitution decided that the leadership would appoint the management and a committee, made up of the three powers, and would supervise it. In this manner, the administration of the radio and television broadcasting organization came out of the councilor state as well.

5. **Expediency Council of the System:** In the constitution of 1979, all legislations approved by the Assembly needed to be endorsed by the Guardian Council in terms of their conformity to religion and the constitution. When they had a difference of opinion, there was no authority to resolve the dispute between these two institutions. On February 06, 1988, upon the request of the heads of the three powers and approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, His Eminence the Imam instituted a body by the name of "Expediency Council of the System", to resolve all disputes between these two institutions. The decision of the institution would be final and binding. This subject was added to Article 112 of the constitution. This was an advisory body to the leadership, in cases that he turned over to them.

6. **Amendment to the Constitution:** This subject was kept in abeyance in the Constitution of 1979. Therefore, an article called the Article of Amendment to the Constitution (Article 177) was added. According to it, whenever the leader saw it necessary, after consultation with the Expediency Council of the system, he proposed to the President to form the Council for Amendment to the Constitution as described in the legislation. After making the amendments, with the approval of the leadership, the amendment cases were to be put to public referendum.

7. **National Consultative Assembly changed to Islamic Consultative Assembly**: Under the nationalist elements at the time of ratification of the Constitution in the year 1979, the legislative power was named the National Consultative Assembly. Based on the Imam's directive of June 24, 1980, the name became 'Islamic Consultative Assembly'. These amendments went through a public referendum for ratification, thus solving the difficulties faced by the various organizations of the system. These amendments played a key

role in increasing the efficiency of the various instruments of the system.

C) Passing away of His Eminence the Imam, and selection of Ayatollah Khamenei as Leader:

On June 04, 1989, following a protracted illness and surgery, Imam Khomeini bade farewell to the transient world. The light of his blessed life, after twenty-five years of revolutionary struggle and leadership of the greatest revolution in the history of Islam extinguished, plunging millions of his ardent Muslims disciples and followers into sorrow.

The Revolution's opponents inside the country and abroad hoped that the passing away of the Leader of the Revolution would prepare the groundwork for weakening the Revolution. This was due to the fact that the extraordinary influence of Imam Khomeini among his followers, his charisma and his exceptional capabilities, had played such a vital role in the Revolution's victory and survival. His exceptional ability in counteracting all the conspiracies of the Islamic Revolution's enemies convinced them that it was impossible for any person to fill the void created by his absence.

Experience of other revolutions and socio-political upheavals established on the charismatic power of their leaders bore testimony to such a point of view.

Some considered a military coup to be inevitable,[1] or viewed the survival of the Revolution as linked to the Imam's heartbeat. They perceived that with the stopping of his heartbeat, the Revolution would reach the end of the road as well.[2]

A group that viewed the issue more optimistically, considered a civil war to be extremely likely, even though they reckoned the odds of such a war succeeding in toppling the Islamic system to be low.[3]

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1. Ervand Abrahimian, "The Iranian Mujahedin", Yale University Press, 1989, P. 77.
2. Shaul Bakhash, "The Reign of the Ayatollahs", Guernsey Press, UK, P. 264.
3. Dilip Hiro, "Iran Under the Ayatollahs", Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1985, P. 367.

It needs to be said that the question of succession of the leader of the Revolution and the post-Imam Khomeini period had always deeply worried his followers in Iran as well. For this reason, in their slogans and invocations, they would pray for the prolongation of his life until the Appearance of the Twelfth Savior Imam Mahdi (May Allah hasten his blessed appearance).

This anxiety and concern was not confined to the mass of people; it caused grave concern to the authorities of the Islamic Republic system as well. The haste with which Ayatollah Montazeri, despite his weaknesses was appointed to the deputy leadership was the outcome of the heart ailment of the Imam. It were these anxieties and the dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri, which took place just seventy days before the Imam's passing away, that added to the anxiety.

There is no doubt that His Eminence the Imam's position made it impossible to succeed him with the same power, charisma and dignity. The Imam himself was quite aware of this matter and made an extraordinary effort to remove all obstacles in the path of the Revolution, and, by presenting worthwhile traditions; he intended to make the job of guiding the Revolution easier for his successor. It seems that his quick and firm decision to dismiss Ayatollah Montazeri and amend the constitution before his passing away was based on this premise. Even after the dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri, the Imam, with his marked references, put the seal of approval on the merit and competence of the current leader, and, in the process, removed the doubt and confusion afflicting the representatives of the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership.

Imam Khomeini's wisely institutionalized the Islamic Republic's structure and system. Without adversely affecting the movement of the Revolution; by preserving and restructuring the pre-Revolution institutions; and establishing revolutionary institutions parallel to them, he was able to establish a unique system of control and supervision.

His spiritual-political will remains like an immortal charter for future generations, as it quite clearly demarcates the correct path and direction of the future leaders and of his ardent followers. Departure and deviation from it implies deviation from the Revolution's principles.

The massive nine-million strong funeral procession for the Leader of the Revolution and the death of tens of people on account of grief and sorrow at his passing away reveals the indescribable love of millions for him. One can dare to claim that on the day of his funeral procession in Tehran, hardly a soul stayed at home.

Writing about the Imam's personality, distinct behavioral attributes requires several volumes; and the pen of this author is rendered incapable in this respect. It should suffice to quote from the preface of *Sahifeh-e-Imam,* written by his successor, Sayyid Khamenei. "Whenever, a human being with learning, wisdom, and lofty ideas; self-control, piety, and firm belief; courage, valor, and lofty aspiration; sagacity, clear vision, and political maturity; pursues a sacred objective patiently and unceasingly he will undoubtedly bring his country and nation, and at times mankind, great honors and lasting progress. All renowned persons in history possessed some of these special characteristics."

This great and contemporary personality, Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, possessed all those characteristics together and that too, on a scale normally unattainable and rare. He was a pious scholar, an abstemious man of wisdom, a politician, a philosopher, a modern believer, a brave and shrewd mystic, a just ruler and a selfless *Mujahid*. He was an Islamic jurisprudent, a fundamentalist, a teacher of moral behavior, man of literature; a poet. To him belonged the highest seat of learning as well as the most intensive and heated academic department of the theological school in the course of protracted years. In him, the outstanding God-given attributes blended with all that he himself had learnt from Quranic teachings and adorned his heart and soul with them. They had created a supreme, charismatic and powerful personality that every one of the prominent faces of the world in the last century – a century of great and renowned religious, political and social reformers – appeared less appealing, one-dimensional and insignificant in comparison to him. The challenge that he took up and succeeded in, with his faith, trust in God, tact and patience, was to the same extent, great, incredible and astounding.

Throughout his political life, his supreme and brilliant personality was mesmerizing and unique. On the day when, as a religious

authority in Qum, he challenged the dependent and corrupt Pahlavi regime and its interfering American patrons with his awesome prophet-like speech, he aroused the nation's fury at the oppression, despotism, wealth-collection and anti-religiousness of the Shah and his inner circle. In the same way, after an unrelenting fifteen-year struggle he established the Islamic system with the help of the mammoth sacred struggle of the Iranian nation and exterminated the treacherous, corrupt and incompetent regime. Under all circumstances, he displayed the pinnacle of faith, courage and selflessness together with abundant wisdom, planning and sagacity.

He knew Iran quite well. He understood its sensitive geographical situation and political geography; it's natural and human potential; it's aims and aspirations; and its last 150 years of turbulent history dominated by outsiders and plunderers; the treason, corruption and self-centeredness of the Pahlavi dynasty, and thousands of poor families dependent on it. The scientific, industrial and moral backwardness imposed on it…and, above all, it's great, civilized, courageous and faithful nation.

He was familiar with the global situation, the colonized nations, the arrogant governments, the baffled young generation craving to know the truth; and in particular, the plight of Muslim countries and the Islamic *Ummah*. He was pained because of them and deeply troubled by the sorrowful issue of Palestine.

His sense of religious duty compelled him to enter the field of historic revolutionary struggle which only the exceptional of men of history step on to and only a few emerge from it triumphant.

He would think deeply of saving Iran from the claws of a corrupt regime that had imposed backwardness, decadence, economic, moral, and scientific poverty on it. He judged that, the only way out was to return to Islam, establish the Divine values and political system of Islam in the country. He placed a live model in front of the Islamic nations and created a fresh political current in the world of Islam, whose foremost auspicious product was the revival of an Islamic identity.

He began his struggle in the name of God from the very first step, with the help of the huge mass of people. He spoke to them and

sought the help of their faith, intelligence and courage. He never pursued the claimant political parties and groups, and often viewed their motives with suspicion, turning away from their political collusions. He always spoke sympathetically to the people; and because he was an insightful tutor and an experienced mentor, he placed his intelligence, wisdom and knowledge in the long path of the sacred struggle, at the disposal of the protégés.

When the revolutionary struggle of the people of Iran, much to the disbelief of the world, ended in victory, and the people of Iran wholeheartedly accepted his leadership and administration unanimously, he brought about the greatest change in the political history of the country. He transformed the monarchy, which is the arrogant rule of oppressors and worldly materialists into *Imamate*, which is the divine and popular rule of the worshippers of God. He adorned his strength with justice and righteousness; he illuminated his unanimously acknowledged supremacy with worship of God and humility; and he treated wealth and affluence with piety and abstinence. He never wavered for a moment from the path of God and the worship of God. Because of the heavy burden entrusted to him, he increased the vigilance of his soul. The words that poured out from his heart - the humble heart and behavior inspired by his religion - caused a profuse spring of knowledge, wisdom and divine planning to flow across the thinking and intelligence of the people of Iran, enamored by his sincerity and spirituality. It would equip and prepare the government officials and administrators as well as each single unit of the people to confront the innumerable hostilities and conspiracies and solve the problems imposed on them. The ten-year period of the honorable Imam's blessed presence was the rebirth of Islam's political system; of the revival of Islam's identity among the world's Muslims, and of hoisting the banner of Islam in our country. It was the period of Iran's independence and freedom; of national honor and pride, and the nation's unprecedented leap towards excellence and progress. It was the period of revolutionary zeal, political awareness and movement for preservation and development of the country. It was the period of Iran's honor in the global arena and impact on international issues. It was the period of the start of a new way in our country's history. With its perpetuation, Islamic Iran achieved material and spiritual excellence. The wise and shrewd Imam

demarcated this path with markings, and clearly revealed it on tens of occasions, through hundreds of groundbreaking guidelines, addressed to the country's officials and to the entire nation of Iran.

These markings and guidelines are today equally valuable, valid and groundbreaking. The government and people of Iran need them in order to traverse the bumpy road towards salvation and make progress on the material and spiritual front.

On the very day of his passing away (June 4, 1989), the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership held a meeting; and after reading out the Last Will of the Imam, organized a top-secret meeting. In less than ten hours, it decided on the Imam's successor as the new leader of the Revolution and announced the selection of His Eminence Ayatollah Khamenei – the incumbent president – from the communications media to the people of Iran and the world. Due to the secret nature of the negotiations, it is not clear what manner and what type of negotiations and conversations took place in the Assembly of Experts that enabled this crucial decision to be taken without any sort of opposition and such speed. One can claim with certainty, that the Imam's letter dated May 06, 1989, to the Council of Amendment to the Constitution and likewise, the guidance and marked references of His Eminence the Imam played a key and essential role in preventing differences of opinion among the representatives of the Assembly of Experts and, in guiding them towards the desired decision. Contrary to all the predictions of western and anti-Revolution political analysts, transfer of power took place without any problem and hindrance. All strata of society; political, religious and military groups and factions vowed to support the new leader and, in the process, stamped their seal of approval on the Assembly of Experts' decision.

Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei was born in the year 1939 into a scholarly family; and like his father and ancestors, he pursued the path of theological studies and lessons of religion. He studied under his father and the rest of the seminary professors in the cities of Najaf and Qum and very quickly became a Mujtahid. At the same time, for more than 25 years he actively attended the lessons on revolutionary struggle and politics given by his mentor and teacher Imam Khomeini. Like a talented student actively involved in the struggle against the evil *Taghut* regime, he was imprisoned time and again,

exiled, tormented and tortured by the Pahlavi regime. In other words, from the beginning of the Imam's revolutionary struggle until the triumph of the Revolution, he stayed firm in the thick of the revolutionary struggle, and was tempered and toughened as a result.[1]

The victory of the Islamic Revolution placed a more sensitive obligation on him and the companions of the Imam. He took charge of the controls of the Revolution, occupying sensitive and dangerous positions. While establishing the Islamic system, he confronted various conspiracies of domestic and foreign enemies. Alongside Martyr Ayatollah Beheshti and Hujjat-al-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Khamenei played the biggest role in the scenes of the Revolution. Membership in the Council of the Revolution, membership of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Presidency of the Islamic Republic and finally, Congregation Prayer Leader of Tehran, was the road that he traversed in the first decade of the Revolution. He was present in that turbulent and volatile period inside and outside the country, on the warfront and behind the frontlines, in the international arena and on various rostrums. At the same time he was an obedient protégé of the Imam and one can dare to say that on evaluating the brilliant report card of his revolutionary student, he had come to the conclusion that he was deserving of the Revolution's leadership and to be his successor. It was due to this reason that, at a meeting of the country's top officials before his passing away, he made his opinion quite clear and categorically expressed it openly and confidently.

Despite appearing to be relatively young for this critical responsibility, he proved his competence on the practical field throughout this period that people saw the Imam's likeness in him and soon forgot the sorrow of losing their leader.

The analyses of domestic and foreign observers, proves that Ayatollah Khamenei follows precisely the same path that Imam Khomeini had traversed. Therefore, with regard to Ayatollah Khamenei's report card, the post-Imam period is not anything

1. For more research in this field, see "Biography of the Supreme Leader", Qadr-e-Velayat Cultural Publications Institute, Fourth Edition, P. 1379.

different from the time of the Imam and, it cannot be easily spoken of as 'the post-Imam period.'

On November 29, 1994, following the death of Ayatollah Araki, upon the recommendation and endorsement of the faculty of the Qum theological School, he earned the lofty rank of *Marjaiyat* (source of emulation).

Earlier we said that leadership, people and the ideology are the three main pillars of the Islamic Revolution's victory and survival. The passing away of the Imam could not create a serious void in the pillar of leadership and its connection with the two other pillars. With the selection of Ayatollah Khamenei, the institution of guardianship of the Islamic jurisprudential authority, the main pillar of the Revolution and the Islamic system, remained as solid as before.

D). Beginning of the Reconstruction Phase:

Following Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598 of the United Nation's Security Council and ending the imposed war, the necessary groundwork was laid for the country's planning on a macro scale to bring about the necessary development in the economic, political, cultural and social arena. The eight years of war had changed the normal course of production in the country and placed it at the service of the war, damaging the economic growth of the country. The destruction resulting from bombardments, demolished cities and critical economic lifelines placed a heavy burden on the government after the war. Ruins of the war are seldom rebuilt without the help of other countries. Rebuilding the ruins of the Second World War in Europe was facilitated with the financial assistance of America by implementing the Marshall Plan. Whereas the Islamic Revolution's position and the headstrong stances adopted by the West and, in particular, the United States vis-à-vis Iran, did not provide such suitable circumstances for the Islamic Republic. In such conditions, not any and every person could shoulder the burden of accepting the country's executive administration.

In the year 1989, with the term of Ayatollah Khamenei's presidency ending, it was essential that a capable and talented manager be elected to this position. In the ensuing presidential elections, the people of Iran chose Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani for this position.

It is necessary to point out that from the point of view of the Islamic Revolution's supporters and even the opponents of the Revolution, the sensitive and critical role of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani after the victory of the Islamic Revolution is undeniable and unquestionable. Even during the period before the victory, and from June 6, 1963, as one of the few students and companions of His Eminence the Imam, Hashemi Rafsanjani played a key role in the struggles against the monarchy, and was reckoned to be one of the Imam's disciples. He had demonstrated his prowess in the Council of the Revolution, in the Interior Ministry, in his term as Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, as Tehran's Friday Prayer leader, as a commander in the war and finally, as the President. It is interesting to note that apart from the official position he occupies and in the manner in which he takes decisions, Mr. Rafsanjani continues to be responsible for taking critical decisions. While he was speaker of the assembly, he would lead and guide the sensitive foreign policy issues and, at the same time, command the war efforts.

Political personalities who have played an undeniable role in the history and destiny of their country have been extremely few – and Hashemi Rafsanjani is undoubtedly one of them. He is a man of crises; a man of sensitive and big decisions and a man who accepts crucial responsibilities. He has never been afraid of their consequences; and has spared no effort to preserve the achievements of the Revolution.

He has the power to employ the services of useful manpower from political factions and not allow factional opinions of administrators disrupt the affairs of the country. During his term of office, factional disputes and clashes reached to a minimum – the same clashes that had neglected war issues and affected the frontline – influencing the decision to accept Resolution 598.[1]

During Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani's term as president, economic development, especially increase in production was considered as the only solution to the existing crises. For the first time in the history of

1. See "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (principles and Issues) written by this author; Dadgostar Publishers, Second Edition, 2000, Chapter Six, P. 170.

the Islamic Republic, a comprehensive plan, including the first and second five-year plans, was prepared, ratified by the parliament and implemented. Compiling an economic plan and executing reconstruction projects for a country; and, before being able to repair the destruction of the former regime, being dragged into an extensive and long war. This was an extraordinarily complicated and difficult task. The chances for its success with regard to the diverse and somewhat contrasting objectives were slim, especially as the implementation of any economic project could create problems as well. At the same time, one must take into account the issue of hostility of the arrogant powers and particularly of America. It would spare no efforts to undermine and prevent the Revolution from succeeding and as long as the policies of the system continue to oppose global arrogance, it shall continue to do so.

The country's economic situation at the beginning of the second decade of the Islamic Revolution is listed below:

- Poverty, and the massive gap between the classes, and the resulting deprivation of the long years of monarchy in Iran

- The ruins from the previous regime;

- Unavoidable side-effects arising from the Islamic Revolution causing fundamental changes in the political, societal, economic and cultural structure;

- The eight-year imposed war and the consequent losses inflicted on the country;

- Domestic plots conspired by groups and individuals that had suffered losses as a result of the Revolution;

- Wide fluctuations in the price of crude oil affecting the country's economy and the success or failure of the economic plans extremely dependent on oil revenues;

- Inefficiency of the bureaucratic system of the country influenced by its societal structure that the Shah's regime had taken towards its quantitative increment and caused a decline in its efficiency. After the Islamic Revolution, the flight of many managers of the private sector, the nationalization of wealth, properties and companies, which had bloated the volume of governmental bureaucracy and centralization of

governmental decisions, were among the problems in the path of the new government. The focus of the first plan was to overcome the problems in the process of economic reforms, so the following objectives were considered:

1. Privatization of industries, mines and production of utilities was increased. At the start of the second decade, the share of the private sector in the country's national product was less than 25%. The objective was to increase the share to 75%.

2. Reduction of bureaucratic control, and cumbersome rules and regulations in the financial and banking fields implemented.

3. Encouragement of foreign investment in the domestic economy, and a safe and secure environment for attracting foreign investment created.

4. Foreign loans accepted in a manner that repayment is feasible for the country and does not cause problems or dependency because of it.

5. Establish free trade zones in order to promote opportunities for reconstruction and development of aforesaid zones. Increase technological and industrial contacts with the developed world.

6. Establish equilibrium and take the national currency to its actual value in comparison with reliable foreign currencies. Towards this end, new possibilities for guiding financial resources towards production created.

7. Gradual reduction of subsidies, and encourage production by transferring these subsidies from consumer to producer.

8. Remove hurdles to free trade and direct it towards the private sector.

9. Deregulate prices in keeping with the supply and demand rule, bearing in mind that, shortages during the war period, forced strict control over them.

10. Encourage Iranian specialists, and likewise, Iranian capital and investment to return from abroad.[1]

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1. For more research on this subject, see "Iran's Foreign Policy During Period of Reconstruction: the Economy, Defense, Security", authored by

Criticism was leveled by economists holding various points of view, concerning the implementation of this plan, approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in its third term, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this book and the field of study of the author. Even if we accept that there were deficiencies in this plan, today, after thirteen years, we saw many of the main themes of the first plan considered in the second and third plans. The macro-economic policies adopted were rightly chosen, and continue to be acknowledged by subsequent governments.

What is significant in this field and must be given importance is that Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani was able to implement projects with unmatched courage and audacity, and execute macro-economic plans in critical financial circumstances that rescued the country from wartime stagnation and its aftermath. He prepared the necessary groundwork for rapid development and the government was successful. However, certain grave criticism was leveled on it, because of excessive emphasis on economic development, which may, perhaps, be justified.

Second Stage:
Islamic Revolution and Regional Changes in the Islamic World

Parallel to the changes taking place inside the country, important changes occurred in the Middle East and the world of Islam. They changed the region's strategic conditions to such an extent that the problems afflicting the Islamic Revolution changed fundamentally from those of the first decade of the Revolution; Iraq's attack on Kuwait in 1990 and the interference of multinational forces, especially the United States of America in this crisis, disintegration of the former Soviet Union and birth of newly-independent Muslim countries in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, departure of the Russian forces from Afghanistan and emergence of a new phenomenon called the 'Taliban' in that country were some of the main occurrences.

Anoushirvan Ehteshami; translated by Dr. Motakki and Mr. Poustinchi; Islamic Revolution Documents Center , 1999, Pages 17 – 63.

America's attempt to force a compromise between the Palestinians and Israel that led to signing of the Oslo Accord, and start of the *Intifada* uprising in the occupied Palestinian territories, were among other changes that took place globally.

We will briefly discuss these changes in the following sections and mention the impact of the Islamic Revolution on them, and the stances adopted by the Islamic Revolution vis-à-vis these incidents.

A brief review shows that the principled positions taken up by the authorities of the Islamic Republic system resulted in its finding a more expansive place among Muslim people and the region's Islamic governments, and becoming recognized as the biggest power of the region. The Islamic Republic was now, able to regulate its relations with the countries of the region and the international order.

A) Iraq's Attack on Kuwait and Start of the Persian Gulf War:

In August 1990, Iraq's all-out attack on Kuwait and its occupation of this oil-rich sheikhdom, in particular, after its failure in the imposed war with Iran, not only shocked the analysts of international issues; rather, it forced the world's governments and the international order to interfere directly in this crisis.

Why Saddam Hussein made such a foolish move is a question that is still being analyzed by international pundits. Some opine that the green light shown by the American administration to the Saddam regime - similar to the green light shown to that country by America for its invasion of Iran - encouraged him to make such a move. It would give America the license for greater interference in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf and a legal form as well. There is also another theory that has a more powerful reasoning.[1]

The truth is that from the eight years of war with Iran, Saddam did not attain any result that satisfied his ambitious cravings. Except for misery, poverty, suffering and loss of hundreds of thousands of human lives, it did not achieve anything worthwhile for his people. At the same time, it imposed billions of dollars of foreign debts on the

1. For more research, see "Persian Gulf War in Confidential Documents"; written by Pierre Salingerand Eric Loran; translated by Hushang Lahouti, 1991.

post-war economy of the country. His engaging in a new war was solely based on the optimism that with the occupation of Kuwait, he would not only be able to solve the economic problems; rather, he would be able to realize his long cherished aims and aspirations as well. Not only did he not attain any of his desires, rather, the sanctions imposed by the Security Council brought an intense and intolerable pressure on him. After a lapse of more than a decade, a government that, before the war with Iran had foreign exchange reserves of more than thirty billion dollars was then faced with a debt burden of one-hundred billion dollars.

Saddam had acted as a solid barrier vis-à-vis the power and expansion of the Islamic Revolution, and had safeguarded the interests of the conservative Arab governments, and influential western powers in the region. He reserved the right for himself not only to demand that the Arab governments forgive Iraq's debts, rather, he wanted them to assist him in his country's reconstruction by granting him new loans. On the other hand, he assumed that in lieu of his confrontation with the Islamic Revolution, the American Administration would not challenge him. The confusing approaches of the American authorities strengthened his perception as well.

With this reasoning, he launched a lightning attack on Kuwait and in less than 48 hours, Kuwait fell under the occupation of Iraqi forces. The Emir of Kuwait fled to Saudi Arabia in a helicopter.

The American government exploited the situation and, by creating a multinational force and taking advantage of the disintegration of the bipolar order, entered the fray and got involved in an unequal war with Iraq. Although Saddam tried to attract the support of Islamic and Arab countries by changing his political stance and emblazoning the word 'Allah-u-Akbar (God is Great) on Iraq's national flag and in particular, taking a tough stand vis-à-vis Israel, he did not achieve his objective. From the military, economic and political point of view, he was in an extremely weak situation. The country's national sovereignty severely damaged, Saddam's fate depended on the final decision of the American administration.

This war created unique conditions for the Islamic Republic. The sagacity of the system's authorities in dealing with this crisis caused Brezinski, the National Security Advisor of the Carter administration

to utter that the war between Iraq, Kuwait and the multinational force had only one winner – which was the Islamic Republic of Iran.

There were three ways open to the officials of the Islamic Republic:

The first one was to exploit Iraq's sensitive circumstances and invade that country by launching an all-out attack on Iran's common borders with Iraq and not only extract revenge for the Saddam regime's savage aggressions but, impose its demands on the government of Iraq. This matter was one of the serious worries of the Saddam regime and he started correspondence with the government of Iran, which ultimately led to acceptance of the Islamic Republic's demands, including restoration and implementation of the 1975 Algerian Accord; return to official borders and exchange of prisoners of war of the two parties.

The other path open was that the Islamic Republic consign to memory the eight-year hostility and adversity with the government of Iraq; and now that Saddam's government was facing up to the 'Great Satan' America, rush to its assistance, and by establishing a union between the two governments, fight American aggression in the region. This theory had its supporters among some of the political personalities inside the country. Some people would recall Saddam as a Khalid Bin Waleed! Undoubtedly, adopting such a policy would cause irreparable damage to the country and the Islamic Republic system. America, which had sufficient excuse, would settle its problem with both the Iraq and Iran governments in favorable international conditions.

The third path that would surely do the least amount of damage to the Islamic Republic was to avoid getting literally involved in this war and to abstain from the probable dangers of the first two paths. The authorities ultimately adopted this policy. While condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it rejected the interference of the superpowers in the region's crisis.

This policy achieved the following benefits for the Revolution and the Islamic system:

1. The United Nation's Secretary General finally introduced the government of Iraq as the aggressor of Iran's territory - and this was a longstanding demand of the Islamic Republic.

2. The 1975 Algerian Accord, shredded and violated by Saddam at the beginning of the war with Iran, was reaccepted and all of Iran's occupied territories restored to it.

3. By exchanging prisoners of war, the honorable prisoners of war returned to the country and their families, freed of anxiety.

4. The Arab governments of the Persian Gulf region realized that Iran, despite, its ability to exact revenge from them, for their unstinted support for Iraq during the war with Iran, it did not take revenge, and insisted on its principled position. This resulted in relations with these governments to improve after the conclusion of the Persian Gulf crisis, due to their fear of the Saddam regime, and relaxing tensions with the Islamic Republic began to bear fruit. Despite the provocations of the superpowers, the Islamic Republic's relations with its southern neighbors were on the mend.

5. Despite the dual containment policy put forward by America in order to weaken Iran and Iraq; and despite its all-out efforts for its implementation, this policy was unsuccessful as far as the Islamic Republic was concerned. With the weakening of Iraq in this war and the variety of imposed sanctions on a country that was regarded as a rival to Iran, today, the Islamic Republic has been recognized as a big regional power. This country not only resolved its problems of the destructions resulting from the war; rather, it took successful steps towards economic, military, political and cultural development. In fact, as stated by Brezinski, the Islamic Republic was the sole winner of the Persian Gulf War.

B) Disintegration of the Soviet Union and formation of new governments:

One of the most important geographical alterations of the region was the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and creation of new governments of Muslim-inhabited areas in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. Before this event, Iran shared a common border extending up to two-thousand five-hundred kilometers (2500Kms.) with one of the two superpowers i.e. the USSR. This was always a big threat for Iran and resulted in Iran occupying a special position in the strategies adopted by the West in order to encircle the Eastern Bloc. Now Iran was faced with a number

of small Muslim-inhabited states on both sides of the Caspian Sea that were confronted with enormous economic, cultural, political and social problems. Their bigger problem was that because of being landlocked, they needed to establish special relations with their neighboring countries and in particular with the Islamic Republic in order to engage in trading activities by gaining access to the open seas.

This fundamental change in the region's political geography had created suitable conditions for the Revolution and the Islamic state; it would affect fresh contacts to the north of Iran. Border disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Qarabakh region and fighting between two powerful factions in Tajikistan; and, coordinated efforts of western powers, especially the United States, Turkey and Israel, to obtain bases of influence in these countries created new equations that necessitated confronting.

The major problem of these governments was that firstly, from the economic aspect, due to their absolute dependence on Moscow, they could not easily detach their economies from that of Russia and transform a centralized socialist system into an open economic system. This was in circumstances in which the management of these governments w in the hands of managers remaining from the USSR' era. These managers were accustomed to that system and it was not possible for them to offer fresh ideas. Despite their historical background, the Communists engaged in seventy years of uninterrupted efforts to get rid of all Islamic influences and challenged the religious beliefs of the people in these countries. These people continued to regard themselves as being traditionally Muslims without having any knowledge of the principles and fundamentals of Islam. In particular, the young generation that had no knowledge of the pre-Communist era, had an extraordinarily big cultural gap with the Islamic system established in Iran.

After the declaration of independence by these governments, the Islamic Republic of Iran recognized them officially in quick succession; and without making any territorial claims over these countries, announced its readiness to assist them and cooperate in their reconstruction.

The policy of the Islamic Republic in relation to its new neighbors in the northern frontiers was based on the gradual cultural and ideological development of the people of this region, by offering urgent economic assistance and by making transit routes available in order for them to have access to the open seas. Linking of the Mashhad-Sarakhs-Tejen railway route resulted in the Central Asian countries gaining access to the Oman Sea and Persian Gulf. At the same time, by using the oil pipelines available inside the country, suitable means for transfer and sale of crude oil from these countries to the free world was made available.

The American administration and Turkey tried hard to compete with the Islamic Republic by agreeing to carry out the costly Baku – Ceyhan oil pipeline project and preventing the Islamic Republic from taking advantage of its strategic position. However, this project has so far, not been welcomed by this government, and its implementation seems to be unlikely.

At the same time, towards resolving the internal differences of this government including the Qarabakh crises and the domestic conflicts of Tajikistan, the Islamic Republic acted as an arbitrator in Tajikistan, and succeeded in restoring peace and calm among the various groups.

On the other hand, in a close link-up with the Russian Federation - the main successor to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – it challenged the efforts of Americans to gain influence in the region and did not allow them to establish a base. On the subject of legal administration of the Caspian Sea, there is still no consensus among the littoral states, but efforts to solve the problem of exploiting the seabed as soon as possible by the littoral states of the Caspian Sea are underway.

The future prospect of the Islamic Republic of Iran's relations with Central Asian governments and the Caucuses region reveals the fact that with the passage of time the cultural, geographical and economic conditions of these governments will bring them closer to Iran and shall transform Iran's role to a central one. This is especially true as in the competition of the three powers in the region namely America, Russia and Iran, the chances of understanding between the Islamic Republic and Russia, in confronting America's influence and greed, is far greater. Of course, the problems and policies of this region's

governments are themselves not the same, and each of them has their own unique problems.

Although the entry of these governments into the regional Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) shall facilitate and expand cooperation with this government, at the same time, the unique problems of each of the governments shall remain in place. Should the differences between Azerbaijan and Armenia not be solved, it will undoubtedly pave the way for the West's entry, as Azerbaijan has time and again invited NATO to establish a base in that country. With regard to the cultural proximity of Armenia with the West, it seems unlikely that members of NATO will agree to establish a base in Azerbaijan.

C) Changes in Afghanistan and the Emergence of the Taliban in Iran's East:

In 1980, Henry Kissinger, the brain behind policy-making in the United States of America, and member of the Foreign Policy Council, analyzed the events in the Middle East, following the victory of the Islamic Revolution. In the past, he reckoned the influence of Communism and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be the biggest threat, but changed his stance and declared that Shiite radicalism, Islamic fundamentalism and the Islamic Revolution were the biggest threats to the region, and the West's interests. He admitted that the direct danger posed by Iran's Revolution had eclipsed the long-term threat posed by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.[1]

In dealing with this new phenomenon, Kissinger proposed that the best solution for preventing the spread and influence of the Islamic Revolution among the rest of the Islamic communities was to confront the Islamic Revolution by creating a guided Islamic movement among the Sunni followers, which would be in line with America's policies. Right from that time the CIA has been planning to establish such a movement. At first it tried to exploit the Sunni minority inside the country and establish a movement towards this end by creating a council called the "Central Sunni Council", with the help of one of the disgruntled elements opposed to the system by the

1. As quoted from Ad-Dastour Journal, British edition, dated July 05, 1982.

name of 'Shams'. The vigilance of the system's authorities ensured that this movement got nowhere. However, outside the country and particularly in Afghanistan, this program was relatively successful. By planning and spending money on training youth in religious schools in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, a phenomenon called the Taliban was formed.

Afghanistan, which lies to the east of the country, has a long border with Iran; and its people share common aspects of culture and language. From before the Islamic Revolution, it has been one of the mental preoccupations of the foreign policy officials of the country. The multiplicity of tribes and clans of the land, the severe cultural and economic poverty, cultivations of narcotic drugs and transiting the narcotic drugs through Iran to Europe; and the presence of more than two million Afghan refugees in the country, are among the issues that have created serious problems for Iran and troubled the state authorities.

Successive military coups and governments with Communist leanings; invasion and occupation of the country by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the very first year of victory of the Islamic Revolution; and, expectations of Afghanistan's Jihad groups from Iran's newly-emerged Revolution, placed the Afghan issue at the center of the policy-making of the Revolution's leaders.

Following the guideline of his Eminence the Imam, the government of the Islamic Republic based Iran's policy in relation to Afghanistan on two pillars:

First, that the Russian invasion of Afghanistan be condemned. All-out support be declared for the people of Afghanistan in their confrontation with the forces of aggression.

Second, all-round efforts be made to unite the Jihad forces; and on the other hand, efforts be undertaken to prevent these forces from leaning on America in their confrontation with the Soviet Union.

However, this point must not be forgotten that in the issues pertaining to Afghanistan, in addition to Russia, other international and regional players such as America, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan always played an active role. In the first decade of the Islamic Revolution, the

Afghanistan issue was handled on the basis of the aforesaid policies in the following manner:

1. Accepting Afghan refugees by making available special camps and likewise, providing the means for their employment in the country.

2. Providing all-round financial, military and ideological support to the combatant Jihad groups in confronting forces of occupation.

3. Solving disputes among Jihad forces

4. Unrelenting combat against transit of narcotics from Afghanistan

These policies continued until the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the year 1989. Disintegration of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and departure of Russian forces from Afghanistan, itself was a great victory for the people of Afghanistan, freeing them from the subjugation of foreign powers. Unfortunately, tribal, ethnic and religious differences laid the groundwork for occurrence of new internal crises. These domestic conflicts did not result in peace for the nation; it laid the groundwork for interference of western powers as well as the emergence of the new "Taliban" phenomenon.

It is said that 'Taliban' or seminary students are those who have been given religious and military training in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and have been generally selected from among the Pashtun tribe, a big ethnic group of Afghanistan. This ethnic group enjoys power, status and a substantial influence in Pakistan as well, claims to create a Pashtunistan government and proposes self-rule in a part of Pakistan.

With the patronage of generals remaining from Afghanistan's Communist regime; and with the huge financial assistance of Saudi Arabia and the United States; and with the strategic backing of Pakistan, this group was able to gain control of a large part of Afghanistan's territory. In 1997, in a brutal encounter that ended in the massacre of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif, the Taliban accepted the challenge of confrontation with Iran. This event could have ultimately led to a clash between the Islamic Republic and Pakistan, and the likelihood of America's interference, but forestalled by the prudent action of the state's authorities. At the same time, despite the Taliban gaining control of a significant part of

Afghanistan's territory, they have not been able to gain recognition of the international community for their position as a government, for the following two reasons:

Firstly, the Taliban's fanatical interpretation of Islam is distressing and unacceptable for the modern world's Muslims. The likelihood of change in method and policy in the thinking of the leaders of this group is weak; therefore, it seems unlikely that they would be able to gain recognition in the near future.

Secondly, with the exception of Pakistan, the rest of the governments in the region, such as Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China are strongly opposed to the idea of establishing such a regime and have announced their unstinted support for the Taliban's opponents. Meanwhile, even Pakistan has expressed its serious concerns at the creation and establishment of a Pashtun government in Afghanistan.[1]

In connection with Afghanistan, the Islamic Revolution has had success and failure. The Islamic Revolution's success has been its ability to check the increase in America's influence in Afghanistan and prevent formation of a government that could seriously threaten Iran's eastern borders. At the same time, it has failed in its attempts at creating unity among the Jihadi religious forces and establishing an Islamic state conforming to the wishes of the deprived people of Afghanistan.

At the end, what is important is the answer to the question: What will be the future of Afghanistan and what policies will the Islamic Republic pursue vis-à-vis this country? Undoubtedly, Afghanistan's future shall depend on the creation of a multi-polar system in the world. Expansion of relations between the Islamic Republic, the Russian Federation, People's Republic of China and India, have the potential to form a pole in front of America, and the West can, as one would expect, resolve the problem of Afghanistan.

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1. For more research on the subject see article "Taliban: the New Force" written by Yuri Gangofsky; Central Asia and Caucuses Studies quarterly, sixth year, third term, No. 17, Spring 1997, P. 143 – 148.

D) The Islamic Revolution and the Palestine Movement:

The Palestinian nation has, for more than half a century, been involved in conflict with Zionism and tolerated the injustice and cruelty of this regime. Each time, it pinned its hopes on its Arab brethren and attached itself to one of the leaders of the Arab world and Palestinian guerilla organizations. For a long period, it had put its faith on Gamal Abdel Nasser (former President of Egypt) and in his pan-Arabism. However, right at the time of victory of the Islamic Revolution, Abdel Nasser's successor and deputy changed course, and traveled to *Bait-ul-Muqdas* (Jerusalem) where he met with the leaders of the Israeli regime and delivered a massive blow to the Palestine movement. Finally, in 1979 at Camp David, he withdrew from the circle of patrons of the Palestine movement and extended the hand of friendship to Israel. On the directive of His Eminence the Imam, and as a reaction in relation to this betrayal, Iran's relations with Egypt were cut off immediately. Although the Palestinians lost Egypt as a leader and backer of its movement, the victory of the Islamic Revolution and collapse of the Shah's regime, which was a strong supporter of Israel, brought for them a better souvenir.

Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization was the first leader to visit Iran after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and was welcomed warmly by the people and leaders of the Revolution. The cry of the slogan "Today Iran, tomorrow Palestine" was often heard at gatherings after the Revolution. Yasser Arafat was under the impression that he could use the Islamic Revolution and the people of Iran as a means to achieve his own objectives. However, he was unaware of the fact that the Islamic Revolution and its leader, the late Imam, had their own ideas, views and plans for dealing with the Palestine issue, which did not necessarily conform with those of Arafat. Thus, despite the fact that the Islamic Revolution placed the defunct Israel embassy in Tehran at the disposal of Arafat's representative, in order to establish the Palestinian embassy, soon the difference of view of Arafat and his companions with the leader of the Islamic Revolution became quite evident. Arafat then sought the assistance of the anti-Revolution forces and enemies of the Islamic Revolution, such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization and the Iraqi regime, and the style of compromise – for a person who himself was the leader of a guerrilla organization – gradually became

obvious. A person who believed that the Israelites must be thrown into the sea gradually retreated from his position and joined hands with the sworn enemies of the Palestine nation. In the hope of gaining America's support and in his own words "forming a Palestine government even on the back of a donkey", he was drawn step-by-step towards compromise.

The second decade of the Islamic Revolution began with Arafat's disgraceful acceptance of the Oslo Accord. The Islamic Revolution declared its serious opposition with the conciliatory proposals in a situation where the majority of Arab and Islamic governments had acquiesced with this appeasement.

From the point of view of the Revolution's leaders, the Palestine issue was not only an issue of the Arab world; rather, it was an issue of the world of Islam. Naming the last Friday of the lunar month of Ramadhan as 'Quds Day', His Eminence Imam Khomeini intended it as a reminder of this affair. From the point of view of the Islamic Revolution, the Zionist regime of Israel recognized no other solution except the use of force, and that one needed to combat force with the language of force. The Palestine people should not put their faith in actions of political parties and groups; rather, they must rise on their own and like the people of Iran, seize their rights.

Victories achieved in Lebanon by Hezbollah against the multinational and Israeli forces were attained due to firm faith and conviction and by relying on the principle of martyrdom. This itself was one of the effects of the Islamic Revolution in that region and made an appropriate model available for substantiating the claim of the Revolution's leaders. Finally, the people of Palestine, particularly its younger generation, despaired of all their compromising leaders and by adopting the style of popular struggle, launched the "stone revolution".

The second decade of the Islamic Revolution coincided with the advent of a new phenomenon called *Intifada* and the stone revolution. By adopting the Islamic Revolution as a role model, the *Intifada* on the route to its destination, launched and carried on its relentless struggle against the Zionists. At the same time, movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, based on Islam, have somehow despaired of the materialist ideologies propounded in the western world.

The effect of this movement was such that today, the rest of the factions that believed in ideologies such as nationalism, socialism and liberalism, nowadays admit that the only path to liberation of Palestine lies in Islam.

The flight of Israelites from South Lebanon, that was under Zionist occupation longer than the lifetime of the Islamic Revolution, without any treaty being signed between the Zionists and Hezbollah; and the liberation of these regions with the same style added to the optimism of the Palestinians. In the face of the 'Stone Revolution" and *Quds Intifada*, the Israelis were baffled and bewildered. The autonomous Arafat government, weakened more than ever before, was rendered impotent in its attempt to save the Oslo Accord. Even conservative Arab governments, under pressure of public opinion in the Arab world, were compelled to back the *Intifada* movement.

In fact, in the regional context, the success of the Revolution lay in its ability to send its message to the deprived and oppressed peoples, and find its place as a model of revolutionary struggle among the Muslims. It succeeded in sending the Revolution overseas. Today, the Palestinian Movement is yet another Islamic revolution, which is in a tumultuous state much like a boiling pot. It has drawn the attention of the entire world to itself and there is no doubt that this no-compromise style will achieve its objectives of defeating Zionism in Palestine much in the same way that it succeeded in Iran, and in the same way that it fructified in Lebanon. Time will not be in the favor of global arrogance and Zionism. The impact of the Islamic Revolution is not confined to Lebanon and Palestine alone. The role of this Revolution in creating Islamic movements in Turkey, Algeria and the rest of the Islamic countries cannot be denied.

E) The Islamic Revolution and Persian Gulf coastal states:

The downfall of the Shah shook these weak governments, presently under the West's control. They became so anxious about their future that when they learnt of Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran, they set aside their longstanding hostility with him and hastened to his assistance with the entire financial and logistical capability at their disposal. They thought that perhaps, with the defeat of Iran and the Islamic Revolution, their anxieties would be mitigated. Besides, the presence of Iranian Hajj pilgrims at the tumultuous Hajj Pilgrimage

rituals and especially at the 'disavowal of pagans' ritual held there, posed a threat to them, which they needed to prevent at all cost.

Despite all the hostilities, the Islamic Revolution dealt with them patiently. It tried to explain to them that not only was the Revolution not directed against them; rather, it could help to free them from domination of global arrogance and America.

The Persian Gulf War and the attack that Iraq launched on Kuwait – its former ally in the war with Iran – at the start of the second decade of the Revolution made it quite clear and revealed to them that the Islamic Republic neither sought to avenge them nor coveted their territory. Despite the fact, that the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council was established after the Revolution, to confront the Islamic Revolution. Despite always making claims and passing unanimous resolutions on the three Iranian islands, and the attempts of American and British imperialism at widening the rift and deepening the hostility between these governments and the Islamic Republic, nevertheless, the Islamic Republic has prevented global arrogance from exploiting the situation and has tried to improve its relations with these governments. Today, we are witnessing a profound change in the stances of these governments and a keen desire to establish deep ties with the Islamic Republic. This, in itself, has paved the way for establishing security in the Persian Gulf region and forestalling interference of superpowers, such as America and Britain. At the same time, it shall be effective in ensuring optimum exploitation of the enormous crude reserves, the common resource of these governments and the economic and industrial lifeline of the west.

In this section, we have reviewed the foreign relations of the Islamic Republic and the impact of the Islamic Revolution on the region and neighbors, and concluded that, despite enormous problems in the path of the Islamic Revolution, the report card of the Revolution's second decade in the Middle East region has been positive. Today, there are few who would not confess to the power and confidence of the Revolution and the Islamic Republic in the Middle East.

In a strategic region wherein instability is characteristically common and most countries of the region suffer from immense problems that are generally legacies of the colonial era, the Islamic Revolution continues to move forward on its chosen route. By leaning on the

policy of combating global arrogance, favoring Islamization and exercising prudence and sagacity, it has achieved significant success. It does not retreat a single step from its fundamental objectives in a situation where the western powers, especially America, have launched huge efforts to increase their influence and secure their interests. Undoubtedly, because of oil, sponsorship of Israel and the region's strategic location, it shall not desist from doing so in future, as well. The Islamic Revolution and the system established as a result must continue to be in a state of full readiness in order to confront the adventurisms of the west - and especially of America - in the region.

Third Stage:
Islamic Revolution and Global Changes

The ramifications of the Islamic Revolution in this decade are not restricted to Iran, or the Middle East and the world of Islam only. It seems that this Revolution has been able to affect issues on the international scene as well.

The Islamic Revolution occurred when the bipolar order held sway over the world. An alliance of the Third World or non-aligned countries was formed in the year 1957, but it never made an impact on the bipolar world order and its legality.

After the Second World War this legality was of significance and any incident that occurred in the world could shift the balance of power in favor or to the detriment of one of the two blocs, and therefore, reciprocity of the two superpowers in shaping and processing of that incident was clearly observable. Forty years of experience corroborates this view.

Victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1929, the Korean War in 1952, military coup in the Arab Middle East, the Cuban Revolution, the Hungarian crises, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War were among those events in which the two superpowers came to the assistance of one of the two parties and faced one another.

Rivalry between the two superpowers was clearly visible even in the incidents in Iran before the Revolution; for example, the continued occupation of Azerbaijan by the Russian forces, the movement for nationalization of the oil industry, the military coup of August 19, and

the incidents of the 1950's in Iran. Although after the 1953 military coup in Iran, this country was regarded as a part of the western bloc, with its membership in military, political and economic alliances of the west. Nevertheless, with regard to Iran's extraordinarily strategic position, and a 2500 kilometer long border with the superpower of the east, the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to Iran's issues. It reacted visibly to Iran's problems and foreign policy.

The start of the Islamic movement led by Imam Khomeini and its climax on June 05, 1963, did not cause the Soviet Union to take up a positive stand in relation to this movement and to rise in support of this anti-American movement. Not only did it not offer such a support to the movement; rather astonishingly, it adopted a negative attitude towards this popular uprising, similar to the stance adopted by the United States of America. This matter arose from two issues:

1. The religious and Islamic character of the movement made it clear that despite their differences, both the east and the west had a common position in their attitude towards religious and especially Islamic movements.

2. Right at the beginning of the movement, his Eminence the Imam had declared his position concerning the two superpowers and had uttered the famous words, "America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America; and the Soviet Union is worse than both of them; and all of them are more evil than one another. Today, our problem is with one of these wicked elements; it is with America."[1]

With this statement that, "We are at war with international Communism to the same extent that we are fighting the global plunderers of the West led by America."[2]

These words informed the two superpowers that both of them stood to lose from the triumph of this movement and that this Revolution challenged their supremacy in the global order.

With the Revolution reaching its climax in the years 1978-79 and the slogan "Neither East nor West; only Islamic Republic", unstinted continuous support of the two superpowers for the Shah's regime was

1. Sahifeh-e-Imam, vol. 1, P. 105.
2. Ibid, Vol. 12, P. 19.

obvious. Their joint support of the enemies of the Islamic Revolution, especially the Iraqi regime during the imposed war, confirmed that victory of the Islamic Revolution did not fit into the scheme of things of the bipolar order. Rather, this victory, achieved by the revolutionary Muslims and the resistance shown by the majority of the population and 'Baseej' mobilization forces, proved the fundamental weakness of the bipolar order.

Perhaps one can say that victory of the Islamic Revolution and its disinclination towards any of the two superpowers had played a role in the disintegration of the bipolar order.

With Gorbachev's assuming office and becoming the Secretary General of the Communist Party and President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and his espousal of the policy of 'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost', the first shots directed at disintegration of the eastern bloc and the bipolar world, were fired.

His eminence the Imam was keenly observing these changes. He was concerned that the disintegration of the Communist system would be interpreted as a victory for the western bloc; that the countries of the eastern bloc would fall into the hands of the west and America, and be persuaded to adopt the capitalist system of the west. In a historic letter to Gorbachev, he informed him of this danger and reminded him of the main problem of the Eastern bloc, which was its denial of God. With all his strength, he declared that as the strongest bastion of Islam, the Islamic Republic was fully capable of filling the ideological vacuum of the people of the Soviet Union. Because of the significance of this message, we mention some sections of it below:

"In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful,

His Excellency Mr. Gorbachev, President of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics,

With wishes of happiness and prosperity for you and the people of the Soviet Union, considering that since you have assumed office, one gets the feeling that in analyzing the political events of the world, especially in connection with issues of the Soviet Union, Your Excellency is going through a new phase of review, change and

attitude. Your courage and audacity in dealing with realities of the world has resulted in disruption of current equations governing the world. I deem it necessary to make certain suggestions. It is possible that your sphere of thought and new decisions is the only method for solving the party's problems, and beside it, some of your people's problems. However, the courage to review a doctrine, that for prolonged years, had imprisoned the children of the world's revolutions behind iron fences, is admirable. And if you think beyond this amount, the foremost issue, that shall certainly make you succeed, is that you review the policies of your ancestors based on 'denial of God' and 'elimination of religion' from society, that for sure, has dealt the biggest and greatest blow to the people of the Soviet Union. You should know that a realistic approach towards issues of the world is not feasible except by this means. It is possible the incorrect methods and erroneous actions of the former bosses of communism in the economic sphere show the lush garden of the world of the west; but the truth lies somewhere else. If at this stage you would like to solve the intricate economic problems of socialism and communism by seeking recourse in the capitalist system of the west, then not only will you not treat the illness of your society; rather, you will invite others to come and compensate for your failings. This is because today, Marxism has reached a point of no return in terms of its economic and social methods. On the same issues, in another form, and on other issues as well, the western world is suffering from crises.

Your Excellency Mr. Gorbachev, one must face the truth. The main difficulty of your country is not the question of ownership, economy and freedom. Your problem is the lack of true faith in God. It is the same problem that has either dragged or shall drag the west to decadence and the point of no return. Your main problem is your longstanding and useless fight with God, the Source of Existence and Creation.

Your Excellency Mr. Gorbachev, it is clear to all that from now on communism will be found in the museums of the world's political history, because Marxism could not respond to any actual human needs. It is because it is a materialist ideology. One cannot save mankind from the crises of a lack of faith in spirituality, the most fundamental ailment of human society in the west and east, with **the**

help of materialism. Honorable Mr. Gorbachev, it is possible that you have not turned away, indeed, from some aspects of Marxism, and express your full faith in it in interviews, too; but deep down you yourself know that it is not actually in this fashion. China's leader[1] dealt the first blow to Communism, while you have dealt the second and apparently final blow to its body. Today in the world there is no such thing as Communism anymore; but, I earnestly request you that, in breaking down the walls of Marxist fantasies, you don't get caught in the prison of the west and the Great Satan.[2] I am optimistic that you shall achieve the true honor of eliminating the last decayed layers of seventy years crookedness of the world of communism from the face of history and your country. Today other governments in the same path as yours, who have intense feelings for their homeland and people, will never be willing to consume their underground and surface resources anymore to prove the success of Communism after the smashing of its bones has reached the ears of their children.

Mr. Gorbachev, when after seventy years, the chant of Allah-hu-Akbar (God is the Greatest) and bearing witness to the prophetic mission of His Holiness the Last Prophet (peace and blessings of God be upon him and his progeny) reverberated from the minarets of some of your republics, it brought tears of joy to all the followers of the righteous Muhammadan (SA) Islam. Thus, I deemed it necessary to remind you to think about the two material and spiritual global perspectives again.

I would like to ask you to seriously study and research Islam; not because Islam and the Muslims need you; rather, it is because of the global values of Islam that can be the means of comfort and salvation for all nations, and resolve all the fundamental problems of mankind. A serious look at Islam could possible save you forever, from the problem of Afghanistan and issues of this sort in the world. We regard the Muslims of the world like the Muslims of our own country and always consider ourselves partners in their destiny. By granting relative freedom of religious traditions to some of the republics of the Soviet Union, you have shown that you no longer think that religion is the opium of society.

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1. Mao Tse Tung
2. America.

Is a religion that has enabled Iran to stand solidly like a mountain in front of the superpowers an opium of society? Is a religion that seeks implementation of justice in the world and demands liberation of human beings from material and spiritual restraints, an elixir of society? Yes, a religion, that becomes a means for placing the material and spiritual assets of Islamic and non-Islamic countries at the disposal of superpowers and lesser powers, and yells at the people that religion is distinct from politics, is indeed an elixir of society. But this is no longer the true religion; it is a religion that our people call "the American religion".

In the end, I declare categorically, that as the most powerful base of the world of Islam, the Islamic Republic of Iran can easily fill the ideological void of your system. Our country, as in the past, believes in peaceful coexistence and mutual good relations – and respects it. With greetings of peace, and obedience for the guided…

Ruhullah Al-Musawi Al-Khomeini
January 01, 1989.

The second decade of the Revolution began with establishment of a new and strategic relationship with this northern neighbor. This relationship has played a key and strategic role in global and regional changes throughout this period, and made a mess of previous equations of the international order.

The Islamic Republic, with distinct subtlety, took steps to develop and expand its relations with the new independent former Soviet Republics - which we discussed in the previous chapter – and established cordial and strategic relations in the military, economic and technological fields with Moscow.

Mr. Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow immediately after the Imam's demise laid the necessary groundwork for this relationship and strengthened it by signing numerous memorandums of understanding. The most important of these memorandums was in the transfer of technology and technical knowledge of manufacturing strategic weapons, like, fighter aircrafts, tanks and submarines that managed to fill the void created in these fields during the war. Agreement for completion of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr by the Russians,

that, despite the commitments of the Germans, remained incomplete due to America's opposition to it, aroused America's profound anxiety. The effect of the disintegration of the bipolar world order was not limited solely to Iran's new relations with the Russian Federation; rather, it had an effect on the future of the international order and the stances of the West – especially of America.

Disintegration of the eastern superpower and defeat of Marxist-Leninist ideology was accompanied with the decline in the apparently invincible power of the Soviet Union and its stepping aside as the leader of the eastern bloc. Consequently, it created an extremely favorable field for the other superpower to expand and develop its undisputed power over the entire world. Although theoreticians of the United States of America claimed that disintegration of the eastern bloc not only proved the impotence of Marxist-Leninist ideology; rather, it revealed the strength of the capitalist system. Thus, a capitalist system, based on liberal democracy of the western type, in which America was placed at its head, had the right to supremacy and hegemony over the world of mankind. According to Fukoyama, this hegemony would continue until the end of history. However, worries arising from the end of the Cold War could pose a serious danger of removal of the other superpower from leadership of the western world in its aftermath. This compelled America's leaders and politicians to make necessary efforts to preserve and perpetuate the leadership of the west over the entire world by adopting new policies.

Some of the American theoreticians considered the end of the Cold War as an appropriate backdrop for promoting the idea that global order and peace necessitated the presence of a dominant power, which, by relying on its material resources and absolute power, could guarantee general security and wellbeing. Subsequent to it, American ideologues proposed a new doctrine called 'the New World Order". This doctrine was based on the thinking that in order to exercise its influence effectively in the world, the United States of America needed to maintain a substantial presence of its military forces globally. This theory attracted the attention of a number of international policy thinkers in universities across America and they chose to justify and defend it.

The strength of the new order could be based on two basic principles:

First: America continues to have the capability of the global order's leadership from the military, economic, political and societal aspects.

Second: members of the global community continue to accept such an order and comply with the demands of America; in case of defiance and disobedience, the administration punishes the disobedient and the defiant.

After the disintegration of the bipolar world order and establishment of the unipolar order, the Islamic Republic continued to maintain its irreconcilable position in relation to the oppressive orders, which were the handiwork of the big powers. It came to be recognized as the foremost 'defiant' and 'disobedient' government and the American administration made indefatigable efforts to punish this disobedient government so that by strengthening and establishing legitimacy of this new order, it could grant substance to its undisputable hegemony over the global community. Schemes such as the Gingrich plan, the D'Amato plan, and the 'dual containment' policy, are considered to be part of American efforts designed to put pressure on Iran.

These efforts were not only ineffective as far as acceptance and establishment of the unipolar order was concerned; rather, the Islamic Republic's resistance to them encouraged other countries to oppose this unjust order and ultimately caused its premature failure. Indeed, the theory of clash of civilizations discussed in recent years was not only a declaration of early defeat of the unipolar order; rather, it exposed a conflict between the arrogant powers on one side and nations on the other. To summarize in a single phrase, the deprived and oppressed people all over the world, those that the Islamic Revolution and the Imam supported and led, held the flag of revolutionary struggle in their hands and revolted against all the global oppressors.

"With the help of their political stooges who have gained control of the people, the colonialists have imposed a cruel economic order on them, so that people have become divided into two groups: the oppressor and the oppressed."[1]

1. Imam Khomeini, Guardianship of the Religious Jurisprudent, P. 42 – 43.

The Islamic Revolution not only resulted in victory of the people of Iran over the oppressive monarchy; rather, it was the pioneer of a global movement for smashing dictatorial global orders by relying on the rebellion of deprived and oppressed nations. Below we explain the structural framework of the order as defined by His Eminence the Imam and the Islamic Revolution.

As an ideological revolution, the Islamic Revolution not only revived the unique programs and viewpoints of Islam concerning government and administration; rather, with regard to the universality of the religion of Islam, it had unique ideas and opinions and proposed its own particular global order.

Like any revolution, the Islamic Revolution has created its unique and exclusive terminology, interpretations and expressions, some of which are themselves a world of pure ideas. Included in these terms one can name new terms and expressions such as 'the oppressed', 'arrogant powers', 'global arrogance', and 'rule of the oppressed'.

The Islamic Revolution not only rejects the viewpoints governing international relations and existing global orders that have their origins in the ideas of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Hans Morgenta, which regard might as being right; rather, they move along the following beliefs and theories that:

"The world's wellbeing and peace is tied to the extinction of the arrogant oppressors; and as long as these uncultured hegemony-seekers exist on earth, the oppressed shall not get their due inheritance, which Almighty God has favored them with. Rule of the barefooted (downtrodden) is the prerogative."[1]

From the start of the Islamic movement, especially after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, His Eminence the Imam, in his statements and writings, would consistently refer to the desired global order from the point of view of Islam and the Islamic Revolution. We shall describe the generalities of this order using his statements and writings:

1. In contrast with Marxists, who believe in the predestination of history and consider the rule of the labor class to be inevitable, His

1. Ibid, vol. 11, P. 262.

Eminence the Imam believed that only with awareness and knowledge of their legitimate rights and revolt against arrogant oppressors, will the oppressed nations achieve freedom. "The Oppressed must revolt…the oppressed of all nations must seize their legitimate rights with clenched fists…they shouldn't wait for them to give them their rights. The arrogant oppressors will not grant anybody their rights."[1]

2. Creating awareness and practical uprising of the oppressed to realize their rule over the world is necessary and inevitable, and with reference to the blessed verse of the Glorious Quran, their victory is certain and assured.

"O, nations of the world who are oppressed! Arise and seize your rights; and do not be intimidated by the yelling of the powerful, for God is on your side and the earth is your inheritance – and the promise of Almighty God is inviolable."[2]

3. Maintaining global peace is not dependent on balance of power, nor, on orders proposed by the ideologues of the West; rather, it is feasible only through annihilation and defeat of arrogant powers.[3]

4. The oppressed are neither limited to Muslims nor nations of the Third World; rather, they include all people under the subjugation of the arrogant oppressors all over the world. Therefore, no single

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1. Ibid, P. 259.
2. Ibid, vol. 15, P. 212.
3. On this subject Imam Khomeini states:
"This movement; the movement of the oppressed against the arrogant oppressor must spread throughout the world. Iran is the origin and role model and the starting point for all oppressed nations. In all parts of the world, the Muslims should rise to their feet; rather, the oppressed should rise to their feet. The Divine Promise embraces the oppressed and states that 'We have granted a favor to the oppressed so that they become leaders in the world and the inheritors. Leadership is the prerogative of the oppressed; inheritance (of the earth) is of the oppressed. The arrogant oppressors are the usurpers. The arrogant oppressors must leave the arena."
Both the superpowers have resolved on destroying the oppressed nations – and we must support the oppressed of the world. Islam makes no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim states and backs all the oppressed of the world."

geographical and cultural factor or government-nation classification can reveal the dividing line between the oppressed and the arrogant oppressors. Therefore, the theory of clash of civilizations or clash of cultures or even global polarizations is nothing except perpetuation of hegemony of arrogant oppressors, or rivalry and conflict among arrogant oppressors in distribution of booties, exploitation and oppression of various communities and nations.[1]

5. In contrast with previous orders, that were established on the basis of secularist and humanist ideas and promoted lasciviousness and consumerism as the good life, this order is based on return to religion and sovereignty of God. It considers happy and prosperous living to be tied to increased devotion to piety, moral discipline and spiritual and divine beliefs, while it strongly rejects an unfettered culture and accumulation of wealth, which is the manner of the arrogant oppressors.

6. Muslims in general, and the Muslim nation of Iran in particular, who have been able to triumph over the arrogant oppressors - by the blessing of the religion of Islam - are responsible for guidance and leadership of this great global leap. In other words, spreading and marketing the Islamic Revolution overseas implies making efforts towards combating oppression globally and supporting the oppressed.

It appears that in the twenty-first century, after transition from a multi-polar order, the global community will enter a new bipolar order. On one pole of this new order lie the arrogant powers with all their military and economic might, while on the other pole are the oppressed nations of the world; particularly, oppressed Third World nations who, led by the aware and informed Muslims, shall rise in revolt and bring the oppressors to their knees.

Although, the arrogant oppressive governments possess substantial military and economic facilities, however, they shall be compelled to enter into a relentless war with the aware and informed mass of people, both on the domestic as well as on the external fronts. In such

1. “You must know that nations of the world, even those nations that are not spiritual; all of them are part of the global oppressed and have always been under the hegemony of the arrogant oppressors.

circumstances, all of those facilities will be of no avail and will not save the powerful bullies.

In the multi-polar world that is in the process of taking shape, the Islamic Revolution must and can play an active role. In the bloc-formation of the future and in the face of the excesses of the United States of America, in addition to the blocs taking shape in Europe, another powerful bloc in West Asia comprising of Russia, China, India and the Islamic Republic is in the formation stage. Because of possessing enormous sources of power and not having ambitious needs, these four great powers can furnish the means for taking on America. In this bloc building, because of having a dynamic and powerful ideology, a strategic location and huge underground resources and reserves, the Islamic Republic can play an important role until the time that nations acquire the necessary awareness and rise in revolt to determine their own destiny.

Despite American pressure on the whole, and at least from the trade and economic point of view, the Islamic Republic's relation with Europe is developing; and this is in circumstances when three important events caused disruptions in relations with Europe. The most important was His Eminence the Imam's religious decree or *Fatwa* delivered against Salman Rushdie, the author of the novel 'The Satanic Verses.'

This 'fatwa' created such a hue and cry in the western world that it not only resulted in the recall of ambassadors of European countries from Tehran; rather, it challenged the international order fabricated by the west. The Imam's fatwa showed that a simple writing of an Islamic leader can climb over the solid security walls of the west and compel it to deploy a large number of security personnel for years on end in order to protect the life of a single citizen. Despite the passage of years and the passing away of the man who issued the fatwa, it has still not been able to provide the necessary security for Rushdie.

Global equations and the international order are in the process of change and transformation. After the failure of the unipolar order and invalidation of the theory of clash of civilizations, the Americans are putting forward the theory of globalization and 'small global village'. In this global village with America as the 'village chieftain' all political, economic and cultural systems must be exterminated and be

overshadowed by the political, economic and cultural systems of America, so that America's hegemony over the world is indeed established for all time to come. In the words of Fukoyama, we shall reach the end of history! Although the theory of globalization has been given an enormous amount of publicity; and many of the Third World countries have been intimidated by this theory, there is no doubt that increased communications among nations won't necessarily imply continuation of the west's – in particular America's - hegemony. This is because, according to Divine and Quranic covenant, global sovereignty shall be of the oppressed, led by the awaited messiah His Eminence the Twelfth Savior Imam Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance).

Third Part:
The Islamic Revolution among the world's great revolutions

Introduction

Chapter One:
Comparison of monarchial regimes in the three countries of Iran, France and Russia

Chapter Two:
Comparison of social power in Iran, France and Russia prior to revolution

Introduction

The Islamic Revolution is one of the few successful revolutions in contemporary history. Naturally, one of the methods of examination of its strengths and weaknesses is to compare it with other revolutions. In this chapter, using the theoretical framework presented in the first chapter, especially points related to the relationship of the two divergent political and societal powers, attempt has been made to compare, in summary form, the Islamic Revolution with the French and Russian revolutions, which are the most famous and prominent of revolutions. Thus with a view to the causes and factors of each of them; it aims to state the magnitude and superior features of this Revolution by relying on documentary proof for its historical reasons and evidence. [1]

1. Those interested in further research on this subject, can see the book "Islamic Revolution in Comparison with French and Russian Revolutions" compiled by the author; second edition, 1993.

Chapter One:
Comparison of monarchical regimes in the three countries of Iran, France and Russia prior to the Revolutions

- Economic situation of the regimes

- Military capability of the regimes

- Complexity and strength of the regimes

Societal power consists of active societal groups that have come close together because of shared beliefs. When political power does not have the capability to secure their values, the societal groups either despair or move behind leaders that are able to secure their wants and views. As mentioned previously, in creation and formation of societal power, three basic pillars can be identified; namely, the people, the leadership and the ideology.

Popular Participation

In the French and Russian revolutions, the level of popular participation in deposing the authoritarian regimes was extremely low. As mentioned earlier, even in France the people did not have a major role;[1] the French regime submitted because of its own weaknesses.

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1. On this subject, Robespierre makes an interesting statement worth quoting:
"Almost in all the European countries there are three centers of power namely, the monarchy, the aristocracy and the people who, however, are devoid of power. In such circumstances, a revolution can only take place as a result of a gradual process. The process is started by the aristocracy, the clergy and the wealthy who enjoy the support of the oppressed people; that too, when their interests clash with the dominant power which is the monarchy. For this reason, in France the judges, aristocrats, clergy and the wealthy provided the main impetus and motivation to the revolution and the

In Russia, only a limited number of factory workers in Saint Petersburg, and soldiers in the city's barracks, revolted and brought about the downfall of the Romanov dynasty.

However,[1] in the Islamic Revolution of Iran, with the exception of a small minority and the majority of the military personnel who were dependent on the Shah's regime, people from all social classes and groups, all across the country, including cities and rural areas – all together - shut down the economic and administrative wheels of the country. With bare hands they resisted the armed-to-the-teeth regime and brought about its downfall. Subsequent studies have also revealed that after the victory of the French and Russian revolutions, when the chains of dictatorship had been broken and suitable groundwork to create political awareness and participation of the people had been prepared, this participation decreased due to the lack of desire of the administrations after the revolution - both the moderates and radicals. The history and statistics of people's participation in elections after the revolution confirms this theory.

However, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the mass of people of Iran participated in the repeated and successive elections.

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people appeared on the scene later. It wasn't long before the ones who made the first move repented or, at least, when they saw that the people could possibly attain their sovereignty, they wished that they could halt the revolution in its tracks. However, in fact it was they who started the revolution; and was it not because of their resistance and miscalculation the people would still be under subjugation of despotism.
George Brazilling, New York, 1965, P. 137. "A History of Modern France", Alfred Cobban

1. Trotsky admits that "it is no exaggeration if we say that the February Revolution was realized by Petrograd and the rest of the country followed suit."
There was no revolutionary struggle anywhere else except in Petrograd…the revolution occurred with the agitation and initiative of a single city that comprised a maximum of one seventy-fifth of the population. The entire country was faced with a committed action.
T.H. Green: Comparative Revolutionary Movements, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, USA, 1974, P. 49.
Zagorin: Theories Of Revolution of Contemporary Historiography, Political Science Quarterly, dated. March 1973, P. 34.

Even in critical situations and bombing of cities during the war, not one of the elections necessary for continuation of political activities of the Islamic Republic, was either cancelled or postponed.

In the past twenty-two years our people have participated in more than twenty-two elections including the presidential elections, the elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, elections to the Assembly of Experts, deciding on the type of government, referendum on the constitution and elections to the Islamic councils. Statistics of the ever-increasing participation of the people in these casting of votes have been striking and noteworthy. More important than all else is the yearly presence of the people in million-strong rallies and gatherings that are held on the occasion of the Revolution's anniversary which reveals the people's involvement, vigilance and support for their Revolution.

Leadership

The personality of the leader becomes evident when the ideological aims of revolutionary groups are diverse or their organization weak. The role of leadership in the Revolution's process expands in the course of time.

The role of the Revolution's leaders is important in three important dimensions: the revolution's ideologue, commanding and leading after the revolution's victory. In a brief examination and comparison between the roles of the leaders of the three revolutions under discussion, we shall observe that in this basic principle of revolution, like the principle of the people, the Islamic Revolution possessed outstanding and exceptional power, advantages and special features that the French and Russian revolutions did not enjoy.

1. In the French and Russian revolutions, the revolution's leaders belonged to the middle and upper classes of society whereas in the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the leaders of the Revolution were attached and belonged to the deprived and down-trodden classes of society.

2. In the French and Russian revolutions – particularly in the Russian Revolution – the leaders were guardians and representatives of a class who themselves did not belong to that particular class, whereas in

case of the Islamic Revolution, the leaders of the revolution were precisely the guardians of the class from which they had arisen.

3. In the French and Russian revolutions the intellectual and educated class was responsible for the leadership of the respective revolutions, while the aristocrats and the clergy played an anti-revolution role. Whereas in the Islamic Revolution, the intellectuals affiliated to the left and right were in charge of leadership of the anti-revolution forces while the clergy played the main role of guiding the revolution.

4. In the French and Russian revolutions we do not come across a prominent figure that incorporates all the three special characteristics of leadership and from the point of view of ideology, leadership and post-revolution reconstruction possesses the ingenuity, talent and power such as in the leadership of the Islamic Revolution. In the French revolution, personalities such as Lafayette, Robespierre and Duc Durlain are of importance although none of them was in charge of the leadership of the revolution throughout the period of its formation and victory in a comprehensive manner.

Lenin was the prominent and outstanding figure of the Russian revolution. indeed, he was in possession of specific strengths, capabilities and ingenuities that had a principal and central role in realizing the October Revolution of 1917 whereas, he had absolutely no role in the downfall of the Romanov regime in February of the same year. Figures such as Zinoviyev, Kamenov, Stalin, Trotsky and Kernesky were not particularly well-known, but they also had no role in the downfall of the regime. In fact, the downfall of the Tsarist regime occurred as a result of a spontaneous movement that was devoid of leadership.

In brief, our studies show that neither in the French nor in the Russian revolutions, we come across a figure with the characteristics of an ideologue and commander of the revolution. None of the names mentioned, were either the revolution's ideologue or its commander; rather, they were builders and architects of the post-revolution governments. They were persons who rode on the wave of revolutionary changes after the collapse of the system and made an impact on the changes that occurred subsequently. In the Islamic Revolution, the Leader of the Revolution, Imam Khomeini, benefited from being the qualified religious authority. With the genius, power

and attributes which he possessed – that were unique in their own way – in the course of a quarter of a century, took over the role of ideologue, commander and architect of the Revolution and played it splendidly.

Ideology

The lone factor of legitimacy and solidarity in society and the system before the revolution of all three countries was the institution of monarchy, which had lost its credibility in the revolutionary situation. Therefore, the revolution's ideologies were charged with justifying and rationalizing the restructuring and exercising of executive power. Meanwhile, the aforementioned doctrines assisted the revolutionary elite to attain solidarity and organize the movement of the people towards political struggle.

Upon brief examination of the ideologies governing the revolutions under consideration, we find that Liberalism and Marxism in France and Russia respectively, with a materialist benefit for their followers, were based on a limited horizon in this world and solely from a single angle. They did not have an important role in toppling the monarchy in France and Russia. They were faced with problems even when implementing their own yardsticks after the collapse of the discarded systems, and made lots of changes in their own theoretical opinions. On the other hand, both the doctrines were alien to the people of France and Russia, while being in conflict with the ideological foundations of the common people who were generally religious. Thus, these ideologies were never able to provide the required raw material for organization, solidarity and unity of the various strata and mass of people of their respective societies and remained an ideology of only a specific class of intellectuals.

The religion of Islam, however, had arrived in Iran more than fourteen hundred years earlier, and people were acquainted with it. The majority of the people believed in it, had lived with it and it had deeply penetrated their lives. With regard to its divine global perspective, this doctrine offered a wide horizon to its followers, giving them glad tidings of a happy afterlife. It also provided necessary guidelines for the daily affairs of the individual and the community, directed towards securing material prosperity. In

particular, by benefiting from its necessary revolutionary essence, the Shiite school of thought had laid a totally favorable groundwork in the process of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

The French and Russian revolutions had revolted not only against the government; rather against the clergy and the church as well. In France, the church freed itself from under the jurisdiction of the Pope at the Vatican. In Russia, religion was rejected and humiliated. In the Islamic Revolution, the entire Shiite clergy revolted against the government and led the Revolution.

The ideological position of the Islamic Revolution was the value and hallmark of Iran's revolution. This ideology was a powerful response to the contemporary politicized wishes that had despaired of materialist doctrines. This ideology had a notable advantage over Communism, which was at loggerheads with religion. Instead of creating a new substitute for religion of the masses like Communism had done, it deployed the existing fervent religion that was equipped with the ideological tools required for the battle on the political front. With this action, it did a great and outstanding service to the world's history.

According to the American author Zagorin, if today, someone asked what factor was valid and what factor invalid in Marx's theory of revolution, the answer would be that his theory now belonged to the past. Lack of appropriateness of Marx's theory became evident when contrary to Marx's prediction, revolutions did not occur in the most advanced of western countries, and instead, socialism was carried out in the most backward agrarian communities – meaning Russia and China. With development of research on many revolutions, it was proven that because of its excessively naïve perception, the Marxist model was impractical and an impediment to greater understanding of revolutions.

Thus it is quite evident that the secret to victory of the Islamic Revolution can be sought solely in the magnitude, management and extensive level of application of the three pillars of the revolution i.e., people, leadership and doctrine. Thus, contrary to predictions of pundits, and to the astonishment of the world's inhabitants, it was able to bring the powerful and age-old monarchy to its knees and topple it altogether.

Victory of the French and Russian revolutions arose not as the result of solidarity, strength and power of the revolutionary forces; rather, it was due to the fundamental weakness of the regimes in power that intensely corroded the administrative setup. Military-economic crises and international pressures had exaggerated this weakness, making the collapse of the political system inevitable.

In fact, competing societal groups in an atmosphere arising from a vacuum of power and political sovereignty, arrived on the scene as the legitimate heirs to the collapsed system; and they began their activities and rivalry as revolutionary forces and grabbed power.[1]

In comparison with the French and Russian revolutions, the Islamic Revolution is certainly of a far greater magnitude.

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1. American writer Theda Skocaopol, after undertaking comparative studies on the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, concludes as follows:
"France, Russia and China had established empires that had the required capacities to sustain their superiority of the ruling class in the face of possible rebellions of the lower classes. Therefore, before a social revolution could take place, the military and executive powers of these governments had to fall apart. When the revolutions took place in France (1789), Russia (1917) and China (1947) it wasn't because the prudent and intentional actions towards such an objective had been taken by the revolutionaries or powerful political factions during the time of the former regime. Rather, revolutionary political crises occurred as a result of military and administrative collapse. These crises also appear when the imperial governments come under numerous pressures such as intense military rivalries, or exercising influence from abroad or inadequacies of political institutions. Considering that existing structures make it impossible to tolerate military and international pressures alongside revolutionary crises, the regimes become vulnerable in the face of crises."
The writer continues:
"The process of social revolutions in dependent countries takes shape under conditions that not only because of demand for military defense and claim in the face of potential and de facto foreign attacks; rather, they shall continue to be under the direct influence of military and economic assistances from abroad. Usually, such assistance is provided to emerging victorious revolutionary heroes by major foreign powers who are interested in influencing the formation and policies of the new regimes."

Victory of the Islamic Revolution astounded the political-academic circles. Based on their studies, concerning the past revolutions, they could never imagine such an incident to occur in Iran.

On this subject, Theda Skocaopol remarks:

"Collapse of the Shah's regime and beginning of Iran's revolutionary movement from 1977 to 1979, was a great surprise for foreign observers. From the friends of the Shah to journalists, political and social scientists, including those like me, who are so-called experts on revolutions – all of us watched the events of the Revolution with astonishment and disbelief. Above all, Iran's revolution was a phenomenon that was totally opposed to principle and nature. This revolution is definitely a social revolution. All the same, the process of the Revolution and in particular, the events that led to the downfall of the Shah, rejected the causes that we had mentioned in our comparative studies of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. Clearly, Iran's revolution was popular and changed the fundamental and basic cultural-social and economic-social relationships in Iran to such an extent that, truly, it is a specimen of great social-historical revolutions."[1]

Now, if we call the French and Russian revolutions great revolutions, what should we call the Islamic Revolution? If the Islamic Revolution is a genuine and true revolution, then what should we call the events that occurred in France and Russia? Apparently, Skocaopol's statement is true. The French and Russian revolutions came and were not developed. The Islamic Revolution of Iran did not come; it developed with regard to the status quo – that too, not easily. It deployed all facilities of the people throughout the country, from all social strata and classes, with strong leadership and payment of a high price - the martyrdom of tens of thousands of ardent supporters of the Revolution. It was for this reason that the victory of the Islamic Revolution astounded everyone.

1. Theda Skocaopol: "Rentior State and Shia Islam in the Iranian Revolution Theory", USA, Vol. No. 11.3, P. 284, 1982.

Conclusion

In this compilation, by presenting a suitable theoretical framework, an attempt was made to examine and analyze the Islamic Revolution in its various dimensions and at different periods; to state its grounds and ramifications briefly and in the end, to compare it in summary form with two of the world's great revolutions. Naturally, considering the volume of the book, it was not possible to discuss all angles and dimensions of this great historic event in detail, and brevity was observed in all fields. At the same time, few if at all, important issues were overlooked, and the readers directed to appropriate sources.

Our analyses of the Islamic Revolution are confined to the year 1997, and the end of the Revolution's second decade. We have not discussed the third decade, in particular, the changes that occurred in the domestic politics from the time that Mr. Mohammad Khatami was elected to the presidency, and discussed issues such as political development, establishing a civil society and dialogue among civilizations. Analyses and examination of this period requires sufficient passage of time so that the effects and implications of carrying out those plans become evident. Thus passing any kind of judgment and prediction on the subject would be premature.

The Islamic Revolution, despite the losses inflicted on it and the loss of a large number of its most faithful force has been able to withstand the blows resulting from internal and external plots. The Revolution has emerged more tempered, more glorious and more chaste from the cauldron of these events.

The chronology of incidents of these two decades may perhaps equal the chronology of incidents in a century of a volatile and eventful country. It is hoped that, one day, historians will publish these events in detail and analyze their aspects and dimensions.

Victory of the Islamic Revolution and the collapse of the Shah's regime and likewise, overcoming post-Revolution difficulties and tragedies, had widespread ramifications all over the world and

particularly in Islamic states. The big global powers were left, wondering how to cope with this amazing and novel phenomenon of the twentieth century. They were ultimately, forced to accept it as an undeniable fact.

Convening scientific seminars and conferences, political congregations in the west, and publication of articles and books on understanding and dealing with the Islamic Revolution has seen a daily increase, which itself reveals the focus and anxiety of the enemies of the Islamic Revolution. However, few of the friends and enemies of the Revolution doubt that the Islamic Revolution has stabilized and the Islamic Republic can no longer be defeated and toppled by plots, military coups, military aggressions, economic sanctions and other tried and trusted shenanigans of imperialism and global arrogance.

By accepting this reality, most countries of the world have regulated their political-economic relations on this basis and on the long-term survival of the Islamic Republic.

It seems that for the world's arrogant powers, the annihilation of the Islamic Republic system is no longer an issue; rather, what is important is how to contain and confine this Revolution to its own borders and prevent it from spilling across the border to other communities and neighboring states. However, they have not achieved any success on this issue as well. Nowadays, the phenomenon of the Islamic Revolution, which they call 'Islamic fundamentalism', poses a real threat to them. In Islamic countries, the only recognized way to combat and be liberated from the claws of colonialism and oppression is to follow Islam.

Of course, we must not be negligent of the factors that can, in the long-term, cause the Revolution's deviation and defeat in Islamic Iran. As the late Imam had repeatedly assured, this Revolution will not be defeated from abroad because of foreign aggressions and plots. One can dare claim that activities of the domestic anti-revolutionaries do not have the potential to directly, defeat the Revolution. However, this does not mean that domestic and foreign-based anti-revolutionaries have given up on long-term planning for defeating the Revolution. Rather, they shall strive to cause the Revolution to deviate from its main route and objectives.

Any Revolution can suffer from woes, which in the course of time result in decay from within. Especially when the revolution is transformed into a political system, the danger of being afflicted is far greater and indeed, more inevitable. Although the Islamic Revolution was necessarily, transformed into a political institution, but by simultaneously establishing a system called the Islamic Republic, it has maintained its revolutionary status and is moving ahead at the global level with dignity.

Nevertheless, negligence and indifference in the revolutionary struggle, and confrontation with its malady, can place any revolution with any amount of strength and success on the road to decline and downfall. Vigilance and care in identifying these maladies and in other words, pathology of the Islamic Revolution, is the duty of all officials of the system, as well as of every devoted follower of the Revolution.

Here it needs to be pointed out that accurate diagnosis of the Revolution's afflictions and woes needs carrying out an extensive and all out research, which is beyond the scope of this book. At the same time considering that without a brief mention of the major afflictions and maladies, the job of the writer of this book would remain incomplete, I deemed it necessary to discuss this topic briefly and in fact, in index form in the last section of the book.

Pathology of the Islamic Revolution

The basic condition for identifying the maladies of the revolution is to take note of the causes and factors of the revolution's triumph and strength, endurance and survival. On the other hand, the revolution's enemies, who have despaired of direct confrontation with this Revolution, shall spare no effort towards giving rise to and worsening the maladies of the Revolution. Thus, it is the duty of the supporters and administrators of the system to take steps towards accurate diagnosis of these afflictions and aim to fight and cure them. For greater understanding, we attempt to discuss these afflictions within the framework of the three pillars of the Revolution.

In terms of ideology

The revolution's ideology is the soul of the revolutionary society and gives it the required momentum and dynamism. Islam – particularly the Shiite doctrine of 'Ahlul Bait (Household of the Prophet of Islam (AS)), played the main role in the victory of the Islamic Revolution and its survival. Thus, preserving and strengthening its characteristic features and preventing permeation of ideas that can take away this power from the Revolution's doctrine must be the topmost priority of the revolutionaries' plans and duties. This is the very doctrine that the Imam has called 'the pure Muhammadan Islam'.

The afflictions that can infect this doctrine are of various types; and here we will discuss only a few of them.

Spreading apolitical Islam, decadent Islam and liberal Islam are among the afflictions and woes that must be countered sagaciously and their infiltration and influence prevented. At the same time one must not forget that with regard to the speed of change in scientific and technological conditions and with the proposition of new subjects and phenomenon, this religion must possess the necessary dynamism to enable it to respond to current issues and new phenomenon in the modern world. Any type of stagnation and disregard of modern realities of the time can cause the revolution's ideology to take on an

obsolete and reactionary state, and become backward. Fortunately, with the door to free investigation (Ijtihad) never being closed in the Shiite school of thought, there is this optimism that our theologians carry out their mission in this field like the late Imam had done and be competent guardians of the Pure Muhammadan Islam, which is the actual doctrine of the Revolution.

In terms of Leadership

One of the initiatives of Imam Khomeini for the Revolution was the principle of *Wilayat-e-Faqih*, or authority of the Islamic jurisprudent and establishing a political system based on it. The principle of authority of the Islamic jurisprudent is the Revolution's main column. Experience of the past two decades has confirmed that without this institution, nothing worthwhile would have remained of the Islamic Revolution and the system created from it. Any step or any interpretation aimed at weakening this principle will result in weakening the pillar of the Revolution's leadership and shall lead it towards decline. Experience of other revolutions has shown that with the death of the revolution's leader and because of lack of institutionalization of leadership, altercations among his successors have taken place and the revolution has been transformed in to an absolute dictatorship. However, in case of the Islamic Revolution, due to institutionalization of the principle of authority of the Islamic jurisprudent, the Imam's passing away did not make a dent in the pillar of leadership and this institution continued with its task by selecting the successor to the leader of the Revolution without wrangling and dispute.

The leadership of the system is not limited to the institution of *Wilayat-e-Faqih* or authority of the Islamic jurisprudent; rather, it embraces a setup of bureaucrats as well as political and religious elite. In particular, with regard to the undeniable role of the Islamic scholars and clergy in the Islamic Revolution, the vulnerability of these strata has a direct impact on efficiency and performance of the system, and on the relationship and trust between the people and the system's organizational setup. Any type of opulent lifestyle of the administrators of society, by obtaining special privileges for themselves and their families must be squashed. Administrative corruption, expansion and bloating of the administrative structure and

finally, infiltration of opportunist elements are among the afflictions that can facilitate the degeneration of the political system and cause the Islamic Revolution to gradually suffer the same fate that the Islamic administration suffered after the demise of the Prophet of Islam (SA).

In terms of the people

There is no doubt that widespread participation of the people on the scene of the revolution was among the crucial factors of victory and defusing the plots of the Revolution's enemies. The majority of the revolutions in modern history, despite the people's role in them, have after the revolution's victory, become devoid of people's involvement and the revolutionary system has been transformed into individual and protracted dictatorships. However, in case of the Islamic Revolution, despite the power and influence that he had and the fact that his words were final for the people, His eminence the Imam while guiding the people, maintained their presence on the scene and succeeded in institutionalizing it. This involvement has been maintained until this day, whether in terms of selection of the executives of the society, or deployment of the required forces on the warfronts to confront the domestic and foreign enemies and eliminate the incidental dangers, so that the people feel that the Revolution belongs to them. Any attempt that drives away the people from the political arena shall pose a serious threat to the Revolution.

History has shown that a lack of communication between two generations results in crises and causes problems for the society. The question of lack of communication and mutual understanding between two generations is among these problems, and there should be no difference between revolutionary communities. If the generation of the revolution is not able to transmit its revolutionary ideals and thoughts to the next generation that has no clear picture of the events before and after the revolution, it is faced with this crisis, and the enemy exploits this gap and causes the two generations to confront one another.

Lack of education and absence of continual information; permeated by easygoing and comfort-oriented thoughts, can create a rift between leaders and the people. The thought that the ruling system is neither,

serving them nor belongs to them, and the appearance of discrimination and injustice that cause class distinctions, are among the afflictions that can gradually transform a revolutionary society into a society consisting of indifference and ultimately, discontent human beings, and place them in direct opposition with the governing system.

However, there is no doubt that combating such a malady is not easy, but a continual and constant fight, whether individually or collectively, shall decrease the amount of dangers of these afflictions. Of course, it is the duty of the ideologues, elite and leaders of society not only to try and diagnose these afflictions; rather, to offer the treatment to combat and to eradicate them as well.

As was mentioned earlier, factors that have so far been responsible for the Revolution's victory and preservation, were a uniform presence of the people in the arena; emphasis on Islamic values and yardsticks and finally, obeying the leadership. Our nation must not be under the impression that now, since the Revolution has triumphed and it has overcome the domestic and foreign plots, their duty is over and they must perform their normal and routine tasks. One must bear in mind that the Revolution has not attained all its predetermined objectives inside and outside the Islamic state – and in particular, the cultural objectives. It is only the continual presence and follow-up of the Hezbollah (Party of God) that can help to achieve those objectives. Perhaps for one or two generations – and perhaps for always – it is necessary for our society to preserve its revolutionary state and morale so that the society can attain its revolutionary wishes. Therefore, the most important and most dangerous maladies of the Revolution can be assumed as being the absence of the people from the scene of political activity; lack of consistent follow-up in carrying out the ideological objectives of the Islamic Revolution, and, sowing discord and disagreement in the Revolution's leadership rank and file.

When the attendance to the weekly Friday congregation prayers reduces and thins out; when indifference is shown in relation to realizing Islamic criteria and symbols; when our government officials and leaders are overcome with the soul of carnality, and ambitions and material worship replace self-sacrifice and Islamic piety, it will

lead to the Revolution's deviation and defeat. Resignation and isolation of qualified and committed administrators seeking to be guiltless, is itself a malady of the Revolution. Such individuals, by having a sense of religious and revolutionary responsibility, must not be afraid of dealing with difficulties, impediments and creation of hostility, and must continue their active involvement; otherwise it would make it possible for opportunists, the incompetent and unqualified elements to penetrate the system.

One must not search for opportunism only in profiteering, tactful and capricious individuals, who change color every day, and safeguard their interests (Although this on its own is a dangerous malady and phenomenon). Rather, the infiltration of defeated and disgraced intellectual currents is itself a dangerous malady of a revolution. When these intellectual currents do not get the required results from direct confrontation and are vanquished, they promote and spread deviant thoughts by penetrating the ruling system and without revealing their true identity.

In our revolutionary Islamic society, there are two dangerous intellectual and deviant political currents of the left and the right (Marxism and Liberalism). Likewise, there are deviant religious currents, such as degenerate Islam, apolitical and opiate Islam present, which have been roundly defeated and their official organization either disintegrated or disgraced, but most of their leaders are adamant in their policy line and way of thinking. For their survival and existence and even for advancing their thought in the Machiavellian style, they not only deny being allied to any of the aforesaid intellectual currents; rather, they seek to distance themselves from them. However, in practice, they expand and promote their intellectual current in the name of the Revolution and in the name of Islam and seek recourse in Islamic yardsticks. Inclination to the right or to the left always poses a significant danger and can facilitate the Revolution's deviation and defeat in the long term.

To prevent the infiltration of such currents and ensure the Revolution's safety from any danger and deviation, the Revolution's intellectuals – especially the Islamic jurisprudents – have two principal and essential duties:

A. With revolutionary struggle and persistent efforts, they should clarify, explain and compile the different angles and aspects of Islam, considering the problems and intricacies of the times, so that they assist the authorities in drafting and implementing appropriate laws.

B. Identify precisely the characteristic features of deviant political-social currents and follow them up; and by presenting and introducing them, rid the society of the danger of their infiltration.

There are numerous unresolved issues in our societies. We will discuss them in a summarized manner.

Although with the acceptance of Resolution 598 and declaration of ceasefire, one must not forget that war with global arrogance is to continue until the total annihilation of global arrogance. The nation must not lose its state of readiness for sacrifice and martyrdom. For the Islamic Republic and the Revolution, this war was not only a question of repulsing aggression and seeking compensation for damages inflicted. It was an important test and experiment to neutralize one of the big plots of the Revolution's foreign enemies to cause the collapse of the Islamic Republic system and bring it to its knees. It played a significant role in analyzing the level of resistance, endurance and irreconcilability of the Revolution in the face of political, military and economic pressures brought on it.

Successive victories of the warriors of Islam, under the influence of faith and determination, self-sacrifice and martyrdom – especially the martyrdom seeking operations in Lebanon and Palestine has caused serious worries to the enemies of Islam. The subject of domination or balance of powers, formerly calculated on military might and weaponry, has confronted them with a new and unsolvable phenomenon.

The Islamic Republic must continue to use all its strength and capability to strengthen the military constitution and activity in the diplomatic arena in order to realize its wishes. It must expend its immense human and financial resources for this purpose, for it will certainly have special significance in further stabilizing and consolidating national capability in the region to realize its global objectives.

Parallel to it, solving basic economic problems is among the Revolution's priority issues. Eliminating economic and social injustices left behind by the oppressive *Taghut* regime and establishing a just Islamic economic order is still an issue, not seriously looked into, and its framework and programs not clarified and recognized. Why must the vast majority of society continue to be deprived of the minimum provisions of living, and the small minority of the rich and affluent benefit from all means and provisions, is a question that must ultimately be addressed. This is what the Supreme Leader has referred to as the fight against poverty, corruption and discrimination.

Solving the problems of rural areas and inhabitants that are the main producers of society's provisions, preventing their haphazard emigration to cities and solving the problem of ever-increasing and unplanned expansion of cities, are major issues for which no solution has yet, been found. Right now, more than half of Iran's population live in urban areas, and less than the other half live in rural settlements. Due to lack of availability of essential facilities they cannot secure their basic needs. Nevertheless, how can our country become self-sufficient in terms of strategic foodstuffs? The people's housing problem, the biggest headache of any family, which swallows the major portion of their income, is among the crucial welfare issues and a big problem of society.

Resolving the problem of administrative bureaucracy and reforming universities and educational institutions is among the extremely important issues that must be addressed.

Despite all its glories that we recounted, the Islamic Revolution was offered to us as a divine blessing and spiritual provision in the darkest moments of Iran's history. This Revolution is a Divine trust that God has favored us with, and reckoned us as deserving it from among all generations to the present generation and from among all societies and nations to our nation, to uphold and spread its ideals. Our nation too, by giving several hundreds of thousands of martyrs and having many injured; with its constant presence in the arena and its extensive participation in guarding it with all its might, has tried hard to overcome all impediments. The splendid daily-increasing victories of the Islamic Revolution have given sleepless nights to all the arrogant

powers. They fear that if this revolution is left in peace and given leeway to introduce an Islamic system, its appeal will cause not only the Muslims nations to be drawn irresistibly towards it but non-Muslim nations, that are disgusted and tormented by the world's status quo and bloc formations as well. They would have the choice to adopt a model that would make choosing any other besides it impossible. Therefore, arrogant powers will try hard to create headaches for the Islamic Revolution until certain defeat and total despair. They shall strive to topple it, by claiming that such a desired perfection, known as an Islamic system, is not practical, and that religion at its ideal level is a personal relationship with God, or at most, an official form of a government that is run by a Muslim ruler in a Muslim state.

One must be vigilant, lest any type of success of global arrogance in this field culminates in a big defeat for the Revolution, so that for years, rather for protracted centuries it would either lead to the defeat or nip in the bud any type of Islamic movement.

The people of Iran and its leaders have attained this opportunity to implement, within the modern and collective political framework, all that they expressed in their spiritual and moral opposition with the former system. Issues such as nature of politics and Islamic economy, social relationships and establishing Islamic justice in society, are issues that must be dealt with. Whereas, bourgeoisie-liberal western revolutions lean on personal freedom at the expense of social justice, and Marxist revolutions speak of establishing social justice at the expense of personal freedoms, the Islamic Revolution should be able to present a society to the world that does not sacrifice any one of them at the expense of the other.

The world of today is no longer the world of the pre-Islamic Revolution era. Today a new page has opened in Islam's history. The past glory of Islam shall return to it once again. The enemies of Islam shall engage in constant battle against it. Overcome with pride for their materialist power, they will not desist from hostility and conspiracy.

Although the downfall of the oppressive *Taghut* regime – and all that it represented – was achieved at the cost of tens of thousands of human lives, however when it is compared with the enormous plans

and objectives that lie ahead, it manifests a small success and shows us the beginning of the way.

Nowadays, the voice of the Muslim people with Islamic slogans fills the air in most parts of the Islamic world. The victory of the Islamic Revolution has encouraged the Muslim masses to choose a path that we have traversed. Any type of negligence in continuation of the path shall furnish the causes for their despair and lethargy. Therefore, the burden of success and defeat of other nations also rests on our shoulders and we must not be inattentive to it. This is when current Islamic governments, not only from the political, economic and military point of view, but from the ideological point of view, are attracted to the global arrogance's camp. The last hope of the enemies of the Revolution, and concern of the friends and supporters of the revolution, was the passing away of Imam Khomeini, the leader and founder of the Islamic Revolution from the scene of the Revolution.

However, the death of the Imam occurred in such a way that not turned the last remaining hopes of the enemies into despair, rather, it compelled the world to confess that this Revolution possessed a lot of strength, power and potential. With his actions, messages and large amount of writings, the last of which was his Final Political-Divine Will, the Imam left behind tradition, policy and instructions for his followers and supporters so that by leaning on them, they could distinguish and choose the genuine and righteous path.

The unprecedented funeral ceremony of the Imam, which the foreign media admitted, was attended by more than ten million mourners; the Assembly of Experts' speedy choice of His Eminence Ayatollah Khamenei as the Imam's successor and leader of the nation; the unanimous declaration of allegiance to the new leader, astounded the world. However, at the same time, it deepened the despair of the Revolution's enemies and showed that all their predictions were false, based on purely materialist analyses and perceptions.

The people of Iran were left mourning the loss of their leader and guide; and that blessed figure was no longer in their midst to give solace in times of crises and tragedies with his indescribable spiritual power, and not let society's internal differences cause the Revolution's pillars to weaken. However, the guidelines and traditions that His Eminence left behind, and the efforts of society's

leaders to continue on his path, give glad tidings to a revolutionary society.

In this writing, we have stated briefly and in general terms all that took place during the Revolution as grounds and ramifications; and what lies ahead of it and needs to be accomplished. Now, we must see what the duty of each one of us is, in relation to this divine blessing. What must we do so that we will have not only performed our duty; but, done our utmost to support the achievements of the Revolution and realize its lofty objectives.

What a knowledgeable Iranian Muslim should know is that at present, he is carrying the banner of the Revolution on his shoulders. He is the forerunner and leader of the global Islamic Revolution. This creates a heavy responsibility, so that any sort of negligence in understanding its depth and accepting its difficulties shall bring heavy retribution in its trail. The most important duty that rests on the shoulders of the current Iranian generation is to preserve this invaluable trust and legacy in a befitting manner. They should strive for its fulfillment and hand it over to the future generations. In order to have performed our duty as best as we could, we must take note of the following principles and apply them:

1. One must never lose hope and despair in the face of difficulties and sufferings; defeat and disruptions; conspiracies and deviant behaviors. With purely Divine motives, we should strive hard in the path of Islam and the Islamic Revolution by seeking recourse in the blessed Quranic verse, ("And those who strive in Our Path; certainly will We guide them in Our Ways…" Surah Al-Ankabut, Verse 69), succor from the Almighty Creator, and be confident of His assistance and support.

2. At the same time and more importantly than that, strive to purify our souls, which the Prophet of Islam (SA) had called "the greater Jihad." We should make it our number one priority, so that we can strive sincerely in the path of the Islamic Revolution like a capable and competent soldier.

3. Nowadays, for those who are aware of the depth of their heavy duties and responsibilities vis-à-vis the Islamic Revolution, undertaking any other task except engaging in the sacred struggle for

the Revolution is unpardonable. All our time, thoughts and plans must be devoted to realizing the objectives of the Islamic Revolution.

4. At no time and condition, under no circumstance of rumor-mongering, slandering, libel and these sorts of issues, should we leave the scene. We must not leave the field open for entry of opportunist, self-seeking, unfit and incompetent individuals by letting fatigue and pessimism to get the better of us. The constant and involved presence on the scene of struggle for the Revolution's faithful guarantees its preservation and success.

5. At the same time, the main objective of the Jihad and holy struggle must be to gain the consent of the Almighty Creator and discharge what the Imam had called "religious obligation." Therefore, we must not consider divine abstinence as a strategic objective; rather, we must place it as the number one objective of our struggle and living. We must neither sacrifice principle at the altar of superficial and fleeting successes, nor depart from the path of virtue and piety in order to achieve worldly successes.

6. By making our lives conform to Islamic yardsticks, we should create a prototype and model of an actively involved and revolutionary Muslim and try to match our words with our deeds.

7. We should lessen the burden on the revolutionary society by raising the level of our scientific knowledge and increasing our awareness. In this manner, while compensating for society's deprivation, we will be of greater assistance in realizing the Revolution's objectives.

Then, Almighty God shall assist us in carrying out our duties and obligations and ensure our success.

For surely there is no help other than from Allah.

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